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Abstract 
This paper aims to redress serious imbalances in the research on ginseng. 
Most accounts of ginseng treat it as an exclusively East Asian commodity, 
and are dominated by the natural sciences. Ginseng, however, was much 
discussed in England and America in the early modern period: the 
discussion encompassed not only botanical and medical interests, but also 
discourses on the commercial marketability of ginseng; ginseng was also an 
item that embodied European prejudices, symbolizing perceived ‘differences’ 
between the West and East. As such, ginseng was an ‘indigenous’ item of ‘the 
East’ that was much discussed in ‘the West’, but one that resisted 
assimilation into its systems of knowledge. 
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Introduction 
 
Early modern Europe experienced an unprecedented expansion of 
material culture through exploration, trade and colonialism.1 This new 
global era was largely initiated and proceeded with an ardent search for 
costly spices and valuable medicinal plants, 2  and historians have 
investigated the migrations and economic effects of such prominent items as 
tobacco, sugar, pepper, cloves, and tea. Recently a number of scholars began 
to pay attention to relatively less recognised medical plants such as the 
columba root, the cinchona bark and the peacock flower, investigating their 
natural and cultural significance.3 Paying close attention to the recent 
discussion on the ‘social life of things’, they also examine how these 
medicinal plants were traded and sold and acquired different identifications 
in various social settings. This paper, building on such research, examines 
ginseng, one of the less academically discussed medical plants which 
underwent a peculiar social life in the global market. 
The way ginseng entered the Western world was analogous to that of 
other spices and medical plants. The aura of mystery surrounding ginseng 
resembles how products such as sugar, coffee, and tobacco were once given 
credit as panaceas following their wide diffusion since ‘the discovery of the 
                                                   
1 Maxine Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury, Global History and British Consumer 
Goods in the Eighteenth Century’, Past and Present 182, 2004, 85-142; T. H. 
Breen, ‘An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of Colonial America, 
1690-1776’, Journal of British Studies 25, 1986, 467-499; Pratik Chakrabarti, 
Materials and Medicine: Trade, Conquest and Therapeutics in the Eighteenth 
Century, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2010. 
2  Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swan, eds, Colonial Botany: Science, 
Commerce, and Politics in the Early Modern World, Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 
3 Chakrabarti, Materials and Medicine, 172-175; Roberta Bivins, Alternative 
Medicine?: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 31-32; Londa 
Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic 
World, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004, chapters 3-4. 
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new world’. But unlike other materials mentioned above, the primary 
consumers of ginseng have been limited to East Asia well into the late 
twentieth century. Today’s academic interest on ginseng clearly reflects this 
glaring imbalance. While much research has been done on ginseng since it 
first became an academic subject in the 1950s—the relevant literature 
amounts to 7,000 articles—the studies on ginseng show a noticeable 
asymmetry in two aspects. First, as most of the research is concerned with 
the pharmacological effects of ginseng and conducted in the fields of science, 
there is a conspicuous lack of research in the humanities. Second, the 
literature is dominated by scholars of East Asian origin, who treat ginseng 
as an exclusively Asian commodity. As a result, countries such as the US or 
Canada have been largely excluded from the fields of research, despite being 
two of the largest producers of the plant. Similarly, it is difficult to 
understand how people perceived this particular commodity in America or 
Europe, where demand for this product has risen recently. 
This paper will focus on how ginseng was perceived in early modern 
England. The fact that England played a central role in the ginseng trade, 
and that it greatly influenced America’s subsequent discovery and export of 
ginseng, warrants foremost attention to England among all Western 
countries. The historical focus on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
is justified for two reasons. First, it was in the seventeenth century that 
ginseng was first introduced to Europe, and in the eighteenth century 
England was the major player in the global ginseng trade. This prominence 
was short-lived, however: circa 1798, America emerged as the most 
important exporter of ginseng to China, effectively driving England out of 
the trade market. The other reason for focusing on the seventeenth to 
eighteenth centuries is that an important work on ginseng, John H. 
Appleby’s ‘Ginseng and the Royal Society’ (1983), focuses on the same 
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period.4 Being one of the very few historical accounts of ginseng in early 
modern England, Appleby’s paper is of particular significance, although not 
without its limitations. As the paper’s historical focus is set after the 
establishment of the Royal Society, events that precede the 1660s are 
largely overlooked. In a similar vein, as it focuses on the discourse on 
ginseng conducted by the Fellows of the Royal Society (FRS), the object of 
discussion is confined to that particular academic circle. 
The aim of this paper is to broaden the scope of Appleby’s argument and to 
examine how ginseng was perceived and discussed in early modern England 
and colonial America. Its analysis incorporates the entire range of around 
two hundred printed materials relating to ginseng, published in England 
and America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: medical 
treatises, dispensatories, East India Company reports, botanical texts, 
geographical texts, topographies, almanacs, correspondences, travelogues, 
dictionaries, novels, poems, and advertisements. By utilising such diverse 
sources, this paper will focus on three defining features of the early modern 
discourse on ginseng—botanical interests and medical practices, 
international trade, and orientalism. 
 
 
Botanical Interests and Medical Practices 
 
It is generally accepted that ginseng was first introduced to Europe by the 
East India Company in the early seventeenth century. Despite a lack of 
detailed records, a close examination of the Company’s correspondences 
reveals that by 1611, English and Dutch5 vessels were already competing to 
                                                   
4 John H. Appleby, ‘Ginseng and the Royal Society’, Notes and Records of the 
Royal Society of London 37, 1983, 121-145. 
5 From early seventeenth century the Dutch smuggled and sold ginseng to the 
Japanese: William Mavor, Historical Account of the Most Celebrated Voyages, 
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procure ginseng. Interestingly, the central site of competition was the Cape 
of Good Hope, not someplace in Asia. In 1615, the natives of that port came 
and sold roots by the name of ningine6 and employees of the Company 
exchanged them for pieces of copper.7 The records show that the employees 
climbed nearby mountains in search of the root, but those they found were 
evidently smaller and less ripe than those brought by the natives.8 
In 1617, Richard Cocks, the head of the British East India Company 
stationed in Hirado,9 wrote to headquarters, reporting that the ginseng of 
‘Cape Bona Speranza’ was ‘worth nothing, [being] dried, [and] that no 
substance remained in it’. He continues: ‘Herewithal I send your Worships 
some of it, with another piece of that which is good and cometh out of Corea’. 
He also comments that ‘[ginseng] is [in Japan] worth the weight in silver, 
                                                                                                                          
Travels, and Discoveries from the time of Columbus to the present period, 25 
vols, London, 1798-1802, XV, 191-192. The historical records of early 
missionary activities of the United Brethren write, ‘Ginseng, a plant brought 
first from Corea to Europe by way of Japan, grows wild in North America. In 
China and other countries in Asia, this root is deemed an universal remedy, in 
every kind of disorder ... Formerly it was very dear, and sold in Holland for 
twenty-five florins a pound’. George Henry Loskiel, History of the Mission of 
the United Brethren among the Indians in North America, trans, Christian 
Ignatius La Trobe, London, 1794, 117. 
6 The term ‘ninzin’ comes from Japanese, written in Chinese as 人蔘, and in 
Japanese as にんじん. Ninzin, ningine, ninsi were all names used to refer to 
ginseng in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
7 ‘A root gathered in the Hottentot countries called kanna, is highly esteemed 
for its great virtues, that the Hottentot adore it ... Several authors have 
supposed this to be the ginseng of the Chinese’. John Payne, Universal 
Geography Formed into a New and Entire System, 2 vols, London, 1791, I, 
368; Thomas Salmon, Modern History: or, the Present State of All Nations, 31 
vols, London, 1725-1738, XXVII, 133.  
8 ‘In May, 1611, Pieter, who had instructed by the Company to seek it at the 
Cape on his outward voyage, met two Dutch ships ‘expressly come thither for 
the same purpose, being one of that first discovered the secret’. William 
Foster, ed., Letters Received by the East India Company, 6 vols, London: 
Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1896-1902, V, 18, footnote 2. 
9 Hirado is a city located in Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan. 
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but very little to be had in any common man’s hands, for that all is taken up 
for the Emperor by the King of Tushma, who only hath licence to trade with 
the Coreans; and all the tribute he payeth to the Emperor is of this root’. 
Cocks considered the roots of the Cape as identical to that of Korea, but 
inferior in quality due to the different process of collecting and curing.10 
Further information on ginseng comes from Jesuit missionaries who 
traveled through East Asia. The Jesuits, as befitting their reputation as 
conduits of knowledge of Asian goods and technologies, 11  played a 
significant role in introducing ginseng into European culture. Alvarus de 
Semedo (1585-1658), a Portugese priest who lived in China for 20 years, was 
the first European to discuss Chinese ginseng in detail, speculating that it 
grew around the Liaodong region. He describes ginseng as a tonic medicine 
considered by the Chinese to possess remarkable powers of aiding physical 
recovery. Ginseng is also mentioned in Martinius Martini’s book Bellum 
Tartaricum. These two books were subsequently bound together and 
translated in English in 1655, drawing many people’s attention to ginseng.12  
The first issue of the Royal Society’s official bulletin, The Philosophical 
Transactions contains an article that treats the subject of ginseng by 
Melchisédech Thévenot (1620-1692), a French natural philosopher and 
public official who was also an employee of the Dutch East India Company. 
After discussing the distinctive features of Chinese medical science, which 
employed herbs, trees, and stones, Thévenot describes the powerful effects 
of ginseng as revered by the Chinese. A medicinal herb so valuable that a 
                                                   
10 Foster, Letters Received by the East India Company, V, 17-18. 
11 Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, 116. 
12 Alvarus de Semedo, History of the Great and Renowned Monarchy of China, 
to which is added a History of the late Invasion and Conquest of the 
Flourishing Kingdom of the Tartars, with an Exact Account of the Other 
Affairs of China, trans, Thomas Henshaw, London, 1655. Athanase Kircher, a 
German Jesuit priest and mathematician, quotes Martini’s Atlas Sinesis 
(1655) in his La Chine Illustrée (1670), in which he mentions ginseng in great 
detail. 
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single pound is exchanged for three pounds of silver, ginseng is described as 
‘an extraordinary Restorative and Cordiall, recovering frequently with it 
agonising persons’.13 It was in this milieu that the natural philosophers in 
England would observe, experiment, and document on ginseng from the 
1670s.14 Such pursuits of the Royal Society would be justified by claiming to 
introduce new knowledge for the common good, i.e. commerce, science and 
national wealth.15 
Those particularly interested in ginseng brought the roots from China for 
their own collections and analyzed them. According to records from a Royal 
Society meeting on June 26th, 1679, Dr. Andrew Clench, along with 
vice-chairman Sir Christopher Wren, showed ginseng to the Society 
members, tasting the root and explaining its medical effects.16 It was during 
this era that botanical gardens, medical gardens and ‘cabinets of curiosities’ 
were spreading throughout Europe, many of which included ginseng among 
their primary collections.17  This phenomenon had to do with both the 
post-Renaissance intellectual milieu encouraging natural studies, and the 
fact that many plants brought from the New World to Europe were highly 
acclaimed for their medicinal value. The European elite of the seventeenth 
century, including monarchs, took an active interest in botanical and 
medical studies, which was occasioned by the increased likelihood of death 
due to frequent wars and plagues and supposedly ‘new’ epidemics caused 
                                                   
13 ‘Melchisedec Thévenot, Relations de divers voyages curieux, Paris, 1655,’ The 
Philosophical Transactions 1, 1665-1666, 249. 
14 See Appleby, ‘Ginseng and the Royal Society’, 122-126.  
15 See Chakrabarti, Materials and Medicine, 27. 
16 Thomas Birch, History of the Royal Society, 4 vols, London, 1756-1757, III, 
490. 
17 Anon, A Companion to Every Place of Curiosity and Enjoyment in and about 
London and Westminster, London, 1767, 93; William Curtis, A Catalogue of 
the British, Medicinal, Culinary, and Agricultural Plants, Cultivated in the 
London Botanic Garden, London, 1783, 44; Lady Charlotte Murray, The 
British Garden. A Descriptive Catalogue of Hardy Plants, Indigenous, or 
Cultivated in the Climate of Great-Britain, 2 vols, Bath, 1799, I, 241. 
8 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 6 (2017)  
 
from interactions with the New World.18 As Londa Schiebinger and Claudia 
Swan argue, botany was ‘big science’ and also big business which was 
‘enabled by and critical to Europe’s burgeoning trade and colonialism’.19 
Here botanical collections and gardens served not only as the seedbed for 
metaphysical and intellectual quests but also as the laboratory to 
experiment various missions for the idea of improvement which dominated 
British imperialism.20 
Hans Sloane (1660-1753), the King’s physician and a prominent collector 
who established the Chelsea Physic Garden, was known for his interest in 
ginseng and had over thirteen samples of ginseng in his collection. The 
Japanese ginseng seeds and leaves in his collection, in particular, 
contributed to his unrivalled reputation as an expert on Japanese ginseng.21 
Some of his samples were given to him as a gift from a high ranking official, 
and this fact testifies to the privileged status that ginseng enjoyed among 
the English elite. In the Catalogue and Description of the Natural and 
Artificial Rarities belonging to the Royal Society published in 1681, ginseng 
is mentioned as follows: 
 
The Root Ninzin, corruptly called Ginseng, Taken from a parcel sent 
over by a Chinese Physician ... divided, as often the Mandrake and 
some other Roots, into two Legs. Of a sweeth Taste ... The Root is not 
known to grow (wild) anywhere, but in the Kingdom of Corea, In which 
place, as also in Tunquin, China, and Japan, it is much used, and 
relied upon in Epilepsy, Fevers, and other both Chronick and Acute 
                                                   
18 The establishment of the Paris Royal Medicinal Garden in 1630 can be 
understood in a similar context. See Eugene Flaumenhaft and Mrs. Eugene 
Flaumenhaft, ‘Asian Medicinal Plants in Seventeenth-Century French 
Literature’, Economic Botany 36, 1982, 147.  
19 Schiebinger and Swan, ‘Introduction’, in Colonial Botany, 3. 
20 See Chakrabarti, Materials and Medicine, 127-131. 
21 Nat. Hist. Museum (BM), Botany Library, Sir Hans Sloane-Vegetables and 
vegetable substances, nos. 887, 12140 and 12141. 
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Diseases ... On China, accounted so great a Cordial, that one pound 
hereof, is there sold for three pounds (weight) of silver.22 
 
In 1713, a document that would make the most significant contribution to 
ginseng’s status in Europe was published: a report written by a French 
Jesuit priest Pierre Jartoux (1668-1720).23 In 1709, ordered by the Kangxi 
Emperor, Jartoux was travelling around the Manchu region to draw a map 
of China when he came across ginseng near the region bordering Korea. 
Jartoux writes that while relatively unknown in Europe, ginseng is 
acclaimed by the most prominent doctors of China and that they make it ‘an 
ingredient in almost all remedies’. Stressing the high value that the Chinese 
and Manchurians place on this root, Jartoux confesses that he himself had 
experienced its effects on a day that he was particularly exhausted, without 
so much the energy to mount a horse. He also tried tea made out of ginseng 
leaves and admitted to prefer it over other teas of the highest quality.24 
Jartoux’s documents provide a highly detailed botanic description of 
ginseng. He writes that ginseng only grows in 39-47 degrees north latitude 
and 10-20 degrees east longitude, in the shades of a mountain, among 
thousands of different plants. His book includes an illustration accompanied 
by a detailed account on the five leaves, stem, and root of ginseng. Regarding 
ginseng’s habitat, he criticises Martini’s claim that ginseng grows on a 
mountain near Beijing.25 Having never seen a ginseng flower himself, he 
adds that some people claim it to be small and white, while others claim that 
                                                   
22 Nehemiah Grew, Musaeum Regalis Societatis, London, 1681, 227. 
23  Letters of the Missionary Jesuits, Paris, 1713. Of Jartoux’s report, The 
Philosophical Transactions of 1713 extracted only those passages discussing 
ginseng, testifying to the contemporary interest of English scientists in the 
plant. 
24 ‘The Description of a Tartarian Plant, Call’d Gin-seng, with an Account of Its 
Virtues. In a Letter from Father Jartoux to the Procurator General of the 
Missions of India and China’, Philosophical Transactions 28, 1713, 237-247. 
25 Ibid., 246. 
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it doesn’t have flowers, and wonders which of the accounts is true.26 The 
book further explains that the Manchurians only value the root of the plant, 
that they bury it in the ground for 10-15 days before brushing its surface 
and fumigating it. Providing a detailed account of its processing method, 
Jartoux emphasises that if European doctors could closely examine its 
ingredients, and prescribe the right amount, ginseng would bring enormous 
medical advantages.27 
Another French Jesuit priest, Père Du Halde (1674-1743) was known for 
compiling a massive amount of records written and sent by other priests. 
Despite the fact that he himself had never been to China, Du Halde was 
regarded a prominent Sinologist thanks to his publication. Owing to the 
popularity of his book The General History of China, the information and 
myths about ginseng described in the book also came to spread wide across 
Europe: Ginseng is a ‘cure of all kinds of diseases which weaken and 
emaciate the body’; that its roots resemble the ‘hand, feet, visage and eyes of 
man’, or that it is full of the ‘spirit of nature’ and grows in the mountains of 
‘Corea, Leao tong, or Pe tsi’. The book notes that Japanese ginseng is being 
circulated in the market as well, but it was considered to be of inferior 
quality. According to Du Halde, ginseng was considered ‘a great duty to the 
Emperor’ and it was sold at six times the price of silver in Beijing. Those 
who didn’t meet this duty were subjected to harsh penalties, including 
capital punishment. He mentions a method of identifying ‘true ginseng’, 
which has two people walk two kilometers on foot, each with a root in his 
mouth. The person that appears relatively composed, against the other who 
runs out of breath, is considered the person holding the true ginseng. The 
comprehensive information on ginseng provided in Du Halde’s book runs the 
whole gamut of its cultivation process, taste, medical effect, curing method, 
                                                   
26 Ibid., 244. 
27 Ibid., 238, 246. 
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medical uses for 77 different diseases, and ways to mix it with other medical 
ingredients.28 The influence of Du Halde’s book was such as to trigger 
extensive searches of ginseng or similar plants across the world. In The 
Natural History of Norway (1755), the author makes a reference of a certain 
type of berry by the name of ‘Norway teyobaer’ as closely resembling Du 
Halde’s description of ginseng.29  
Having once visited Canada, Jartoux writes that ginseng is highly 
selective in its habitat, and speculates that perhaps the only other place in 
the world that would produce ginseng might be Canada.30 This statement is 
to be understood in light of the search, in eighteenth-century Europe, of 
cheap substitutes for expensive oriental luxuries: the colonies proved fertile 
ground for these pursuits.31 After reading Jartoux’ article in the Jesuit 
newsletter, Joseph François Lafitau (1681-1746), another French priest, 
came to discover in 1716 a similar plant between Montreal and Ottawa, 
45.31 degrees north latitude. In his Mémoire (1718) published in Paris, 
Lafitau writes that this may be the plant that Jartoux mentioned, and 
expresses his astonishment at how the name the Iroquois use to refer to the 
plant is etymologically similar to the Chinese name for ginseng.32 From this 
parallel, Lafitau became certain in his belief that either the two continents 
were in close cultural contact or that they were originally a single continent. 
                                                   
28 Père [Jean-Baptiste] Du Halde, The General History of China, 4 vols, London, 
1736, IV, 1-21. 
29 Erich Pontoppidan, The Natural History of Norway, London, 1755, 133. 
30 ‘The Description of a Tartarian Plant, Call’d Gin-seng’, 240. 
31 Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, 134. 
32 J. F. Lafitau, Mémoire ... concernant la précieuse plante du gin-seng de 
Tartare, découverte en Canada, Paris, 1718. Peter Kalm also notes that ‘The 
Iroquese, or Five (Six) Nations, call the Ginseng roots Garangtoging, which it 
is said signifies a child, the roots bearing a faint resemblance to it; but others 
are of opinion that they mean the thigh and leg by it, and the roots look pretty 
like it’. Peter Kalm, Travels into North America, trans, John Reinold Foster, 3 
vols, London, 1770, III, 115-116. 
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If not that, then at least the Bering Sea would have served as a bridge 
connecting the two continents.33  
Based on the writings of Jartoux and Lafitau, English and French 
intellectuals would engage in a lively discussion on the botanic features of 
ginseng. 34  Peter Collinson (1694-1768), another prominent English 
naturalist alongside Sloane, exchanged correspondences on ginseng with an 
American planter and naturalist, William Byrd (1674-1744), which 
subsequently led to a vigorous discussion among the American literate class. 
The role that John Bartram (1699-1777), the first American botanist whose 
genius was acknowledged even by Carl von Linné (1707-1778), played in this 
is no less significant than that of Byrd. Not only did he discover ginseng in 
eastern Philadelphia,35 he was appointed as the personal botanist of George 
III and was given the responsibility of actively corresponding with many 
English scholars and of sending objects of natural-historical value to 
                                                   
33  Subsequent articles also considered the presence of ginseng in North 
American ginseng as evidence that the two continents were once connected. 
See Jean Bernard Bossu, Travels through that Part of North America 
Formerly Called Louisiana, trans. John Reinhold Forster, 2 vols, London, 
1771, I, 386-391; Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and 
West Florida, 2 vols, New York, 1775, I, 53-54. ‘The Tartars of Mantchou are 
incontestably the ancestors of the Peruvians … A plant resembling the 
ginseng of the Chinese grows in Canada, therefore the Chinese carried it 
thither, even before they were masters of that part of Chinese Tartary where 
their ginseng is produced’. Voltaire, The Works of M. Voltaire, trans, Tobias 
Smollett, 25 vols, London, 1761-1765, XII, 91. 
34 An article titled ‘A new genus of plants, call’d Araliastrum, of which the 
famous ninzin or ginseng of the Chinese, is a species. Communicated by Mr. 
Vaillant, Praedemonstrator at the Royal Garden at Paris, to the Learned Dr. 
Will. Sherrard, LL. D., late Consul at Smyrna, and by him to the Royal 
Society’ was published in The Philosophical Transactions of 1717. Another 
important document is Père [Noël] Regnault, Philosophical Conversations: or, 
a New System of Physics, trans and ed, Thomas Daly, 3 vols, London, 1731, 
III, especially at 38. It synthesises various discussions by intellectuals on 
ginseng, including Lafitau’s discovery. 
35 ‘Extracts from the Gazette, 1738’, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 41 
vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959-2014, II, 209–217. 
The Perception of Ginseng in Early Modern England  13 
 
England. As T. H. Breen emphasises, England was America’s mother 
country, and knowledge and materials were exchanged within the frame of 
this Atlantic Empire.36 
By 1740, Collinson was growing the ginseng he brought from 
Pennsylvania at Peckham Garden, 37  and in 1769, John Fothergill 
(1712-1780) also notes that the ginseng sent by Bartram are growing well in 
his famous Upton Garden at Essex.38 Both Collinson and Fothergill were 
ultimately interested in the cultivation and trade of ginseng. Ginseng was 
also being cultivated in Oxford’s and Edinburgh’s botanical garden around 
this time, and it also appears in the list of ‘currently blossoming plants’ of 
London’s Pleasure Garden in 1757.39 On the other hand, Philip Miller 
(1691-1771), a botanist of Chelsea Garden, was not as fortunate as his 
colleagues when he tried to grow ginseng roots brought from Maryland. 
According to Miller, the plant successfully blossomed and its seeds were 
impeccable, but the plant wouldn’t sprout. He waited for three years without 
disturbing the ground, but to no avail.40 
The trans-Atlantic correspondence would continue. While American 
naturalists claimed that their ginseng had equivalent medical effects to 
those of the Chinese, English scholars considered American ginseng to be 
inferior to the latter.41 Tobias Smollett(1721-1771), a doctor as well as 
novelist and critic, for instance, in his The Expedition of Humphry Clinker 
has Mr. Bramble express his doubt as to whether the North American 
                                                   
36 Breen, ‘An Empire of Goods’.  
37  R. Hingston Fox, Dr. John Fothergill and His Friends: Chapters in 
Eighteenth-century Life, London: Macmillan and Co Ltd., 1919, 197. 
38 ‘J. Fothergill to J. Bartram, 1 May 1769’, in Memorials of John Bartram and 
Humphrey Marshall, ed, William Darlington, Philadelphia, 1849, 339.  
39 Philip Miller, The Gardener's Kalendar, 11th edn, London, 1757, 215. 
40 Anon, Encyclopaedia; or, a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous 
Literature, 18 vols, Philadelphia, 1798, VIII, 689-690. 
41 John Payne, Geographical Extracts, Forming a General View of Earth and 
Nature, London, 1796, 336. 
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ginseng he procured from London would have the same effect as Chinese 
ginseng imported by the East India Company.42 M. Brunel records that 
Canadian ginseng is considered ‘not only inferior in point of colour, scent, 
and transparency, but equally deficient in its virtues and properties’.43 An 
English doctor, William Lewis (c.1708-1781), however, compared American 
ginseng with that which he received from Nanjing, and claimed that there 
was little difference in their material quality, except that the Chinese 
ginseng was ‘paler coloured’ in the outside and whiter in the inside. 
Concluding that the difference in effect comes from the preparation process, 
Lewis expresses his doubt as to how American ginseng that wasn't subjected 
to the same process could be accepted as equal in quality.44 Thenceforth the 
curing methods of ginseng, particularly that of the Chinese, attracted large 
scholarly attention. As Maxine Berg points out, the global interconnections 
of trade offered opportunities to learn desires for new goods. 45  On 11 
November 1773, a paper titled ‘The method of Preparing the Gin-seng Root 
in China’ was read at the Royal College of Physicians in London.46 Although 
there were ongoing discussions on the processing methods of Chinese 
ginseng, it appears that the scholars weren’t able to draw a satisfactory 
solution. A rather pessimistic comment expresses that ‘we cannot preserve 
                                                   
42 Tobias Smollett, Humphry Clinker [1771], London: G. Routledge & Co, 1857, 
31. 
43 M. Brunel, ‘A Memoir on the Chinese Trade’, in Abbé Alexis Rochon, A Voyage 
to Madagascar and the East Indies, trans, Joseph Trapp, London, 1793, 378. 
44 William Lewis, An Experimental History of the Materia Medica, 2 vols, 
Dublin, 1769, I, 393. 
45 Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, 103. 
46 The title of the article is ‘The method of preparing the Gin-seng Root in 
China, Communicated by Dr. Heberden’. Medical Transactions, published by 
the College of Physicians in London, 3 vols, London, 1768-1775, III, 34-36. 
Also see Matthew Carey, ed., The American Museum, or Repository of Ancient 
and Modern Fugitive Pieces, 7 vols, Philadelphia, 1787-1790, II, 448; ‘J. 
Banks to H. Marshall, 5 April 1786’, in Darlington, Memorials of Bartram and 
Marshal, 559-560. 
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any root as [the Chinese] do Ginseng’.47  
Due to the constant discovery of new varieties, natural philosophers were 
at a loss as to how to categorise ginseng in botanical terms for quite some 
time. Even the renowned natural historian John Ray (1627-1705), provides 
a description of ginseng in his famous Historia Plantarum (1688) without 
any precise information of the plant.48 After Lafitau’s discovery of Canadian 
ginseng, English and French scientists often remarked that there were 
three varieties of Ginseng: first, Korean and Chinese; second, Japanese; and 
third, Canadian. In 1700 an eminent Canadian botanist, Michel Sarrazin 
(1659-1734), sent Canadian ginseng to the French Royal Garden, labeling it 
as Araliastrum, and classified it into three different varieties.49 In 1753 
Linné, after systematically describing Canadian ginseng, defined it as 
Panax genus quinquefolius of the Araliaceae family.50 In an encyclopedia 
published in 1798, the Panax Ginseng was sub-classified into five different 
groups. 
 
1. Quinquefolium. 2. Trifolium. 3. Fruticosum 4. Arborea 5. Spinosa. 
The first and second are natives of North America. The quinquefolium 
is generally believed to be the same with the Tartarian ginseng.51 
 
                                                   
47 John Hill, Valerian or, the Virtues of that Root in Nervous Disorders, 2nd edn, 
London, 1758, 17. 
48  ‘Cap. XX. Radix Ninzin Pisonis Mantis. Arom. Quibusdam Ginseng & 
Gensing’, in John Ray, Historia Plantarum, 2nd edn., London, 1688, 1338. 
49  The Philosophical Transactions 30, 1720, 705-707. ‘1. Araliastrum 
Quinquefolii folio, majus, Nin—zin vocatum Dr. Sarrazin. Gin-seng. 2. 
Araliastrum Quinquefolii folio, minus. Dr. Sarrazin. 3. Araliastrum Fragraria 
folio, minus. D. Vaillant’. 
50 John Abercrombie, The Propagation and Botanical Arrangements of Plants 
and Trees, 2 vols, London, 1784, II, 456; J. Gordon, T. Dermer, and A. 
Thomson, A Catalogue of Trees, Shrubs, Plants, Flower Roots, Seeds, London, 
1783, 68. 
51 Anon, Encyclopaedia, VIII, 689, s. v. ‘ginseng’. 
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In 1842, a Russian botanist, Carl Anton Meyer, classified five different 
variables of ginseng,52 labeling the real ginseng (Korea ginseng) as the 
‘Panax ginseng C. A. Meyer’. With Meyer, the long debate on ginseng’s 
taxonomy would come to a close.  
Another botanical debate during this period was the distinction between 
‘ginseng’ and ‘ninzin’. While many documents treated the two as identical, 
there were also efforts to distinguish them. One of the main figures who 
were especially interested in this matter was John Hill (1714-1775), English 
botanist and author of many scientific works. In his History of the Materia 
Medica (1751), Hill claims that ginseng grows in shady mountains, 39-47 
degrees latitude, in America and Korea as well as Manchuria. Arguing that 
the ‘Ginseng of Corea’ is bigger but hollower, he claims that the reason 
Korean ginseng is inferior in quality is because it is actually a different root 
called Ninzin.53 In his chapter devoted to Ninzin, Hill identifies it as an 
umbelliferous plant and writes that the Chinese or Japanese ‘attribute to it 
all the virtues of the ginseng, but they acknowledge that it possesses them 
in a less degree’.54  
There are other documents that attempt to further elaborate on the 
difference between the two: ‘Ninsi, or Ninzin is a larger Root, oblong, 
whitish on the outside and yellowish within, less firm than the Ginseng, and 
less bitter in the Taste’.55 Another document that analyzes the difference in 
ingredients remarks that despite the fact that ‘Ninzin or Nindsin has been 
commonly supposed a name synonymous to ginseng’, recent research 
                                                   
52 According to Meyer, Panax quinquefoliate grows in North America, Panax 
trifoliate in North America and Canada, and ‘real ginseng’ in the middle of 
Heilong River, east to the island of Sakhalin and Japan, and south to the 
southern parts of Korea, and the Shanxhi and Hebei provinces in China. 
53 John Hill, History of the Materia Medica, London, 1751, 590. In another 
document, Hill writes that ginseng and ninzin were often used in fraud. Hill, 
The Vegetable System, 26 vols, London, 1759, V, 25. 
54 Ibid., 593.  
55 James Millar, A New Course of Chemistry, London, 1754, 89.  
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reveals that they are in fact different plants cured in a similar way. 
Indicating that Ninzin has a ‘weaker virtue’, the author is confident that 
this is also the case with American Ninzin.56 The effort to distinguish the 
two was especially active in the pharmaceutical field, most likely because it 
was a highly sensitive issue to those who prescribed and sold ginseng. It 
appears that the confusion between Ninzin and Ginseng was prompted by 
‘the interest of the seller’.57 The comment that Ninzin was provided to the 
pharmacists at a ‘much smaller price than Ginseng’ 58  supports this 
speculation.  
How frequently was ginseng used in the medical field in England during 
this period? A pamphlet anonymously published in 1680 records over ten 
successful medical cases that were treated by ginseng.59 Its author, a doctor 
living in Hull, Yorkshire, proudly remarks that his success was based on a 
bundle of ginseng he had received as a gift. He describes how his patient Mr. 
Andrew Marvell, a famous poet and critic, was previously suffering from a 
‘long hectick feaver, with an ulcer of the lungs’ and how this ‘perfect 
skeleton, a mere bag of bones’ came to regain weight and successfully 
recover from his illness when he drank a mix of ginseng tincture with red 
cow’s milk every day.60 The pamphlet ends with a comment from the 
famous natural philosopher Robert Boyle (1627-1691): ‘Mr. Boyle once told 
me, he thought it [ginseng] was a medicine sent from heaven, to save the 
lives of thousands of men, women and children’.61 
Samuel Stearns (1741-1810), an American doctor who practiced in 
Massachusetts, often prescribed ginseng for the treatment of ‘coughs and 
                                                   
56 Lewis, Experimental History of the Materia Medica, I, 393.  
57 Hill, History of the Materia Medica, 590. 
58 Ibid. 
59  Anon[William Simpson], Some Observations Made upon the Root called 
Nean, or Ninsing, Imported from the East-Indies, London, 1680. 
60 Ibid., 3-4. 
61 Ibid., 7. 
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other disorders of the longs’ testifying to its effectiveness. He recommends 
the taking of ‘a drachm, in slices or powder, [boiled] in a gill of water, and 
sweetened with sugar, [drinking it] as soon as it is cool enough’ every 
morning and night. 62 In fact, many pharmacopoeias or dispensatories 
recommend the intake of ginseng.63 A case in point:  
 
Ginseng, P. E. 
Panax Quinquefolium. Linn. Ginseng: a small plant growing in 
Tartary, China, and North America 
Part Used: the root 
Sens. Prop: Mucilaginous, with sweetness, bitterishness, and some 
aromatic warmth 
Med. Virt: Tonic, obtunding 
M. Exhib: Power, Infusion, Extract.64 
   
There is also published evidence of an advertising pamphlet on a medicine 
made out of ginseng. It shows ‘Dr. Anthony’s Irish Pills’ as a patent 
medicine made with ginseng ingredients which was thought highly effective 
for stomach disorders. 65  Another pharmacopoeia recommends infusing 
ginseng three times when preparing it for medicine.66 Meanwhile there 
                                                   
62 Samuel Stearns, The American Oracle, London, 1791, 584. 
63 H. Boerhaave, Boerhaave's Treatise of the Materia Medica, London, 1739, 41; 
John Nott, A Posologic Companion to the London Pharmacopoeia, London, 
1794, 41-42; Royal College of the Physicians of London, The New 
Pharmacopoeia of the Royal College of Physicians of London, trans, Thomas 
Healde, 7th edn, London, 1796, 29; Richard Brookes, The General 
Dispensatory, 3rd edn, London, 1773, 42; William Buchan, Domestic 
Medicine, 15th edn, Dublin, 1797, xxxvi; John Elliot, The Medical 
Pocket-book, 3rd edn, London, 1791, 12, 78, 91; The London Practice of Physic, 
London, 1769, 84, 127; Robert James, Pharmacopoeia Universalis: or, A New 
Universal English Dispensatory, 3rd edn, London, 1764, 164. 
64 John Aikin, A Manual of Materia Medica, Yarmouth, 1785, 80. 
65 Michael Devlin, Pillula salutaris; Or, the justly celebrated Dr. Anthony's Irish 
pills, London, 1790, 1. 
66 Pierre Pomet, Pomet’s General History of Drugs, 4th edn, 2 vols, London, 
1748, II, 195.  
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appear some records of unsuccessful instances of treatment with ginseng. A 
patient with genital ulcer, for instance, was prescribed with herbal medicine 
made out of hemlock and ginseng, but his medical conditions worsened after 
the treatment.67 There are also reports of ginseng being ineffectual for 
patients with venereal infection.68  Nevertheless, these cases invariably 
testify to the fact that ginseng was used for medical purposes during this 
period. The usage of ginseng also appears outside the immediate scope of 
medical discourse. Smollett’s picaresque novel The Expedition of Humphry 
Clinker includes a passage in which ginseng is prescribed as medicine. In 
this episode, a patient in distress takes a ‘tincture of ginseng’ prescribed by 
the doctor and claims that he ‘found it exceedingly grateful to the 
stomach’.69 
Nevertheless, the range of usage or the frequency of application is difficult 
to determine. This is especially so considering the fact that ginseng was 
often used without official prescription. For instance, Byrd once wrote that 
he would chew on ginseng roots to ‘help bear the fatigue’, when he was on 
the task of surveying land to solve an old territorial dispute between 
Virginia and North Carolina. However, even for Byrd, the ginseng expert, 
this plant was not so easy to come by. He complains that while ginseng 
‘cheers the heart even of a man that has a bad wife’, it grows ‘sparingly as 
truth and public spirit’.70 It demonstrates that even medical practitioners 
themselves did not have ready access to ginseng. At one point, ginseng’s 
medical use was highly restricted due to its low supply. Lewis, in his The 
New Dispensatory, expresses his hope that although China had banned the 
                                                   
67  Franz Swediauer, Practical Observations on the More Obstinate and 
Inveterate Venereal Complaints, London, 1784, 98-99.  
68  George Wallis, Annual Oration, delivered March 8th, 1790, before the 
Medical Society, London, 1790, 53-54. 
69 Smollett, Humphry Clinker, 123. 
70 John Spencer Bassett, ed, The Writings of Colonel William Byrd of Westover 
in Virginia, New York: Doubleday, Page & Co, 1901, 211. 
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export of ginseng due to its immense value, the discovery of ginseng in 
North America would yield a more stable supply.71 In a similar vein, there 
are records of ginseng not being easily prescribed because of its price. 
William Cullen(1710-1790), David Hume’s physician and a key figure in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, explicitly states that while ginseng ‘has now for 
many years been well known in our shops, the great price put upon it by 
them, would ever have engaged our attention to it as a medicine’.72 The 
Edinburgh New Dispensatory writes under the entry of ginseng that ‘among 
us it has been very rarely made use of’ due to its ‘great price’.73 
The wild fluctuations in the price of ginseng also invited many 
complaints. In Humphrey Clinker, a character complains that in the span of 
six months, a store changed its price for ginseng ‘from sixteenth guineas for 
two ounce to five shillings per pound’.74 The medical account below shows 
another problem pertaining to the prescription and circulation of ginseng: 
 
Hence apothecaries are necessitated to sell plants which they have had 
by them many years, and which have lost all their vertues ... the root of 
ginseng, tho’ a great restorative, being so very costly, is seldom 
prescribed; and when it is, it generally has lost its properties thro’ age. 
For which reason we ought to contrive methods of cultivating it 
ourselves ... But we would not be understood as if in all cases we prefer 
the cultivated plants to the wild ones.75 
 
Meanwhile, there existed two common precautions regarding ginseng 
prescription. One is that its overdose may lead to critical consequences, 
                                                   
71 Lewis, The New Dispensatory, Dublin, 1782, 146.  
72 William Cullen, A Treatise of the Materia Medica, 2 vols, Edinburgh, 1789, II, 
161. 
73 Lewis, The Edinburgh New Dispensatory, Edinburgh, 1789, 194. 
74 Smollett, Humphry Clinker, 31.  
75  Benjamin Stillingfleet, trans and ed, Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to 
Natural History, Husbandry, and Physick , London, 1759, 179. 
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despite its beneficial medical effects. This is a recurring warning, traceable 
even to a 1617 correspondence of an East India Company employee 
presiding in Japan.76 A further comment states that ‘The rich confine 
themselves to take a small dose of it every morning, not heavier than a 
grain of corn’.77 The other advice is not to prescribe ginseng to young or 
sanguineous people.78 This advice is in tandem with the common knowledge 
that ginseng increases body temperature and has optimal effect on old 
people of feeble health. 
 
 
International Trade 
 
Another discourse pertinent to the discussion of ginseng appears in the 
area of international trade. Especially with the discovery of ginseng in 
North America, a dramatic increase of discourse on ginseng’s international 
exportation can be witnessed. Those who first recognised the commercial 
potential of exporting American ginseng to China were the French fur 
traders. Records show that from an early stage, they often used ginseng 
roots to treat diseases such as asthma or stomach disorder for themselves, 
and often took it to enhance fertility.79 Dutch traders, also realising the 
potential profit of exporting ginseng to the East, joined the rush and 
mobilised Indians to search the mountains of Canada and America. 
The aforementioned botanists Bartram and Fothergill also began their 
search for viable ways to commercialise ginseng. Collinson, who was in close 
                                                   
76 William Foster, Letters Received by the East India Company, V, 17-18. 
77 Abbé Rochon, A Voyage to Madagascar and the East Indies, 379. 
78 Ibid.; Hill, History of the Materia Medica, 591; Temple Henry Croker et al., 
The Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 3 vols, London, 1765-1766, II, 
s. v. ‘foeniculum’, and ‘ginseng’. 
79 Kalm, Travels into North America, III, 116. 
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contact with both, not only had the ambition to cultivate ginseng on English 
soil, but used his commercial background and international connections to 
sell American ginseng in the Chinese market. In 1739, Collinson succeeded 
in shipping ginseng to China, and requested Bartram to prepare the 
products for the next shipment. For Collinson, American and Chinese 
ginseng were similar enough to ensure a successful trade. Nevertheless, he 
entreated Bartram to keep secret the fact that the ginseng sent to China 
were originally from America, promising in return to yield all his profits 
from that particular trade.80  
Bartram continued to send his ginseng to Collinson in 1743-1744, and 
Collinson was able to make a huge profit by selling them in China. It 
appears that the Chinese ginseng dealers were willing to purchase 
American ginseng at unreasonably high prices in spite of its inferior quality. 
This was most likely because it was still cheap when compared to Chinese 
ginseng. It was well known, even to the Europeans themselves, that the 
quality of the American ginseng was not as good as its Chinese counterpart. 
Robert Dodsley, cataloguing the collections of the British Museum in 1762, 
commented that ‘The Chinese do not esteem that which grows in America, 
valuing only their own’.81 In 1753, The Gentlemans’ Magazine reports that 
while it is good news that the North American colonies of England are 
producing ginseng, it must be ‘collected [at] a proper season and cured [in] 
the Chinese manner’ in order to yield more profit in the future.82  
In 1747, a large quantity of wild ginseng was discovered in Stonebridge, 
Massachusetts, which subsequently led to a ginseng rush across America, 
                                                   
80 ‘P. Collinson to J. Bartram, 1 February 1738-39’; ‘P. Collinson to J. Bartram, 
24 February 1738-39’, in Darlington, ed, Memorials of Bartram and Marshall, 
125-127.  
81 Robert Dodsley, The General Contents of the British Museum, London, 1762, 
156. 
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which was comparable to the nineteenth-century Gold Rush to the West. 
American geographical writings, travelogues, almanacs, and even textbooks 
would report, in the fashion of newspapers publishing a scoop, that ginseng 
had been discovered in states including Massachusetts, Virginia, 
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, South 
Carolina, and Georgia. Regions where ginseng was discovered were busy 
promoting it as a local specialty or a typical export item.83 The ginseng rush 
eventually spread to the west of the Appalachians, and Americans 
complained that the process brought about the moral hazard of American 
Indians who collected the roots. Some workers refused to attend church; 
others used the money they earned from ginseng to indulge in delinquent 
activities.84  
By the 1780s, English merchant ships that chose a sea route passing 
through the American West Coast opened up new opportunities to collect 
and export ginseng from the North-West regions of America, including 
Alaska.85 One observer remarks: ‘The ginseng of this part of America is far 
                                                   
83 Peter Whitney, The History of the County of Worcester, in the Commonwealth 
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preferable to that of the Eastern side, and approaches nearer to that of 
China’. 86  However, as this new wave of enthusiasm led to reckless 
exploitation, there was increasing criticism concerning the extinction of this 
plant. In many regions, it was already impossible to find ginseng roots 
anymore. Canada in the mid-eighteenth century shows one such example: 
 
During my stay in Canada, all the merchants at Quebec and Montreal, 
received orders from their correspondents in France to send over a 
quantity of Ginseng, there being an uncommon demand for it this 
summer. The roots were accordingly collected in Canada with all 
possible diligence; the Indians especially travelled about the country in 
order to collect as much as they could together, and to sell it to the 
merchants at Montreal. The Indians in the neighborhood of this town 
were likewise so much taken up with this business, that the French 
farmers were not able during that time to hire a single Indian, as they 
commonly do, to help them in the harvest. Many people feared lest by 
continuing for several successive years, to collect these plants without 
leaving one or two in each place to propagate their species, there would 
soon be very few of them left; which I think is very likely to happen, for 
by all accounts they formerly grew in abundance round Montreal, but 
at present there is not a single plant of it to be found, so effectually 
have they been rooted out. This obliged the Indians this summer to go 
far within the English boundaries to collect these roots.87 
 
Many American regions were facing a similar problem. At Joseph Banks’ 
request from England, Humphrey Marshall of Pennsylvania travelled west 
to Chester County in 1786 to obtain one hundred pounds of ginseng for 
                                                                                                                          
with the North-West Coast of America, for the Purpose of supplying the 
Chinese Market with Furs and Ginseng’. See Anon, A Narrative of the 
Negotiations Occasioned by the Dispute between England and Spain, London, 
1791, 24. 
86 John Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the 
North West Coast of America , London, 1790, lxxi. 
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Banks. Upon arriving, however, he discovered that ‘the Ginseng [was] either 
dug up for sale, or rooted up by the hogs so much’. Marshall predicted that 
ginseng would soon go extinct in the vicinity of human residence.88 
A decline in prices was another problem triggered by the mass-collection 
and exportation of ginseng. Around 1752, French Canadian merchants were 
selling about 100,000 dollars’ worth of ginseng to China. This ginseng was 
collected from Canada, sent to France, and from there again shipped to 
China, bringing in a huge fortune for the merchants. However, the 
oversupply of ginseng subsequently led to a dramatic fall in revenue to 
around 6,500 dollars by 1754.89 The oversupply of American ginseng, which 
flooded the Asian market via Guangzhou (since 1757 the only port where 
Sino-European trade could take place, as declared by Emperor Qianlong), 
was such that henceforth American ginseng would be called ‘Guangdong 
Ginseng’. In 1764, Collinson criticised the excessive frenzy of ginseng 
exportation, pointing out that the greed of Americans and Canadians was 
significantly damaging the ginseng trade with China. Calling this ‘a rage 
after Ginseng’, Collinson argues ‘I call it so, because all the mountains and 
uncultivated country was ransacked for this valuable root, and imported 
hither by hogshead full, and the market in China glutted with this root’. 
Further, he claims that ginseng ‘had been artfully concealed and prepared 
by the cunning Chinese, and sold under secrecy to the great people for true 
Chinese ginseng, but this great plenty soon discovered the cheat, and then it 
sank to nothing’. He even refers to the Americans who brought about this 
crisis as ‘great losers’.90    
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The ginseng trade entered a new stage after the independence of America. 
America not only designated ginseng as one of its specialties, but also 
secured new trade bases for its exports: ‘The Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of 
France, Surat, Batavia and Canton, have lately opened their ports to receive 
the articles of beef, pork, bacon, butter, cheese, timber, ginseng, and several 
others’.91 The British East India Company suffered the most critical blow 
from America’s ginseng exports. Prior to America’s independence, ginseng 
was one of the main trade items of the Company,92 being privately traded 
and securing huge profits for the Company. However, once the 
under-supplied ginseng started to be mass-exported from America to China, 
it resulted in ‘the Chinese [pretending] to have discovered that [the North 
American Ginseng had] no virtue, and it [has] actually become unsaleable’. 
This eventually led to America ceding the upper-hand of the ginseng trade 
to China.93 The following is a record from the East India Company: 
 
It is generally admitted that no Market varies more than that of China, 
the Prejudices of the Natives operating most powerfully upon their 
conduct. Of this, the Article of Ginseng is a striking Proof. The Moment 
it was offered in Quantities larger than usual, and by Persons from 
whom the Chinese were not accustomed to purchase, it became 
unsaleable; and your Committee are confident that American Ginseng 
will never be consumed in China as heretofore.94 
 
Now ginseng would take an unexpected turn in the American society, in 
relation to tea. As Breen rightly points out, tea was the central item 
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testifying to the burgeoning of consumer society, and by 1766 in 
Philadelphia even the poor people consumed Bohea tea. 95  The most 
important product in the Sino-American trade was tea, and due to the fact 
that the British East India Company supplied most of the products, there 
was a huge trade imbalance between the countries. In 1790, an additional 
416,652 pounds’ worth of tea would enter America from other European 
merchant ships as well. 96  In order to redress this imbalance and to 
establish direct trade with China, the Americans seized upon the possibility 
of exporting ginseng. 97  Mathew Carey (1760-1839), a Philadelphia 
economist, perhaps most explicitly and bluntly addresses the circumstances 
that America was facing when he criticises English merchants for 
monopolising the East Asian trade. He argues that ‘the inhabitants of 
America must have tea’,98 and in order to continue to enjoy the ‘elegant 
luxury’ the Americans should utilise another product to meet the cost for it, 
and the other product was to be ‘otherwise useless produce of its mountains 
and forests’.99 At last, in 1784, the first American merchant ship Empress of 
China successfully lowered its anchor in Guangdong, China. Exporting 
American ginseng, leather, and fur, and bringing in diverse Chinese 
products in exchange, the Empress of China made a profit of 1,500%. 
This gave rise to other discussions that America might be able to discover 
or cultivate its own tea plants in a similar way it discovered ginseng. This 
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was a speculation not entirely without reason. If ginseng was not known to 
grow anywhere else but near Beijing, China and America, and if among all 
regions on the same latitude, America was closest to China in its soil and 
ecology, then the argument was that by the same token America might be 
able to discover native tea on its soil.100  
Meanwhile, the argument was raised that Chinese tea was detrimental to 
health, and that it should be substituted with ginseng tea produced in 
America. The contention was based on many grounds: an analogy between 
ginseng tea and regular tea, as both were drinks made by processing leaves 
and roots of plants; an economic perspective that it would be possible to 
produce more tea with less ginseng leaves; and a nationalistic perspective of 
preferring native to imported tea.101 There were also claims that Chinese 
themselves preferred ginseng tea over ‘Chinese’ tea, that they were fully 
aware of the detrimental effects of their own ‘enervating and slow-poisoning 
teas’ but still attached ‘various fine titles’ to sell them to foreign markets.102  
A similar discourse was witnessed in contemporary England as well.103 
Ginseng tea was widely advocated primarily from the recognition that 
Chinese tea was causing trade deficits. The Essay on the Virtue and 
Properties of the Ginseng Tea written by two doctors, Count Belchilgen and 
A. Cope, in 1786, most strongly represents this sentiment. Controversial in 
both sides of the Atlantic, this essay claims that Bohea tea causes fatal body 
disorders such as ‘spasms, palsies, and scrophulous diseases’ and that 
ginseng tea is the most effective cure for all physical weaknesses. It urges 
the wide use of ginseng tea for sailors on long voyage, as it is the optimal 
preventive measure for scurvy.104 For Belchilgen and Cope, ginseng tea was 
                                                   
100 Ibid., II, 177; Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 1, 1771, v. 
101 Jonathan Carver, The New Universal Traveller, London, 1779, 4-5. 
102 James Adair, The History of the American Indians, London, 1775, 361. 
103 Carver, New Universal Traveller, 4-5. 
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‘one of those beneficent dispensations of Providence’.105 In a similar vein, an 
American doctor claimed to have used ginseng as a posterior application for 
patients who ruined their health from Chinese tea. He reports that many 
other doctors have applied the same treatment and met success. 106 
Furthermore, Belchilgen and Cope not only claim that the everyday use of 
tea is detrimental to health, but also provide statistics that the per capita 
consumption of tea and sugar amounts to half of that of bread.107 They also 
list many other cases that describe how those who replaced tea with ginseng 
tea were able to recover health and return to their daily routines: 
 
Miss Harriot Moulton, daughter of Edward Moulton, Esq. has been 
constantly afflicted with laughing and crying hysterics, rising in the 
throat, continual pain in her stomach, violent pain in her head, bad 
sight, and great tenesmus. Is now happily restored to health by the 
sole use of the Ginseng Tea. 
 
Witnesses 
Edward Moulton, Esq. 
Wm, Henry Winsor, Esq. 
Ed. Norton Hayes, Esq. 
Geo. Henry Duncore, Esq.108  
 
 
Orientalism 
 
The most prominent feature of the discourse on ginseng is without doubt 
the comments on the high regard in which ginseng was held in China. In A 
New Vocabulary of the Most Difficult Words in the English Language (1784), 
                                                                                                                          
the Ginseng Tea, London, 1786, 8. 
105 Ibid., 6. 
106 Adair, History of the American Indians, 362. 
107 Belchilgen and Cope, Virtues and Properties of Ginseng Tea, 20. 
108 Ibid., 26. 
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ginseng is defined as ‘a famous plant greatly esteemed in China’.109 This 
was a rhetoric commonly appropriated by Americans well after the discovery 
of native ginseng, both in its marketing of ginseng as a national specialty 
and its export to other countries. It appeared either as a form of respect paid 
to the country of origin or as a way of appropriating China’s authority and 
its long history and tradition of ginseng cultivation. As Maxine Berg argues, 
‘the exotic provenance of imported foods made them into luxuries in 
Europe’,110 and as such the aura of the mighty kingdom in Asia could be 
conveniently used for commercial interests. At the same time, however, it 
may have been a conscious strategy to associate and bind ginseng to the 
realm of the other, the exotic ‘China’.     
China, or East Asia as a whole, represented an arena that operated with 
principles and criteria different from those of Europe. That is why American 
and English discourses on ginseng are grounded on the binary spatial 
categories of China and Europe. While ginseng is ‘looked upon by them [the 
Chinese] as a panacea’, ‘in Europe it is esteemed to be no better than most 
other mild aromatic substances’.111 Even those records testifying to the 
successful effects of ginseng are often accompanied by the comment that 
their effect was ‘milder’ than was acclaimed by the Chinese. 112  Some 
narratives are much harsher in their tone: ‘[Ginseng] may be of use, but the 
weakness of its sensible qualities gives it no foundation for a place in 
                                                   
109 William Fry, A New Vocabulary of the Most Difficult Words in the English 
Language, London, 1784, 102. 
110 Berg, ‘In Pursuit of Luxury’, 99. 
111 Donald Monro, A Treatise on Medical and Pharmaceutical Chymistry, and 
the Materia Medica, 3 vols, London, 1788, III. 119. See also Samuel Williams, 
The Natural and Civil History of Vermont, Walpole, N. H., 1794, 70. ‘But we 
do not find them [ginseng] extraordinary, as the Chinese have represented’. 
112 William Woodville, Medical Botany, 3 vols, London, 1790-1793, II, 272-73; 
John Quincy, Pharmacopoeia Officinalis or a Complete English Dispensatory, 
15th edn, London, 1782, 61. 
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medicine’.113 Also, it was frequently claimed that ginseng had a ‘cordial and 
restorative’ effect rather than being the ‘universal medicine’ that the 
Chinese regard as.114 Despite the fact that Du Halde’s The General History 
of China, a text that had a wide readership in Europe, listed 77 different 
diseases that ginseng could cure, European physicians of this era limited its 
effects to the treatment of mainly three diseases: convulsions, vertigoes, and 
nervous complaints.115 These evaluations add weight to Roberta Bivins’s 
claim that increasing contacts in the eighteenth century between East and 
West, rather than eroding walls and boundaries between their different 
medical systems, actually reinforced them.116 
However, there is an exceptional medical case that is often discussed with 
ginseng in detail: sexual dysfunction. Byrd, for instance, mentions that both 
Charles II and Louis XIV saw the effects of ginseng offered by Siamese 
ambassadors, but argues that he didn’t consider ginseng an aphrodisiac, 
speculating that it may have lost many of its effects during long voyages.117 
Hill’s History of the Materia Medica mentions that ‘[Ginseng] is famous in 
the East for giving strength and spirit to persons who have disabled 
themselves by too free a use of women’.118 In this context, it appears that 
ginseng’s aphrodisiacal effect was widely known and contested in Europe. 
William Hanbury’s horticultural text, for instance, warns that ‘under a 
pretense of contributing to health and long life, many [people], it is to be 
                                                   
113  William Cullen, Lectures on the Materia Medica, London, 1772, 276. See 
also Richard Pearson, A practical Synopsis of the Materia Alimentaria, and 
Materia Medica, 2 vols, London, 1797-1802, II, 125.  
114 Richard Brookes, The General Dispensatory, 3rd edn. London, 1773, 42; 
Munro, Treatise on Medical and Pharmaceutical Chymistry, III. 119; Cullen, 
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115 Croker et al., Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, II, s. v. ‘foeniculum’, 
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116 Bivins, Alternative Medicine?, 31. 
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feared, use it for bad purposes’.119  
Other documents often deny ginseng’s aphrodisiacal quality in a more 
somber tone. Cullen claims that the myth that ginseng possesses ‘the 
engaging virtue of a powerful incentive and aphrodisiac’ is based on a 
‘slender, and indeed absolutely false foundation’.120 He offers a case in 
which a middle-aged gentleman he knew took ginseng every day for the past 
few years but ‘never found his venereal faculties in the least improved by 
it’.121 Such arguments by Europeans that the ‘panacea’ turned out to be 
little more than a ‘mere common root’ further led to a cultural evaluation of 
the Chinese as being largely unreliable in their words or judgment.122 The 
Scottish historian William Guthrie, for instance, writes on the meager 
medical effects of ginseng in Europe and claims that ‘this instance alone 
ought to teach us with what caution the former accounts of China are to be 
read’.123 Here, as Bivins argues, ‘the observer’s gaze was no longer primarily 
acquisitive’, but became ‘critical, assessing, and increasingly jaundiced’;124 
there was growing skepticism toward many oriental remedies. 
The more interesting fact is that such assessments went beyond the 
academic arena of botany or medical science, frequently recurring as 
common metaphors. 'Chinese ginseng' often referred to a greatly-valued 
object or luxury,125or cases in which such objects allowed one to gain sudden 
                                                   
119 William Hanbury, A Complete Body of Planting and Gardening, 2 vols, 
London, 1770-1771, I, 690. 
120 Cullen, Lectures on the Materia Medica, 276. 
121 Cullen, Treatise of the Materia Medica, II, 161. 
122 Thomas Bankes, Edward Warren Blake, and Alexander Cook, A New royal 
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wealth.126 Ginseng was also often mentioned as an essential ingredient in 
distinctively Oriental dishes such as 'sea swallow nest soup', with emphasis 
placed on its exotic qualities.127 At the same time, ginseng was used to refer 
to illusory medical effects attributed to foreign products,128 or products 
whose values were over-inflated.129 One record notes ‘panacea’ as one of the 
many ‘pompous names’ ascribed to ginseng, listing others such as ‘the 
spirituous simple’, ‘the pure spirit of the earth’, or ‘the plant that dispenses 
immortality’.130  Such discourses are based on a condescending attitude 
towards Chinese people as 'bluffers' or as having lost an objective rationality 
due to their imagined supremacy. 
Collinson, for instance, made a highly derogatory remark of the Chinese, 
writing that ‘Fanciful as the Chinese are, their prejudices on this head were 
not so firmly rooted as those of John Bull’.131 This comment is ironic in light 
of the fact that Collinson himself was making a huge profit by passing off 
American ginseng as Chinese. The Philosophical Transactions, in 
introducing an article on Chinese ginseng, sneeringly adds: ‘As for their 
Chemists, of which they go beyond ours, [promises] not only to make Gold, 
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but to give Immorality’. 132  In a similar tone, Charles Johnstone 
(c.1719-1800), an Irish novelist, sarcastically remarks that it was due to 
ginseng’s power to grant immortality that ‘the empire of China [flourished] 
above fifty thousand years more than the age of the world’. 133  Such 
derogatory rhetoric was also accompanied by a discourse that ginseng’s high 
status in East Asia had to do with the relatively underdeveloped state of 
medical science there.134 Despite the fact that he himself had traveled 
around Europe in search for medicinal waters, Smollett, for instance, writes 
that the Japanese's dependence on ‘medicinal waters and certain 
roots-ginseng’ comes from their lack of ‘skill in physic and surgery’.135 
Ironically, the Chinese are often portrayed as ‘expert cheats’ despite their 
lack of medical knowledge. For instance, there are many accounts of how the 
Chinese ginseng-diggers would cut off the top knots (or tubera) of their old 
roots, as their marketability drops once the knot dries up. The list goes on: 
the Chinese would fill in wormholes with yellow powder and they often put 
‘pieces of lead’ inside roots to increase their weight.136 Moreover, the often 
quoted description by Jartoux’s description of ginseng collecting process, in 
all its vividness, underlines the enormity of ‘oriental despotism’ in the scene. 
In 1709, the Chinese emperor ordered the Tartars to collect ginseng. Each 
had to offer two ounces to the Emperor, and the surplus would be weighed 
and rewarded with silver. 
                                                   
132 Philosophical Transactions 1, 249 
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II, 167. 
134 William Julius Mickle, The Lusiad; or, the Discovery of India, Oxford, 1776, 
469. 
135 Smollett, The Present State of All Nations, 8 vols, London, 1768-1769, VIII, 
15. 
136  Abbé Rochon, A Voyage to Madagascar and the East Indies, 378; Hill, 
History of the Materia Medica, 589; Hill, The Vegetable System, V, 25; 
Stearns, American Oracle, 45; Croker et al., The Complete Dictionary of Arts 
and Sciences, II, s. v. ‘foeniculum’, and ‘ginseng’. 
The Perception of Ginseng in Early Modern England  35 
 
 
It is computed, that by this means the Emperor would get this year 
about twenty thousand Chinese pounds of it, which would not cost him 
above one fourth part of its value ... This army of herbarists observed 
the following order. After they had divided a certain tract of land 
among their several companies, each company, to the number of an 
hundred, spreads itself out in a straight line to a certain fixt place, 
every ten of them keeping at a distance from the rest ... These poor 
people suffer a great deal in this expedition. They carry with them 
neither Tents nor beds, every one being sufficiently loaded with his 
provision, which is only millet parched in an oven, upon which he must 
subsist all the time of his journey ... In this manner these ten thousand 
men passed six months of the year.137 
 
In 1783, ginseng would come to catch the English public’s attention, due to 
an unfortunate incident. In March 1783, the ship Imperial East Indiaman 
heading from Liverpool en route to China sunk near Dublin Bay in the Irish 
Sea. This ship was loaded with a large amount of silver and lead. Charles 
Spalding (1738-1783), an Edinburgh engineer and diver, had signed a 
contract with the ship owner and arrived at the scene to recover the ship’s 
cargo. On June 2nd, Spalding and his nephew dived down to 42 feet only to 
be discovered dead in the diving bell. Their funeral was delayed because the 
corpses were hardly decomposing, uncannily retaining their original 
appearance. Other divers who had approached the ship reported of a foul 
odour coming from the ship and speculated that it was the stench coming 
from rotten ginseng, which were also loaded on the ship. This was reported 
in the newspapers,138 occasioning a lively discussion among the public as 
well as scientists; the matter was controversial enough to be discussed twice 
in Royal Society meetings as well. Most people traced the smell to either the 
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putrefied bodies of the sailors or the ‘highly noxious fluvia’ coming from the 
rotten ginseng. Despite an autopsy, no one was able to verify the exact cause 
of their death. Nevertheless, the putrid air coming from the rotten ginseng 
was considered the most likely cause, and until now the 'mysterious herb' 
bears this unfortunate stigma.139  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Materials and Medicine, Pratik Chakrabarti argues that within 
imperialism local knowledge and experience in medicine were eventually 
either absorbed into Western modern medicine or marginalised.140 Within 
this two-trajectory model, ginseng in the seventeenth to eighteenth 
centuries stands in a curious position, because it was neither completely 
marginalised nor absorbed into modern Western medicine. Despite the 
common perception of ginseng as a plant exclusive to East Asia, it was 
widely discussed in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and 
America and actually used for medical purposes. Whereas other materials 
were severed from their indigenous origins when they were accepted within 
Western medicine,141 ginseng was labelled with and maintained its Asian 
provenance. This root which was ‘so highly valued in China’ often occupied 
the center of discussions in scientific circles. It was an object of botanic 
interest and also a valuable commodity in international trade, and a 
national specialty considered as a solution for trade deficits. Ginseng was 
also a theme and a metaphor that contributed to the construction of myths 
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and prejudices against East Asia. 
The discourse on ginseng in the early modern period manifests a tension 
between its perception as a ‘mysterious panacea of the East’ and a ‘puzzling 
medicine’ that couldn’t quite be subsumed or categorised under the modern 
medical science of the West. Such a tension betrays a sense of Western 
inferiority concerning Chinese techniques such as curing, the economic 
context in which merchants were highly occupied with the export of ginseng 
and the possibilities for its domestic consumption being relatively 
unexplored as a consequence, and the difficulty of applying its own strictly 
standardised model of medical science to its medicinal use. Such limitations 
often wore the façade of imperialism in which the West would tout its own 
products as superior, while attributing cultural inferiority to Oriental 
products which it paradoxically claimed to be identical to its own. Such is 
the ironic fate of not only ginseng, but many of the non-western products 
which encountered the West.  
This ostracising gaze that creates the dualism of ‘I’ and the ‘Other’ 
extends beyond the immediate object to those who use it and the spatiality 
in which it is located. Such distinctions have a persistence that is 
incorrigible even with the aid of 'objective experiments'. This is the reason 
that we should shift the focus of research on ginseng from its 
pharmacological properties and embrace perspectives from the humanities 
and social sciences, especially in a global-historical context: we should aim 
to provide a corrective to such prejudicial perceptions of ‘the Other’.
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Abstract 
In the 1910s, Canadian provinces enacted or tried to enact ‘white women’s 
labour laws’, preventing Asian male immigrants from employing ‘white’ 
women. The laws originally targeted Asian male immigrants at large, but 
some of them were amended to aim at Chinese male immigrants only and 
the others were withdrawn. This article examines imperial factors in the 
amendment and withdrawal, by analyzing the reactions against the laws of 
the governments concerned, including Japan and Britain. Specifically, it 
describes how Canada and its provinces had to accommodate its 
motherland’s special relations with Japan, known as the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, along with anti-Asian feelings in western Canada, and how the 
Japanese government tackled these laws during the critical period when 
Canada’s adhesion to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation of 1911 was being negotiated. It also sheds light on the 
treatment of East Indian immigrants by both the Canadian and British 
governments, which might have inflamed the anti-British movement in 
India. Furthermore, it shows that the British government still had keen 
interests in domestic affairs in Canada long after it was given 
semi-autonomous status as a ‘dominion’ in the Confederation of 1867.  
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Introduction 
 
  In March 1912, the Province of Saskatchewan enacted An Act to Prevent 
the Employment of Female Labour in Certain Capacities. Section One of it 
stipulates “[n]o person shall employ in any capacity any white woman or girl 
or permit any white woman or girl to reside or lodge in or to work in or, save 
as a bona fide customer in a public apartment thereof only, to frequent any 
restaurant, laundry or other place of business or amusement owned, kept or 
managed by any Japanese, Chinaman or other Oriental person”.1 But in the 
following January, the law was amended by striking out the words 
‘Japanese’ and ‘or other Oriental person’, to regulate only Chinese 
immigrants.2 Following this, the neighbouring prairie province, Manitoba 
also passed An Act to Prevent the Employment of Female Labor[sic] in 
Certain Capacities targeting “Japanese, Chinaman or other Oriental 
person”3 in February 1913, but it failed to obtain royal assent from the 
Lieutenant-Governor and was finally repealed in 1940. 4  In 1913 the 
Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario also tried to enact a much 
more radical bill, An Act to Prohibit the Employment of Women by Orientals, 
to prevent Asian immigrants from employing any women, but it was 
abandoned at the second reading.5 In the following year this province 
enacted an act prohibiting Chinese immigrants from hiring ‘white’ women,6 
and this was in effect until 1947.7 On the Pacific side, the Province of 
British Columbia legislated an act, which was similar to Saskatchewan’s, to 
                                                   
1 Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1912, c. 17, s. 1. 
2 Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1912-13, c. 18, s. 1. This Act, with repeating 
changes, was in effect until 1969. Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1969, c. 24, s. 73. 
3 Statutes of Manitoba, 1913, c. 19, s. 1. 
4 Statutes of Manitoba, 1940, c. 35. 
5 Foreign Ministry of Japan, March 11, 1913, Nihon Gaiko Monjo [Documents 
on Japanese Diplomacy] 1913, vol. 1, 110-111. 
6 Statutes of Ontario, 1914-15, c. 40. 
7 Statutes of Ontario, 1947, c. 102. 
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prevent the employment of ‘white’ women by Chinese immigrants in 1919,8 
which was finally repealed in 1968.9  
  These ‘white women’s labour laws’ are regarded as “the first overt racial 
recognition of ‘whiteness’ in Canadian law”10 in that they specified the 
protection of ‘white’ women. Besides, around the 1910s Asian immigrants to 
Canada were mostly male, so it was clear that these laws tried to regulate 
the boundaries of gender as well as race. They were also unique in the North 
American context. As Constance Backhouse observes about Saskatchewan’s 
law, while “many American states promulgated statutes prohibiting 
intermarriage between white women and Asian males, there appear to have 
been no laws quite like this one”.11 
  These laws reflected the growing tendencies of demarcating the 
boundaries of a ‘white’ Pacific. From the mid-nineteenth century, Asians 
began to emigrate to booming white settlements, such as the United States, 
                                                   
8 British Columbia Statutes, 1919, c. 63. 
9 British Columbia Statutes, 1968, c. 53. As for the changes of all the ‘white 
women’s labour laws’ in Canada, see Michihisa Hosokawa, ‘Hakujin’ shihai no 
Kanada-shi: Imin, Senjumin, Yuseigaku [History of ‘White’ supremacy in 
Canada: Immigrants, Aboriginals, and Eugenics], Tokyo, 2012, 159, Table 8.  
10 Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 
1900-1950, Toronto, 1999, 136. 
11 Backhouse, Colour-Coded, p 137. According to her, the only exception was the 
bill that was introduced to the Oregon legislature to prohibit the employment 
of white females in restaurants or grills owned or operated by Orientals, but 
it was defeated. Ibid., 137, n. 12 (extensive note). But there existed another 
case in the State of Washington. In January 1913, the Japanese Consul at 
Seattle reported as follows. “Senator Scott from Adams Franklin Walla Walla 
Counties introduced on Monday a bill prohibiting employment of white 
women by Chinese and Japanese. He asserts practice is quite prevalent in the 
eastern part of state for Mongolians to work immigrant white women in their 
field as well as employment throughout state of white girls as cashiers in 
restaurants etc. which he asserts has a very demoralizing effect on society as 
a whole”. Japanese Consul at Seattle (Takahashi) to Foreign Minister 
(Katsura), January 28, 1913, Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol. 3, 531.    
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Canada, and Australia, but they were not treated equal with ‘white’ citizens. 
There existed a solid hierarchical order in terms of race and ethnicity.12 
  Canada’s ‘white labour laws’ have so far only been examined by the legal 
historians, Backhouse and James W. St. G. Walker, who both carefully 
analyze the legal cases to show the ambiguity and contingency of ‘whiteness’ 
and how the human rights of Asian immigrants were trampled upon.13 
Their works, however, have not been enough to situate the laws in the 
imperial context, although Backhouse briefly touches upon the negotiations 
between Saskatchewan and Japan. Furthermore, the historiography on 
pre-WWII Japanese immigrants to Canada have focused upon British 
                                                   
12 There are many works on anti-Asian racism in the Pacific Rim. To name but a 
few, Marilyn Lake & Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White 
Men’s Countries and the International Challenge or Racial Equality, 
Cambridge, 2008; Kornel S. Chang, Pacific Connections: The Making of the 
US-Canadian Borderlands, Berkley, 2012, Andrea Geiger, Subverting 
Exclusion: Transpacific Encounters with Race, Caste, and Borders, 1885-1928, 
New Haven, 2015. The following work includes native Indians as well, to 
describe the racial encounters between European colonists, Chinese 
immigrants, aboriginal peoples, and mixed-race populations in British 
Columbia. Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and 
Juridical Truths in British Columbia, 1871-1921, Vancouver, 2009.    
13 Backhouse, Colour-Coded; do., “White Female Help and Chinese-Canadian 
Employers: Race, Class, Gender and Law in the Case of Yee Clun, 1924”, 
Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, 1994; do., “The White Women’s Labor 
Laws: Anti-Chinese Racism in Early Twentieth Century Canada”, Law and 
History Review, vol. 14, no.2, 1996; do., “Legal Discrimination against the 
Chinese in Canada”, in David Dyzenhaus & Mayo Moran (eds.), Calling 
Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and the Chinese Canadian Head Tax 
Case, Toronto, 2005; James W. St. G. Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in 
the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Studies, Waterloo, 1997; do., “A 
Case for Morality: The Quong Wing Files”, in Franca Iacovetta & Wendy 
Mitchinson (eds.), On the Case: Explorations in Social History, Toronto, 1998. 
Recent study on the Chinese community in prairie provinces describes 
regional differences between Saskatchewan and Manitoba by pointing out the 
former’s ‘white women’s labour law’, but overlooks the fact that the latter also 
tried to enact a very similar law. Alison R. Marshall, Cultivating Connections: 
The Making of Chinese Prairie Canada, Vancouver, 2014, 13. 
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Columbia where their overwhelming majority resided,14 almost neglecting 
other areas. But it should be noted that ‘white women’s labour laws’ 
targeting Japanese immigrants were first planned to be enacted in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, not in British Columbia, which was beyond 
expectations for the Japanese government as well as Japanese immigrants. 
Although their concerns disappeared soon, because these two prairie 
provinces amended or withdrew the enactments shortly, but, with hindsight, 
they might have worsened the relations between Japan and Canada, even 
with the British Empire at large. And in the case of India too, such laws 
might have outraged East Indians to deteriorate their relations with 
Canada and Britain. 
This article attempts to explain external or imperial factors in the 
amendment and withdrawal of ‘white women’s labour laws’ in order to 
clarify why the laws that originally targeted Asian male immigrants were 
amended to aim at Chinese male immigrants only. To be more specific, it 
tries to elucidate why the Province of Saskatchewan dropped Japanese 
immigrants from the target list and the Province of Manitoba stopped the 
enactment, showing that Canada, a semi-autonomous dominion in the 
British Empire,15 had to accommodate its motherland’s friendly relations 
with Japan, known as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance along with anti-Asian 
feelings in western Canada.16  Furthermore, it also sheds light on the 
                                                   
14 Population of Japanese immigrants in 1911 was as follows. Total: 9,021, 
British Columbia: 8,587 (95.2% of the total Japanese immigrants), 
Saskatchewan: 57, Manitoba: 5. Ottawa, Canada Year Book 1911. 
15 During the period here examined, Canada was not given treaty-making 
power. It was not until 1923 when Canada first signed the Halibut Treaty, the 
Canada-U.S. agreement concerning fishing rights in the northern Pacific, 
independently from Britain, which paved the way to the dominions’ 
autonomous status in the British Empire, embodied in the Balfour 
Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931. 
16 As for the Anglo-Japanese relations in this period, see Ian Nish & Yoichi 
Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: vol.1: The 
Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930, London, 2000.  
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treatment of East Indians by both Canadian and British governments, 
which might have inflamed the anti-British movement in the British 
Empire. 
 
 
Historical background:  
Canada-Japan relation in the early 20th century 
 
  Since the arrival of Manzo Nagano from Nagasaki in 1877, who was the 
first officially documented Japanese immigrant to Canada, an increasing 
number of Japanese poured into British Columbia, building their ethnic 
community, like the Chinese immigrants, who had been entering Canada 
since 1850s. Both Japanese and Chinese were unwelcomed by the British 
Columbians, who asked for their exclusion from Canada.17 
  In the case of Chinese immigrants, the Canadian government decided to 
levy a head tax on them-----fifty dollars in 1885 (effective as of 1886), one 
hundred dollars in 1900, five hundred dollars in 1903-----, and finally passed 
the Chinese Exclusion Act to prohibit their entry to Canada in 1923.18 The 
Japanese, on the other hand, were not given such harsh treatment. The 
                                                   
17 Major works on the history of Canada-Japan (including China) relation in 
this period are as follows. Ken Adachi, The Enemy that never was: A History 
of the Japanese Canadians, Montreal & Kingston, 1976; Patricia Roy, A White 
Man’s Province : British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese 
Immigrants, 1858-1914, Vancouver, 1989; W. Peter Ward, White Canada 
Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British 
Columbia, 3rd ed., Montreal & Kingston, 2002; John Price, Orienting Canada: 
Race, Empire, and the Transpacific, Vancouver, 2011.   
18  An Act to restrict and regulate Chinese immigration into Canada (The 
Chinese Immigration Act, 1885), Statutes of Canada, 1885, c. 71; An Act 
respecting and restricting Chinese Immigration (The Chinese Immigration 
Act, 1900), Statutes of Canada, 1900, c. 32; An Act respecting and restricting 
Chinese immigration (The Chinese Immigration Act, 1903), Statutes of 
Canada, 1903, c. 8; An Act respecting Chinese Immigration (The Chinese 
Immigration Act, 1923), Statutes of Canada, 1923, c. 38.  
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legislature of the Province of British Columbia tried to exclude Japanese, 
but their attempts were reserved by the lieutenant governor, or disallowed 
by the federal government, who feared those might deteriorate the 
motherland’s good relations with Japan, embodied in the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, first signed in 1902 and renewed twice, in 1905 and 1911. 
  In the early twentieth century, major issues between Canada and Japan 
were the treatment of Japanese immigration to Canada and the 
development of their commercial relationship, both of which were linked in 
the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation.19 
  The treaty was first signed between Britain and Japan in 1894, but 
Canada did not adhere to it for the following two reasons. Firstly, its 
most-favoured-nation clause was to bring Canada into Britain’s 
most-favoured-nation parties, Germany and Belgium, which would be 
against Canadian protective policy. Secondly, the clause to ensure the 
freedom of movement and dwelling of the people of all the membership 
nations would apply to Japanese immigrants, which would be unacceptable 
for most Canadians. 
                                                   
19 The following article is the only study on the Canada-Japan relation over 
Canada’s adhesion to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation. Masako Iino, “Nichiei tsusho joyaku to Kanada no Nihon-jin imin 
mondai [The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation: The 
Japanese Problem in Canada]”, Kokusai-Seiji[International Relations](Japan 
Association of International Relations), vol. 79, May 1985, 1-18. It was not 
until the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 that 
Japan was able to claim full tariff autonomy. As James Hoare points out, the 
1911 treaty has been generally neglected compared to that of 1894, suggesting 
“[w]hile 1894 was clearly the more important, 1911 should not be ignored, 
overshadowed as it was by the Japanese annexation of Korea-----where it also 
had consequences.” James Hoare, “The Era of Unequal Treaties, 1858-99” in 
Nish & Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: vol.1: The 
Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930, 123, 129.     
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  As trade began expanding between Canada and Japan, both governments 
realized the relevance of the treaty. Canada successfully persuaded Britain 
to repeal the Anglo-German and Anglo-Belgian treaties, while Japan 
voluntarily limited Japanese immigration to Canada, which had become 
‘tacit’ understanding between Canada and Japan since the early 1900s. As a 
result, Canada joined the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation in 1906.  
  In spite of this ‘tacit’ understanding, the number of Japanese immigrants 
jumped from 442 in 1906 to 2,753 in 1907, which stirred up anti-Japanese 
feelings among British Columbians. In September 1907, the Vancouver riot 
occurred, in which Japanese and Chinese communities in downtown 
Vancouver were attacked by those who sympathized with nativist appeals of 
organizations, such as the Asiatic Exclusion League. 
  Following the riot, the Canadian government sent Rodolphe Lemieux, 
Minister of Labour, to Japan to solve the Japanese immigration problem. 
Initially, Canada wanted to secede from the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation. But, fearing it might deglorify the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald, 20  British 
Ambassador to Japan, asked Lemieux to continue the treaty. Lemieux 
agreed, and he pressed Japan to specify quantitative restrictions on 
Japanese immigration to Canada. Then in 1908, Lemieux and Japanese 
Foreign Minister Tadasu Hayashi21 signed the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ in 
                                                   
20 He served as British Minister to Japan from January 1901, and became the 
first Ambassador in December 1905 with the establishment of an embassy in 
Tokyo. He held the office until March 1913. 
21 He was appointed as Minister at the Japanese Legation in London in July 
1900, and signed the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August 1905. With its 
promotion to embassy in December, he became the first Ambassador to 
Britain. He served as Foreign Minister (May to August 1906, September 1906 
to July 1908, and, concurrently appointed, August to October 1911) and 
Minister of Communications (August 1911 to December 1912). Diplomatic 
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which Japan consented to restrict the number of passports it issued to male 
labourers and domestic servants to 400 annually.22  
  Although the Hayashi-Lemieux Agreement functioned to decrease 
Japanese immigration to Canada, it did not soften anti-Japanese feeling 
effectively. In 1910, Canada revised its immigration policy to provide for 
greater selectivity in the admission process. Section 38 of An Act respecting 
Immigration (The Immigration Act, 1910) stipulates the prohibition of the 
entry of “immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate 
or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified class, 
occupation or character”.23 This law was not aimed squarely at Japanese 
immigrants, but they were surely a part of the ‘undesirable’ immigrants. To 
make matters worse for Canada-Japan relations, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty 
of Commerce did not contribute to the growth of trade over the Pacific [Table 
1]. 
  In April 1911 when Britain and Japan renewed the treaty,24 the so-called 
‘Komura Treaty’ named after Duke Jutaro Komura who played a major role 
in the negotiation,25 Canada was unwilling to adhere to it.26 Japan, on the 
other hand, wanted Canada to join in the renewed treaty because it 
regarded Canada as an important trade partner and an essential component 
                                                                                                                          
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (ed.), Nihon Gaiko-shi 
Jiten [Dictionary of Japanese Diplomatic History], new edition, 1992, 842. 
22 Ward, White Canada Forever, pp. 53-76; Adachi, The Enemy that never was, 
pp. 63-85; Masako Iino, “Japan’s Reaction to the Vancouver Riot of 1907”, BC 
Studies, vol. 60, 1983, 28-47. 
23 Statutes of Canada, 1910, c. 27. 
24 As for the full text of the treaty (Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between 
the Empire of Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland), 
see Nihon Gaiko Monjo, Tsusho Joyaku kankei [Respecting Commercial 
Treaties], vol. 1, no. 1, 1079-1099. 
25 Its predecessor, the treaty of 1894, is known as the ‘Mutsu Treaty’ in Japan, 
named after then Foreign Minister Duke Munemitsu Mutsu. 
26 Newfoundland joined the treaty in December, 1911. British Ambassador to 
Japan (Claude M. MacDonald) to Foreign Minister Uchida, December 30, 
1911, in Ibid., 1119.  
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of the British Empire. The Japanese government worried the immigration 
problem would influence the treaty negotiation. Then in March 1912, 
Japanese officials began considering approaching not only the Canadian 
government but also the British government on this matter.27 Eventually 
Canada decided to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation in April 1913, but it was during this very critical period when 
another serious problem arose in the Canadian Prairies, not from British 
Columbia: the enactment of ‘white women’s labour laws’. 
 
Year Japan to CanadaCanada to Japan Year Japan to CanadaCanada to Japan
1900 2,950 316 1910 4,261 850
1901 3,276 181 1911 4,006 333
1902 3,485 517 1912 4,808 664
1903 2,923 499 1913 5,090 1,839
1904 3,211 837 1914 4,994 1,073
1905 3,240 782 1915 7,024 1,063
1906 3,958 1,002 1916 11,301 1,666
1907 3,863 1,217 1917 16,158 2,557
1908 3,130 1,119 1918 27,334 7,775
1909 3,855 1,083 1919 24,839 6,126
Trade between Japan and Canada, 1900-19
Source: Finance Ministry of Japan, Dai-Nippon Gaikoku Boeki Nenpyo [Annual 
Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan] , 1900-19.
<Table 1>
[thousand yen]
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 Foreign Minister Uchida to Nakamura, March 29, 1912, in Nihon Gaiko 
Monjo, 1912, vol. 1, 1. 
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Enactment of the law in Saskatchewan and  
its impact on Japanese government 
 
  The original Saskatchewan law of 1912, as mentioned above, targeted all 
the Asian male immigrants. In those days, unlike British Columbia there 
existed very few Japanese residents in the prairie province28 and no serious 
incidents had occurred, so the enactment of the law shocked the Japanese 
government as well as Japanese immigrant communities in Canada. 
  Why did Saskatchewanians try to legislate? It is very difficult to 
determine, but the only possible cause can be found in the upsurge of 
Chinese in Saskatchewan. In 1901, four years before it joined the Canadian 
Confederation as province, only 41 Chinese lived there. But in 1911, they 
increased to 957-----23.3 times as many as in 1901. In contrast, British 
Columbia, which had the largest Chinese community in Canada, had a 
modest increase-----from 14,885 in 1901 to 19,568 in 1911-----only 1.3 times. 
The rapid increase of Chinese immigrants seemed to make them an 
obnoxious ‘visible’ minority-----easily associated with opium addicts, 
gambling dens, and so on-----to the eyes of Saskatchewanians.29 
  It was from a letter of a Japanese resident of Moose Jaw, a city located in 
Southern Saskatchewan, named Nakane, who had been running a 
restaurant for seven years, that the Japanese government first learned 
about the enactment of the ‘white women’s labour law’. On April 9th, 1912, 
Mr. Nakane sent a letter to the Japanese Consul General at Ottawa, Mr. 
                                                   
28  As shown in the footnote 14, in 1911, fifty-seven Japanese lived in 
Saskatchewan, comprising only 0.01% of the total population, while in British 
Columbia resided 8,587 Japanese making up 2.19% of the total. 
29 Population in 1901 and 1911 was as follows (total; Chinese). In 1901, British 
Columbia (178,657; 14,885), Alberta (73,022; 235), Saskatchewan (91,279; 41), 
Manitoba (255,211; 206). In 1911, British Columbia (392,480; 19,568), Alberta 
(374,663; 1,787), Saskatchewan (492,432; 957), Manitoba (461,394; 885). 
Ottawa, Canada Year Book 1901; Canada Year Book 1911. 
50 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 6 (2017)  
 
Takashi Nakamura,30 to ask to take immediate action against it. About a 
month before, on March 5th, ten days before the province’s Legislative 
Assembly passed it, Mr. Nakane had submitted a petition to William 
Turgeon, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, to request the word ‘Japanese’ 
to be omitted from the bill. “[S]hould this Bill ‘to prevent the employment of 
female labor in certain capacities’, however, be passed and applied to the few 
of as(sic)(us) Japanese, I feel it would be a great dishonor to our nation in 
general. So, since, we are trying to live as far as in our power without 
reproach in a foreign land for the honor and credit of our nation”, he 
mentioned. Then he argued “if the principle of this Bill to prevent 
undesirable affairs, it would be extremely unjust to apply to all those who 
are carrying on honest and straight forward business merely on account of 
birth”.31 
  On March 28th, Turgeon replied to Mr. Nakane, saying that “[i]t is 
certainly regrettable that any law of the Province should be found 
objectionable by any portion of the respectable citizens of the Province. 
However, general conditions some time require things to be done which 
cannot be agreeable to everybody. In the present case, this law was put 
through, in so far as at least as some of the people affected by it were 
concerned, not so much to remedy an existing state of affairs, but to prevent 
the occurrence of conditions which have arisen elsewhere”.32 
  This reply did not satisfy Mr. Nakane at all, who then decided to ask the 
Japanese government for help. In the letter to the Japanese Consul General, 
                                                   
30 He served as Consul General at Ottawa from March 1909 to April 1913. In 
December 1916, he became Director of Trade and Commerce department. After 
retiring from the Foreign Ministry in May 1923, he was elected member of the 
House of Representatives twice, and was appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs by Prime Minister Takaaki Kato in August 1924. Nihon Gaiko-shi Jiten, 
665. 
31 N. Nakane to the Attorney General (F. T. A. Turgeon), March 5, 1912, in 
Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1912, vol. 1, 286-287.  
32 Turgeon to Nakane, March 28, 1912, in Ibid., 287-288. 
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he referred to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the difference between 
civilized Japanese and uncivilized Chinese, by pointing out “this bill was 
originally proposed to prevent inferior Chinese from using violence to force 
white women to do as told by prohibiting white women from frequenting a 
gambling den or opium den, but it would apply to all the Orientals 
regardless of profession, character and status, which would be trespass 
against the spirit of law of a civilized nation and be a show of contempt for 
Japan, an ally of Great Britain, and its subjects”.33 
  On having received Nakane’s letter, Consul General Nakamura instructed 
Mr. Chonosuke Yada,34 Consul at Vancouver, to investigate the situation in 
Saskatchewan. Mr. Nakamura also reported to Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Viscount Kosai (Yasuya) Uchida, by suggesting not to treat this law as an 
anti-Japanese problem. Although he admitted that it would be unfair that 
the law whose main purpose to crack down on prostitution might influence 
upright professions, but, anticipating that strong reaction against it would 
worsen the Japanese relationship with Canada, he hoped that friendly 
negotiations with the Saskatchewan government might lead to the 
amendment of the law.35  
                                                   
33 Nakane to Nakamura, April 9, 1912, in Ibid., 285-286. 
34 Yada served as Consul at Vancouver from November 1907 until he was 
promoted to succeed Nakamura as Consul General at Ottawa in April 1913. 
Then he became Consul General at New York in September 1916 until he 
moved to Honolulu as Consul General in December 1919. Nihon Gaiko-shi 
Jiten, 1009. 
35 Nakamura to Viscount Uchida, April 12, 1912; Nakamura to Viscount Uchida, 
April 19, 1912 in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1912, vol. 1, 288-289. Uchida, who had 
helped Munemitsu Mutsu in the negotiations over the Anglo-Japanese Treaty 
of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, became Ambassador at Washington D.C. 
in November 1909 and signed the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation in February 1911. Then in October he became Foreign Minister in 
Kinmochi Saionji’s second cabinet. From November 1921 to September 1923, 
he served as Foreign Minister for three ministries-----Takashi Hara, Korekiyo 
Takahashi, and Tomosaburo Kato-----consecutively. In July 1932, he was once 
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  Having left Vancouver on May 6th, Mr. Yada visited Moose Jaw, 
Saskatoon and Regina. In the provincial capital, he met with several 
dignitaries including Turgeon and M. C. Wright, an organizer of the Liberal 
Association in the Province of Saskatchewan, from whom he enjoyed a good 
personal impression.36 
  On May 28th, eight days after he returned to Vancouver, he proposed to 
Viscount Uchida that the Japanese government should engage in 
negotiations with the Canadian federal government, arguing that this 
matter should be treated as a Canada-Japan ‘diplomatic’ issue rather than 
as a Canadian provincial issue, although he added that he was willing to 
make contact with the Premier of Saskatchewan before the session of the 
legislative assembly began if Viscount Uchida would prefer the latter. On 
the same day, Mr. Yada also reported this matter to the Japanese 
Ambassador to London as well as the Consul General in Ottawa.37  
  In reply, Uchida instructed Mr. Yada to negotiate with the Attorney 
General of Saskatchewan. “Among the issues relating to Canada, we must 
give the highest priority to the establishment of the [Anglo-Japanese] treaty 
of Commerce [and Navigation]. To this end, it is essential for us not to bring 
any other issues to the Canadian central [federal] government”, he 
mentioned, adding “this does not mean we have any intention to belittle the 
problems concerning Japanese immigrants”.38 His instruction was based 
upon the department meeting held at the Deputy Foreign Minister’s office 
in Tokyo about three weeks before, in which it was decided to ask Mr. Yada 
                                                                                                                          
again appointed Foreign Minister by Prime Minister Makoto Saito until he 
resigned by illness in September 1933. Nihon Gaiko-shi Jiten, 79-80.    
36 Report on the visit to Saskatchewan, May 28, 1912, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 
1912, vol. 1, 289-295. 
37 Yada to Viscount Uchida, May 28, 1912, in Ibid., 289. 
38 Viscount Uchida to Yada, July 22, 1912, in Ibid., 295. 
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not to make a direct demand to the Canadian federal government, because 
such would harm the negotiations of the treaty.39   
  As shown above, the Japanese officials had been discussing whether they 
should treat Saskatchewan’s matter as a Canada-Japan ‘diplomatic’ issue or 
a Canadian provincial issue. Under the British North America Act which 
was equivalent to the Canadian Constitution at that time, each province 
could make laws respecting immigration to the province, but the federal 
government had the power to override provincial laws, if they infringed on 
federal laws. 40  So the Japanese government could negotiate with the 
Canadian federal government as well as the Province of Saskatchewan, 
although there were not official diplomatic relations between Japan and 
semi-autonomous Canada.41 The Japanese government chose the latter as 
the first option, because it keenly hoped Canada’s adhesion to the treaty and 
feared that the Saskatchewan issue would be an obstacle in the treaty 
negotiation.  
 
                                                   
39 On July 3rd, 1912, high-level officials at the Japanese Foreign Ministry held a 
meeting concerning Canadian adherence to the treaty and concluded that it 
would be essential to make use of the ‘influence’ of the British government as 
well as approach Ottawa (Canadian federal government). They also discussed 
the Saskatchewan’s ‘white women’s labour law’, and decided to ask the Consul 
at Vancouver not to make a direct demand to Ottawa, because it would harm the 
negotiation of the treaty. Mr. Nakamura, General Consul at Ottawa, attended 
the meeting. Confidential, July 3, 1912, in Ibid., 14. 
40 Section 95 of the British North America Act stipulates, “In each province the 
Legislature may make laws in relation to …immigration into the province; 
and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from time to 
time make laws in relation to …immigration into all or any of the provinces; 
and any law of the Legislature of a province relative to agriculture or to 
immigration shall have effect in and for the province as long and as far only 
as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada. Canada, The 
Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 35. 
41 It was in 1928 that an official diplomatic relationship between Canada and 
Japan was established. In the next year, Sir Herbert Marler was appointed as 
first Canadian Minister in Japan, and Prince Iemasa Tokugawa arrived at 
Ottawa to assume the Japanese Legation.    
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Amendment of the law in Saskatchewan 
 
  Following the instruction from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yada 
formally demanded the omission of the word ‘Japanese’ from the law to the 
Government of Saskatchewan. In his letter to Hon. A. Turgeon, dated 
September 4th, he pointed out the contradiction between the purpose of the 
law and its scope, which ultimately meant ill-treatment for Japanese 
immigrants. “[T]he enactment of this law aims at the suppression of 
immorality which is supposed to exist in doubtful restaurants or 
apium(sic)(opium) dens run by some Chinamen in your Province, but the 
scope of the Legislation is so sweeping and drastic that the threatened 
enforcement of said Act according to its direct language is a great affront 
morally and materially to the Japanese residents in your Province who are 
engaged in an honest business. ….. An interpretation of the law as enacted 
would prevent a Japanese bank, wholesale house, factory or any other 
legitimate business from employing any white girls as stenographers, 
book-keepers or cashiers. Any offence you fear could be prosecuted 
criminally which is, needless to say, a grave injustice and discouragement of 
business development between Canada and Japan”.42 
  Mr. Yada then suggested that such unfair treatment of Japanese residents 
might eventually damage the commercial relations between Canada and 
Japan as well as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. “To-day, Great Britain and 
Japan are bound to each other as allies, each taking upon itself vast 
responsibilities for the other in endeavouring to maintain the peace of the 
world as well promoting that freedom and justice to all people which is the 
certain outcome of modern civilization. ….. Canada is now a great nation in 
a mighty Empire. The greatness of her prosperity is due in a great part to 
                                                   
42 Yada to Turgeon, September 4, 1912, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1912, vol. 1, 
297-298. 
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her loyalty to the mother-land….. The forwarding of her trade in all 
quarters of the glove(sic)(globe) is new advancing and other nations are 
watching her policy and enterprise. A large trade with Japan is at her door 
and my nation looks upon her with favour as the fairest of the daughters of 
Britain. Canada has sent her trade agents to Japan to consummate her 
aspirations and has subsidized steamers to improve that trade at vast 
expense. Feature of progress in trade and good-will are abounding and in 
the wide spirit of friendship great development is promised. These thoughts 
and reflections are submitted to you and through you to the Government of 
your Province that you may consider the wrong and injustice which result 
from a policy towards Japan so widely at variance with the general policy of 
the Empire, and I trust the greatness of your endeavour to serve your 
Province may assist you to avoid any injustice to a people who stand at the 
right hand of the great Empire of which you are all so justly proud”.43 
  On October 23rd, Saskatchewan Attorney General Turgeon replied to Mr. 
Yada. In it he himself fully understood Japanese government’s view, and he 
would make efforts to work upon the whole provincial government to take 
this matter into consideration.44 A week later, Mr. Yada sent Hon. Turgeon a 
letter as follows: “I can not (sic) help appreciating the very cordial spirit 
pervading your whole letter. In view of the sweeping victory of the Liberal 
Party in the recent election in your Province, I entertain no doubt that the 
Act in question will be amended in the coming session of the Provincial 
Legislature so as to remove the objections made on behalf of the Japanese 
Government”.45 
  On the same day, October 20th, Mr. Yada reported to Viscount Uchida on 
Turgeon’s reply, expressing the possibility of the amendment of the law in 
                                                   
43 Ibid. 
44 Turgeon to Yada, October 23, 1912, in Ibid., 306. 
45 Yada to Turgeon, October 30, 1912, in Ibid., 305-306. 
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the next legislature to be opened on November 14th with a clear majority of 
continued Liberal governing party, although he was still cautious by 
suggesting that the Japanese government should begin negotiation with the 
Canadian federal government, if such amendment had not been passed or if 
the amended law had not been sanctioned by the Lieutenant Governor of 
Saskatchewan. 46  Regardless of the instruction from Foreign Minister 
Uchida not to make a direct demand to the Canadian federal government as 
mentioned earlier, Mr. Yada, as a ‘man on the spot’, suggested direct 
negotiation with Ottawa again and again. 
  But, on January 15th the next year, Mr. Yada received from Regina a 
telegram notifying him of the amendment of the law: “I have the honour to 
inclose herewith a copy of Bill No. 60 passed during the last Session of the 
Legislature and assented to January 11, 1913….”47 Thus, An Act to Prevent 
the Employment of Female Labour in Certain Capacities was amended by 
striking out the words ‘Japanese’ and ‘or other Oriental person’. And this 
news was reported to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Duke Taro Katsura,48 
as well as the Japanese Ambassador to London and the Consul General in 
Ottawa.49 
  What made the amendment possible? It can be said that the direct 
negotiation of the Japanese government with Saskatchewan, as described, 
proved effective. But, as will be discussed later, other factors were at work 
that involved Anglo-Japanese and other imperial relations.   
 
 
                                                   
46 Yada to Viscount Uchida, October 30, 1912, in Ibid., 306. 
47  Deputy Attorney General (T. A. Colclough) [on behalf of the Attorney 
General], January 15, 1913, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol. 1, 108. 
48  Prime Minister Katsura served concurrently as Foreign Minister from 
December 21, 1912 until Takaaki Kato succeeded on January 29, 1913. 
49 Yada to Duke Katsura, January 20, 1913, in Ibid., 107. 
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Manitoba and Ontario 
 
  Since what had happened in Saskatchewan, the Japanese government 
was apprehensive for its influence on other provinces, fearing it might drive 
anti-Japanese feelings eastward, although the main target of the ‘white 
women’s labour law’ was the swarm of Chinese immigrants, who were 
thought to be depriving jobs from white labourers.50 Indeed the provinces of 
Manitoba and Ontario also began considering such laws. Let us take a look 
at these cases briefly. 
  The legislature of the province of Manitoba, another prairie province 
where only five Japanese immigrants lived51 discussed a ‘white women’s 
labor law’ during its February session. On obtaining the news, the Japanese 
Consul at Vancouver, Mr. Yada, telegraphed the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Baron Nobuaki Makino, 52  to report on the situation in Manitoba on 
February 8th, who then gave his instruction to Mr. Yada to make inquiry to 
the Manitoba government. But the law was passed on February 15th.53 
  On February 26th, James Howden, Attorney General of Manitoba replied 
to Mr. Yada, saying “[t]he Act respecting the employment of female labour in 
certain capacities passed the Legislature without amendment, this Act 
comes into force upon proclamation. It has not yet been proclaimed”.54 A 
month later, in reply to Mr. Yada’s demand of the amendment, Hon. Howden 
explained that the law had no intention of being obnoxious to Japanese 
people and also hinted at the possibility of a future revision of the law as 
                                                   
50 e.g. Yada to Baron Makino, March 8, 1913 in Ibid., 109-110. For union 
workers’ views on Asian immigrants, see David Goutour, Guarding the Gates: 
The Canadian Labour Movement and Immigration, Vancouver, 2007. 
51 In 1911, the total population of the province was 461,394. 
52 He served as Foreign Minister from February 1913 to April 1914. 
53 Yada to Baron Makino, March 8, 1913, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol. 1, 
109-110. 
54 Attorney General (J. H. Howden) to Yada, February 26, 1913, in Ibid., 113. 
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well as of intervention by the federal government, by pointing out “I might 
say that the scope of the bill will be thoroughly discussed with the 
authorities at Ottawa before being acted upon. In view of what has been 
done by the legislature of Saskatchewan I do not think there will be any 
objection to amend the act in the manner suggested in case it is found 
desirable to bring it into effect”.55  Then Mr. Yada suggested to Baron 
Makino that it would be better to ask the Manitoba government to amend 
the law at the next session.56 
  The following May, Mr. Yoshitaka Hori, who had succeeded Mr. Yada, 
visited Winnipeg, capital of Manitoba, to meet with the Premier and 
Attorney General. During the meeting, Hon. Howden delivered a notice to 
Mr. Hori: “it is not the intention of the Government to bring this Act into 
force in its present form. The Act will be so amended that all reference to 
Japanese will be eliminated, in case it is decided to bring it into force”.57 
Howden did not mention at all about why the Manitoba government had 
decided to amend the law, but it can be said that Manitoba would be 
following Saskatchewan’s case. On this point, Mr. Hori predicted that the 
British Colonial Office might have intervened,58 but as will be shown later, 
they had not yet taken action at this stage. Anyway, Manitoba’s ‘white 
women’s labour law’ was rescinded.59 
  In the Province of Ontario, too, some legislators proposed a ‘white 
women’s labour law’ early in 1913. But, unlike Saskatchewan and Manitoba, 
they demanded an act to prohibit Asian immigrants from employing all 
women. The Japanese government learned about this from a Toronto 
                                                   
55 Howden to Yada, March 17, 1913, in Ibid., 112. 
56 Yada to Baron Makino, March 17, 1913, in Ibid., 112-113. 
57 Howden to Hori, April 17, 1913, in Ibid. 118. 
58 Hori to Baron Makino, May 15, 1913, in Ibid., 117-118. 
59 Manitoba’s ‘white women’s labour law’ was listed as “An Act to repeal certain 
Enactments which have become Obsolete”, Statute of Manitoba, 1913, c. 35. 
Asian Immigrants and the British Empire   59 
 
newspaper on March 5th, and the Consul General, Mr. Nakamura, in 
Ottawa promptly asked Ontario Premier, Sir James Whitney, about the 
details and obtained a copy of the bill. Sir Whitney also sent him a telegram 
predicting that the legislature would probably cease to discuss it. In his 
report to Foreign Minister Makino, Mr. Nakamura pointed out that this bill 
was too drastic, impracticable and ridiculous because it might ban the 
hiring of Asian women by Asian male immigrants, suggesting that this 
Ontario case should be left as it is.60 On March 27th, in the Legislature of 
Ontario one of the cabinet ministers questioned the bill and it was 
abandoned in the second reading.61 
  Around the same time that the issue of ‘white women’s labour laws” was 
solved for Japanese immigrants, the negotiations over the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 ended, and Canada decided to 
adhere to the treaty on April 10th, 1913. 62  During the negotiations, 
regulation of Japanese immigration to Canada remained a big issue. 
Although Canada understood Japan’s close relation with Britain, it did not 
want to repeal or affect any of the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1910.  
  Then in February 1913, Canadian Prime Minister Robert Laird Borden 
asked Japan to offer a written promise that the Japanese government would 
continue the limitation on Japanese immigration to Canada, following the 
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that was ratified in 1911.63 
                                                   
60 Nakamura to Baron Makino, March 11, 1913, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, 
vol. 1, 110-111. 
61 Nakamura to Baron Makino, March 28, 1913, in Ibid., 114-115. 
62  Telegram, April 12, 1913. Canada, Department of External Affairs, 
Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 1, 748.   
63 F. L. Borden to Consul General of Japan (Nakamura), February 7, 1913, 
Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 1, 744-747. The same 
document is compiled in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol. 1, 7-8. On February 
21st, 1911, Uchida, Japanese Ambassador at Washington, signed and 
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of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United 
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On March 1st, the Japanese government agreed with Borden’s proposal, and 
Consul General Nakamura sent him the following declaration: “His 
Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Consul General at Ottawa, duly authorized by 
his Government, has the honour to declare that the Imperial Japanese 
Government are fully prepared to maintain and intend to maintain with 
equal effectiveness the limitation and control with they have since 190864 
exercised in the regulation of emigration from Japan to Canada”.65  
  For Japan, this was the only way to save its honour. In order to solve the 
Japanese immigration issue as well as the Canadian adherence to the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the Japanese 
government relied on Britain’s mediatory role. 66  As for the British 
government too, Canadian secession from the treaty would worsen 
Anglo-Japanese relations. Therefore, the presence of Britain was very 
important.67  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
States, the undersigned, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, duly 
authorized by his Government, has the honour to declare that the Imperial 
Japanese Government are fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness 
the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised 
in regulation of the elimination of labourers to the United States”. Documents 
on Canadian External Relations, 746. 
64 This designates the Hayashi-Lemieux Agreement. 
65  Consul General of Japan (Nakamura) to F. L. Borden, March 1, 1913, 
Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 1, 748.  
66 After Canada decided to adhere to the treaty, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Makino instructed Chozo Koike, Chargé d’Affaires in London, to express his 
gratitude to the British Foreign Minister as follows. “You will express to Sir 
Edward Grey the satisfaction with which the Imperial Government received 
notice of Canada’s adhesion to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and 
assure him of their warm appreciation of his friendly offices which were so 
helpful in bringing the Dominion to this happy decision”. Makino to Koike, 
May 5, 1913, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol. 1, 36.  
67  Iino, “Nichiei tsusho joyaku to Kanada no Nihon-jin imin mondai [The 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation: The Japanese Problem 
in Canada]”, 6. 
Asian Immigrants and the British Empire   61 
 
‘White Women’s Labour Laws’ and the Britain Empire: 
East Indians, Japanese and Chinese 
 
  The issue of ‘white women’s labour laws’ was also influenced by the 
British presence. The treatment of Japanese, East Indians, and Chinese in 
the laws reflected upon their country’s relation with Britain respectively: 
Japan as an alliance partner, India as a dependency with rising 
anti-colonialism, and China as an unstable community outside the British 
Empire. 
  Saskatchewan’s original ‘white women’s labour law’ was amended to 
target only Chinese immigrants by dropping the words ‘Japanese’ and ‘other 
Oriental person’, and Manitoba’s law failed to obtain royal assent. In the 
backdrop, not only Japanese approaches towards Canada and Britain 
worked, but also did British government’s concern about the treatment of 
‘other Oriental person’, namely East Indian immigrants. 
  As early as 1900s, East Indian immigrants, who were very few in number 
though, were also unwelcome in Canada along with the Chinese and 
Japanese immigrants.68 As India was a part of the British Empire, outright 
discrimination against them by Canada would dissatisfy the British 
government which feared that anti-colonialist passion in India would be 
inflamed further. Canada also took into consideration that East Indians 
were its fellow British subjects, who could not be barred entry on the basis 
of citizenship only. This led the Canadian government to issue the 
order-in-council in 1908, known as ‘continuous passage (or journey) 
regulation’ that authorized the immigration ministry to prohibit their entry 
                                                   
68 Total number of immigrants from India from 1900 to 1910 was 5,195 which 
then dropped to 112 from 1910 to 1920. Hugh Johnston, The East Indians in 
Canada, Ottawa, 1984, 7. 
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unless they came from the country of their birth or citizenship,69 which 
eventually caused the Komagata maru affair in 1914.70 
  Sharing the view that Canada should continue to be a white man’s 
country and that East Indians, accustomed to a tropical climate, were 
unsuitable to Canadian society, the British government understood the 
relevance of the ‘continuous passage regulation’, although it still feared that 
it would stir up the anti-British movement in India and beyond.71 As for 
‘white women’s labour laws’, they also became the concern of the British 
government. 
  On August 17th, 1912, the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lewis 
Vermon Harcourt asked Charles Doherty, Canadian Minister of Justice, to 
amend the law by removing “any discrimination by name against Japanese 
or British Indian subjects”, “bearing on questions of international relations 
and the consideration due to His Majesty’s British subjects”. Doherty then 
recommended his government that it should send a despatch to the Province 
of Saskatchewan to demand the amendment. On September 6th, the 
Canadian government transmitted its despatch to Saskatchewan 
Lieutenant Governor, George W. Brown.72 
                                                   
69 Ninette Kelly & Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of 
Canadian Immigration Policy, 2nd ed. Toronto, 2012, 150. ‘Continuous 
Passage regulation’ is as follows. “All immigrants seeking entry must come to 
Canada by continuous journey and through tickets from the country of their 
birth or nationality or citizenship”. Order in Council, dated 8th January, 
1908. 
70 As for Komagata maru affair, see Hugh J. M. Johnston, The Voyage of the 
Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar, expanded and 
fully revised edition, Vancouver, 2014; Ward White Canada Forever, 79-93.   
71  Canada, Sessional Papers 1908, No. 36a, pp. 7-9. As for India’s 
anti-colonialist movements in North America, see Seema Sohi, Echoes of 
Mutiny: Race, Surveillance and Indian Anticolonialism in North America, 
Oxford, 2014. 
72 Order in Council, P. C. 2431, September 6, 1912, in Documents on Canadian 
External Relations, vol. 1, 616. 
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  Harcourt also informed Canada that the Japanese government had asked 
Britain to amend the law. On January 15th, 1913, in his secret despatch to 
the Governor General of Canada, Duke of Connaught and Strathearn (third 
son of Queen Victoria, Prince Arthur), he mentioned that Baron Takaaki 
Kato,73 then Ambassador in London, called “attention to the fact that the 
scope of the law is so sweeping that it would prevent any Japanese bank, 
wholesale house, factory, or other legitimate business from employing any 
white girls as stenographers, book-keepers, cashiers, etc.”. Harcourt then 
expected the Canadian government to make efforts to “secure the repeal of 
the Act by the Provincial Legislature and the subscription of a measure in 
terms not offensive to Japanese or other Asiatics”. 74  Shortly after 
Saskatchewan amended the law, he sent a secret despatch to Prince Arthur 
to tell his satisfaction.75 
  In the case of Manitoba, the British government made a similar approach. 
In his secret despatch to Prince Arthur dated September 20th, 1913, 
Harcourt showed his desire, saying “as in the case of the Saskatchewan Act, 
Ch. 17, of 1912 [An Act to Prevent the Employment of Female Labour in 
Certain Capacities], steps will be taken by your Ministers to secure the 
amendment of the measure”.76 
  As indicated, the British government were much concerned by the ‘white 
women’s labour laws’, which might have caused British imperial relations 
with both India and Japan to deteriorate. Although these laws were within 
                                                   
73 He was appointed as Ambassador to Britain twice (March 1895 to April 1899 
and February 1909 to January 1913), when he contributed to the renewal of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in July 1911, and as Foreign Minister four times 
(October 1900 to June 1901, January to March 1906, January to February 
1913, and April 1914 to August 1915). He held the premiership from June 
1924 to January 1926. Nihon Gaiko-shi Jiten, 181-182. 
74 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, January 15, 1913, in Documents on 
Canadian External Relations, vol. 1, 618. 
75 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, February 17, 1913, in Ibid., 620. 
76 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, September 20, 1913, in Ibid., 621-622. 
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Canadian provincial jurisdiction, ill-treatment of East Indians would 
inflame their anti-British patriotism, while regulation of Japanese 
immigrants would worsen the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Therefore, the 
British government tried to intervene behind the scenes. But this fact was 
disclosed soon in the House of Commons by a Liberal member from Moose 
Jaw, who attacked Robert Laird Borden’s Conservative government in terms 
of violation of provincial autonomy by pointing out that the amendment of 
the law was the result of the negotiations between the Saskatchewan 
government, the British Colonial Office and the Canadian Government.77 
  Eventually Japanese and East Indians were removed from the target of 
‘white women’s labour laws’. At least as far as their treatment was 
concerned, the British government still had keen interest in Canadian 
domestic affairs, long after Canada had become a ‘dominion’ in the British 
North America Act of 1867. Then what about Chinese immigrants? 
  Just before the Province of Saskatchewan first enacted the law in 1912, 
the Chinese community in Moose Jaw held a protest meeting. The Chinese 
minister in Canada promised them to take action if such a law were passed 
in the legislature, but he was unable to visit the Saskatchewan government. 
Only after it was enacted, did the Chinese government demand its 
disavowal. But it was too late, long after the set period for disavowal had 
expired. Also its action was delayed by the Chinese Revolution, and lack of 
cordial relation with Britain or Canada had led China to be at a 
disadvantage.78 
  In the end, only the Chinese became the target of the ‘white women’s 
labour laws’. It was not until 1914 that the Chinese government protested 
against the discriminative treatment. On April 2nd, Lew Yuk-Lin, Chinese 
                                                   
77 Nakamura to Baron Makino, April 8, 1913, in Nihon Gaiko Monjo, 1913, vol.1, 
116-117. 
78 James W. St. G. Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Historical Studies, Waterloo, 1997, 52. 
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minister in London, sent a letter to the British Foreign Minister Edward 
Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon. Lew begged Grey to use his influence to 
remove this kind of law, by pointing out that “it is a discriminative Act 
against the Chinese people lawfully resident in Saskatchewan” and that 
“the Act was passed at a time when my country was undergoing a revolution 
and my Government had not the time to attend to protest against such 
measures, but now that my Government has been fully established”.79 
  This letter was forwarded to Colonial Secretary Harcourt, and he inquired 
Prince Arthur, Governor General Canada, about Canada’s reply to it,80 
suggesting that the British government had no intention to intervene, in 
comparison with the cases of Japanese and East Indians as described above. 
After having made contact with the Saskatchewan government as well as 
federal immigration officers, the Canadian government confirmed the 
legitimacy of Saskatchewan’s ‘white women’s labour law’ by issuing the 
Order in Council in February 18th, 1915.81 
  In the meantime, having been asked by the Canadian government, E. 
Blake Robertson, Assistant Chief Controller of Chinese Immigration, 
submitted his view as follows, which is worth being cited to describe the 
federal and provincial relations in Canada: “With regard to the suggestion 
that Chinese persons should enjoy the same rights and privileges in Canada 
as the subjects of the most favoured nations, the Government would very 
likely be put in the position of having to veto provincial legislation such as 
that introduced in the Saskatchewan and Ontario Parliaments prohibiting 
the employment of white girls by Chinese and Japanese employers, 
although possibly if it was apparent that the Government had made a 
serious effort to limit this class of immigration the Provincial Governments 
                                                   
79 Minister of China to Foreign Secretary, April 2, 1914, in Documents on 
Canadian External Relations, vol. 1, 645. 
80 Colonial Secretary to Governor General, April 16, 1914, in Ibid., 644-645. 
81 Order in Council, P. C. 315, February 18, 1915, in Ibid., 655-656. 
66 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 6 (2017)  
 
would be less likely to attempt to enact drastic legislation”.82  As this 
indicates, the Canadian government found it improper to intervene directly 
in provincial affairs such as controlling Chinese residents, hoping its levying 
on head tax on Chinese immigrants at their entry worked.  
  All in all, both the Canadian and British governments kept or tried to be 
bystanders towards the provincial regulation of Chinese immigrants, which 
totally differed from the Japanese and East Indians issues. Unlike Japan, 
China did not have a useful diplomatic channel with Britain, and, unlike 
Japanese and East Indians problems, Chinese immigration issues were not 
taken seriously. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  The original ‘white women’s labour laws’ of Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
targeted Asian male immigrants at large, but Saskatchewan amended its 
law to aim at Chinese immigrants only and Manitoba failed to obtain royal 
assent. This article examined the backgrounds of the enactment, 
amendment and withdrawal of the ‘white women’s labour laws’ by paying 
attention to how Japan, Canada and Britain responded to them.  
  Japan had to tackle this issue during the critical period when Canada’s 
adhesion to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had 
been under negotiation. Taking it as both a domestic/provincial and external 
(‘diplomatic’) matter, the Japanese government not only approached 
Canadian provincial governments but also asked the British government to 
quietly intervene into its dominion’s affairs. Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
accepted the appeals of the Japanese government, and they also took the 
                                                   
82 Assistant Chief of Chinese Immigration to Secretary, Minister of the Interior, 
June 29, 1914, in Ibid., 653. 
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demand of the British government into consideration to review how their 
laws would affect imperial relations by worsening the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and inflaming anti-British feelings among East Indians, while the 
treatment of Chinese immigrants was not taken seriously in its imperial 
context. This suggests that the British government was still attentive to and, 
to some extent, intervened in such Canadian domestic affairs that might 
have deteriorated Britain’s imperial or external stance, long after Canada 
obtained semi-autonomous dominion status by the Confederation in 1867.  
 
* In this article, permit me to use offensive terms. All of them are citations 
from contemporary sources, which reflect the biased thoughts of the period 
here examined. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses how Winston S. Churchill was portrayed in wartime 
visual propaganda in the United Kingdom and Japan. It will firstly deal 
with his depiction in Britain, analysing what Churchill symbolized, through 
an examination of caricatures and posters in wartime Britain. It will be 
demonstrated that, through such propaganda, Churchill embodied many 
virtues of his country, such as democracy, liberty, and history. After this, an 
analysis of Japanese perspectives, similarly seen through propaganda 
material, will offer another angle on these themes. It will be argued that, 
although he also symbolized the aforementioned virtues in Japanese 
materials, they were considered to be vices, founded on the sacrifice of Asian 
and African people. By comparing his depiction in two countries, the nature 
of the Britishness Churchill personified in wartime will be comprehensively 
delineated. 
 
Keywords: The Second World War, Winston Churchill, Propaganda, Japan
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Introduction 
 
Images of Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) have been a part of everyday 
British popular culture since the Second World War and he has been widely 
researched over the course of the last century. This article aims to present a 
comparative approach, taking visual materials out of the limitations of 
British historiography and into the broader, global context. By using British 
and Japanese national propaganda, the nature of a Britishness that 
Churchill symbolized, such as the British democracy, liberty, and history 
will be examined from two perspectives. It will offer multiple examples of 
national propaganda from the Second World War. The significance of this 
approach is that it will reassert those concepts of wartime propaganda that 
can be considered ‘national’, but more significantly, those that can be 
considered ‘international’ in a somewhat opposite sense in her Asian enemy. 
It will offer an insight into the nature of his leadership in Britain and, 
indeed, globally.  
Winston Churchill’s role in the Second World War has been studied from 
various perspectives. The depiction of Churchill in wartime propaganda has 
been well documented by, among others, Addison, Mackay, and Rhodes 
whose research discusses Churchill’s political life, civilian life in wartime, 
and British propaganda in general. 1  Churchill’s image in wartime 
propaganda and its reception by the British public has indeed been 
extensively investigated by Sinclair.2 In the twenty-first century, Churchill 
possesses a somewhat mythical status in Britain and America, as both a 
defender of the democratic world and a founder of the modern world. It is 
                                                   
1 P. Addison, Churchill on the Home Front 1900–1955, London 1993; A. Rhodes, 
Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II, London 1975; R. Mackay, 
The Test of War: Inside Britain1939–45, London 1999. 
2 G. L. Sinclair, ‘Winston Churchill and the British Public: Propaganda and 
Perception, 1939–1945’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kent 2004. 
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deluded to think that Churchill was popular from the beginning of the war 
and that he created his legendary status during the course of it, yet this 
unconditional exaltation was constructed in the second half of the twentieth 
century.  
In the academic world, his contemporary scholars adored him as a great 
man post-World War II. From the 1940s to the 1960s, most of those writing 
about Churchill knew him personally. While they were critical of his failures, 
nothing could supersede his achievement as a war leader. A. J. P Taylor 
described him as ‘a saviour of his country’,3 and historians constructed his 
image with unceasing applause. Churchill has since been depicted positively, 
but more objectively, by younger historians like Gilbert, Addison, and 
James.4  
Of course, there have been negative depictions of him. Autobiographies of 
Samuel Hoare (1880–1959), a notable Chamberlainite politician, and of 
Allan Brooke (1883–1963), Churchill’s military adviser, were critical about 
Churchill before and during the Second World War. 5  From the 1980s 
revisionists judged Churchill responsible for the end of the empire, and 
focused in negative fashion on his attitude towards, for example, colonialism, 
and class division.6 Their view has some importance in terms of colonialism, 
and in this context the Japanese criticism of Churchill in her wartime 
propaganda may have been partially valid. 
                                                   
3 P. Addison, ‘Churchill and the Price of Victory: 1939–1945’, in From Blitz to 
Blair: A New History of Britain Since 1939, ed. Nick Tiratsoo, London 1997, 
53. 
4  M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill vol. 3–8, London 1971–1988; Addison, 
Churchill on the Home Front. R. Rhodes James, Winston Churchill: A Study 
in Failure 1900–1939, Harmondsworth 1973. 
5 S. J. G. Hoare, Nine Troubled Years, London 1954; A. Brooke, War Diaries, 
1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Berkeley 2001. 
6  G. Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness, London 2001; J. Charmley, 
Churchill:The End of Glory, London 1993. 
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On a popular level, people in general could not unquestioningly applaud 
him. The approval of his premiership was never less than seventy-eight per 
cent in wartime; 7  however, Mass Observation reports noted minority 
opinion of him as a dictator or warmonger from 1941 onwards.8 It is 
undeniable that Churchill was a subject of admiration as a strong war 
leader who would take Britain towards victory, but at the same time people 
understood him not as a peacetime leader who would make their lives better. 
He could be a ‘national leader’, but not a party leader. He was not expected 
to be a peacetime leader by British people,9 while they certainly admitted 
that he played an important role in sustaining civilian morale by his 
speeches and fighting spirit.10  
In examining the reputation and popularity of Churchill, historians have 
used Mass Observation reports, which aimed to study the everyday life of 
ordinary people in Britain, and Gallup polls, which were directed by the 
British Institute of Public Opinion. They offer valuable insight into the 
civilian perception of Churchill. The paper adds visual materials, such as 
posters, pictures, and caricatures, and tries to look at his image more 
concretely. In her PhD thesis at the University of Kent, Sinclair used 
various visual materials to depict his leadership inclusively. She used 
posters, caricatures, photographs, and even pottery to understand him from 
various angles, yet her study covers only those in Britain.11 The paper will 
use visual propaganda in Japan, an Axis Power during the Second World 
War, in order to understand his historical role in different perspectives. By 
                                                   
7 G. H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain 
1937–1975, New York 1976, 29–123. 
8 Mass Observation Report File (MORF), No. 749, 23 June 1941. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Mackay, The Test of War, 143–4. 
11 Sinclair, Winston Churchill. 
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examining caricatures created by the Japanese government, it will offer 
another angle to observe Churchillian leadership.  
The paper will discuss the nature of his leadership in visual propaganda 
in an international context. Firstly, it will deal with his depiction in Britain, 
and analyse what Churchill symbolized through an examination of 
caricatures and posters in wartime.12 It will demonstrate that he embodied 
many virtues of his country, such as democracy, liberty, and history. Then, 
analysis of Japanese perspectives seen in their propaganda materials will 
offer the other angle of those themes. It will argue that although he also 
symbolized those virtues in Japanese materials, they were considered to be 
vices, founded on the sacrifices of Asian and African people. By comparing 
his depiction in two countries, the nature of his Britishness in wartime will 
be understood comprehensively. 
 
 
Churchill in British visual propaganda 
 
Winston Churchill was a hugely popular subject used in British wartime 
propaganda, both by public and private sectors. The Second World War is 
remembered with nostalgia and, for good or ill, he represents a particular 
kind of Britishness in the twenty-first century. Previous works have shown 
that he personified virtues such as defiance, resolution, the spirit of hope,13 
justice, freedom, and truth.14 They have emphasized his role in uniting the 
                                                   
12 Due to copyright reasons, all of the British caricatures and posters described 
in this paper cannot be inserted; therefore, the URL links for each caricature 
is cited in the footnotes. 
13 Mackay, The Test of War, 144. 
14 J. Fox, ‘Winston Churchill and the “men of destiny”: Leadership and the Role 
of the Prime Minister in Wartime Feature Films,’ in Making Reputations: 
Power, Persuasion and the Individual in Modern British Politics, ed. R. Toye 
and J. Gottlieb, London 2005, 92–3. 
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British people, and in making them recognize their historical part in freeing 
the world. It is said that through him people attained their collective, 
romantic, and heroic identity.15  
The portrayals of Churchill transformed over the wartime. His image 
changed from being based more on reality to one more mythical as the war 
progressed. Before Germany invaded Poland, Churchill was generally 
considered to be an old imperialist, looking for a war. While Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain (1869–1940) was praised for Munich in 1938, 
Churchill was a complete outsider, who was viewed sceptically by both the 
Conservative and Labour parties. Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947) described 
him as ‘the flotsam and jetsam of political life thrown up on the beach’,16 
and Herbert Samuel (1870–1963) remarked ironically that ‘if indeed the 
truest patriot is a man who breathes hatred, who lays the seeds of war and 
stirs up the greatest numbers of enemies against the country, then Mr 
Churchill is a great patriot’.17 From 1929 to 1939, Churchill experienced his 
‘wilderness years’. His revolt against Tory orthodoxy over both appeasement 
and India increased mistrust in him among Conservative MPs. When 
appeasement was mainstream among politicians and people, his alarm 
against Hitler was not reflected at all. Soon his prediction was to be realized, 
yet it was never acknowledged by politicians and public before the German 
invasion of Poland. 18  He was considered to have raised unnecessary 
hostility between two nations through his speeches and actions, and, in 
general, he was considered to be a ‘warmonger’ who sought his promotion 
and prestige through war. 19  Once Hitler revealed his ambition and 
                                                   
15 D. Jablonsky, Churchill, the Great Game and Total War, London 1991, 123. 
16 B. Gardner, Churchill in His Time: A Study in a Reputation 1939–1945, 
London 1968, 6. 
17 Ibid, 2. 
18 Rhodes James, Winston Churchill, 267, 409–36. 
19 Gardner, Churchill in His Time, 5. 
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launched his invasion, history proved his legitimacy. His opposition to the 
policy and his strong words in the 1930s were to raise his popularity during 
the war. 
In the early stage of the war, the practical image of Churchill as a war 
minister emerged. From 1939 to May 1940, it is said that Churchill enjoyed 
his reputation on account of his honesty and as an information supplier at 
the Admiralty. During the phoney war period, the Navy was almost the only 
force who fought against Nazi Germany. Naturally, Churchill became the 
one responsible for informing people of the cause of the war.20 While other 
ministers lacked news on the war’s progress, he had plenty to offer people as 
the First Lord of the Admiralty who presided over the Navy. The image of a 
truth-teller was created partly because of his contrast with the men 
associated with Munich, and partly because of his position at the 
Admiralty.21 This image has often been questioned since many reports in 
wartime show scepticism about his information, yet his role as informant 
continued in his first premiership.22  
In the first phase of the war, the image of Churchill was based on his 
practical work in the war cabinet. When he became prime minister, his 
image attained a spiritual or even mythical status. After May 1940 he 
gradually personified his nation, associated with its history and virtues. 
Addison claims that ‘at some point between May 1940 and the London blitz 
of September’ his career ‘merged with the history of British people’ because 
of disasters.23 As a national leader, he embodied his country, ‘the United 
Kingdom’. Britain found the best emblem at the right time. As a child of the 
Victorian era, he sincerely believed in a certain kind of Britishness, which 
could have reminded people of a glorious British history. 
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The Britishness emphasized in the war relied on British history, which 
was still in the tradition of the progressivism of the nineteenth century, and 
it had to emphasize the peculiarity and superiority of the British Empire. 
The concepts of Britishness in British propaganda are well exhibited in the 
wartime posters of London Transport. Four posters published in 1943 were 
named ‘Our Heritage’, and were intended to make both the staff and users 
of London Transport reflect on ‘other occasions of the nation’s will and high 
purpose’. Sir Francis Drake, Lord Nelson, William Pitt the younger, and 
finally Churchill himself were portrayed in each poster and they propagate 
a historical heritage which was passed on from British leaders in the past to 
Churchill.24 
The first myth in the series is ‘British destiny’. Posters of Drake and 
Nelson exploit the notion of the grace of God, by quoting words by them 
before the battles. Those captions in the lower section of each poster 
associate British fate and victory with the will of God, and this link with 
God was important in creating the myth of ‘British destiny’. Churchill 
believed in ‘British destiny’ and ‘a special relation with God’, and the belief 
was shared by the British public. They favoured the myth of the victories by 
                                                   
24  ‘Our heritage; Sir Francis Drake’, London Transport Museum, 
http://www.ltmcollection.org/posters/poster/poster.html?_IXSR_=MXgiMKT49
qk&_IXMAXHITS_=1&IXinv=1983/4/5615&IXsummary=dates/decade&IXfro
mdate=1940&IXtodate=1949&_IXFIRST_=173;  
‘Our heritage; Lord Nelson’, London Transport Museum, 
http://www.ltmcollection.org/posters/poster/poster.html?_IXSR_=MXgiMKT4
9qk&_IXMAXHITS_=1&IXinv=1983/4/5618&IXsummary=dates/decade&IX
fromdate=1940&IXtodate=1949&_IXFIRST_=172;  
‘Our heritage; William Pitt’, London Transport Museum, 
http://www.ltmcollection.org/posters/poster/poster.html?_IXSR_=MXgiMKT4
9qk&_IXMAXHITS_=1&IXinv=1983/4/5624&IXsummary=dates/decade&IX
fromdate=1940&IXtodate=1949&_IXFIRST_=170;  
‘Our heritage; Winston Churchill’, London Transport Museum, 
http://www.ltmcollection.org/posters/poster/poster.html?_IXSR_=MXgiMKT4
9qk&_IXMAXHITS_=1&IXinv=1983/4/5621&IXsummary=dates/decade&IX
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‘a few’ English people: a small island stood alone against a Continental 
tyranny and defended their land and freedom.25  
It is said that the myth of ‘a few’ was created by British geography and the 
history of the island country. For Britain, her geographical status as an 
island was one of the factors that formed an identity. Froude describes how 
‘a combination of curious circumstances, assisted by four and twenty miles 
of water, had protected England hitherto from sharing the miseries of the 
rest of Europe’.26 The physical distance from the European continent made 
people believe in a primordial nation, and led Churchill to believe in the 
‘island race discourse’.27 The sea which divides Britain from Europe had an 
important role in creating British identity. Because of this separation, the 
history of her battles against foreign nations had been naturally determined 
by the Navy until the nineteenth century. The Battle of Gravelines in 1588 
tends to be described as a sweeping victory by ‘a few’ English over a massive 
Spanish Armada. The Battle of Trafalgar illustrates a clear contrast 
between free England and the oppressed continent under a tyrant, 
Napoleon. Those posters remind people of the high virtue of the British 
fighting against continental vices. Victories in history had given the British 
a sense of being a chosen people, and made them believe in ‘a special 
relation with God’. 28  Britain is right and has been right. The series 
reminded people of British legitimacy in history. The myth of ‘a few’ was 
shared by Churchill, and he explains the fate of a small island in his essay, 
‘Faith, Hope and Nationality’: 
 
                                                   
25 M. Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World 
War, Harlow 2004, 96. 
26 Cited in P. Guedalla, Mr. Churchill: A Portrait, London 1941, 302. 
27 A. Law, ‘Of Navies and Navels: Britain as a Mental Island’, Geografiska 
Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 87:4, 2005, 267–9. 
28 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 96. 
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God controls our lives, yet they are ours to shape […]. At any rate there 
is no doubt about one miracle. A wandering tribe in many respects 
indistinguishable from numberless nomadic communities, grasped and 
proclaimed an idea of which all the genius of Greece and all the power 
of Rome were incapable.29 
 
The myth was used to emphasize how alone Britain was against Nazi 
Germany after 1940.30 In this story, Churchill was a war leader who nobly 
stood alone against Hitler since the 1930s in contrast to the appeasers. 
Those posters propose the divine image of the United Kingdom, and made 
people believe in continuity of the nation.  
The second theme in the series is the ‘fighting race’. The series of posters 
suggests an image of Britain as a nation of warriors. Posters of Drake and 
Nelson showcase two victorious warriors in history. Drake is depicted with 
his sword, and his presence reminds people of the great sea battles with 
Spain. Nelson is depicted alongside battleships, and recalls the victory over 
Napoleon. By aligning Churchill with those great military leaders, the 
series succeeded in creating the image of Churchill as warrior. Also, those 
leaders in the past have important roles in reminding people that those 
battles were fought for liberty. Churchill was proud of British liberty, and he 
believed that British people acquired it thanks to centuries of struggle 
against tyranny. He traced the origin of liberty to the Anglo-Saxon race, and 
declared that the English people had been fighting against oppression for 
more than a millennium, and they had defeated enemies of justice. 31  
Churchill believed in the history of the ‘fighting race’ and when he became 
prime minister, the mass media and the government spread his belligerent 
image as a war leader. It was very easy to associate Churchill with fighting 
spirit, since he was inescapably tied to the armed forces throughout his life. 
                                                   
29 W. Churchill, If I Lived My Life Again, London 1974, 191. 
30 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 96. 
31 W. Churchill, The Island Race, London 1964, 24. 
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His youth at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, his position at the 
Admiralty, and at the Ministry of Munitions in the First World War, had 
made a link between Churchill and warrior before it was emphasized in 
propaganda.32  
War is a consistent topic throughout his personal history, and the armed 
forces are inseparable from his career. He was often depicted in caricatures 
and posters, which focused on his fighting spirit, using traditional motifs, 
such as John Bull, a bulldog, and St George, the patron saint of England. In 
a poster by Leslie Illingworth in 1940, Churchill was depicted as a warlike 
John Bull, the symbol of Britain, in a Union Jack shirt and identical hat, 
holding a bayonet.33 The poster indicates that he was a symbol of his 
country and that all the British were behind him. In addition, a poster 
entitled ‘Holding the Line!’ was created and distributed by an American 
artist, Henri Guignon. It first aimed to mobilize public opinion in America to 
support British warfare, yet the image soon became widespread in Britain. 
It shows Churchill as a bulldog standing on a Union Jack, staring resolutely 
at the viewer above the words 'Holding the Line!'. It implies that he stands 
alone to defend the democratic world and Britain is the ‘last bulwark 
against totalitarianism’. 34  On 26 August 1942, a caricature in Punch 
entitled ‘The Bulldog Has Wings’ not only exhibits Churchill’s strength but 
also his role in saving Europe.35 Churchill was known for his footwork, and 
the caricature shows him travelling across oceans to build and maintain 
partnerships for the ultimate victory. The bulldog was a popular motif 
depicting Churchill in visual propaganda. It is said that traditionally the 
                                                   
32 Guedalla, Mr. Churchill, 314. 
33 ‘Back to the wall’, Kew, National Archives, INF 3/1325. See: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/nationalarchives/17365061086. 
34 D. Hall, ‘Bulldog Churchill: The Evolution of a Famous Image’, Finest Hour: 
Journal of the Churchill Center and Societies 106, 2000, 19. 
35 ‘The Bulldog has wings’, Punch, 26 August 1942. See: 
http://punch.photoshelter.com/image/I0000puX0n47aRsE. 
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British bulldog had qualities such as ‘pedigree, highly intelligent, 
formidable, loyal, exploring, determined, hard fighting, adaptable to new 
circumstances, and stocked with untiring reserves of stamina’.36 Those 
characteristics of the bulldog were required of the wartime prime minister, 
and propagandists made use of these characteristics by associating him 
with the bulldog. 
Another motif used in depicting Churchill was St George. The caricature 
‘A Dragon Slayer’, again in Punch on 1 January 1941, shows a masculine 
Churchill in armour vanquishing a German dragon, insinuating that the 
British army should persevere in taking over German towns. By portraying 
him as a saint, it suggests that Churchill, or Britain, was a type of saviour of 
Christendom.37 By exhibiting masculine images, such caricatures show a 
paternal Churchill who would protect Britain and Europe. British wartime 
propaganda used British history and myths, and Churchill became their 
emblem. Those illustrations signify that people were fighting against 
Germany for high purposes, and made the war ‘the battle for freedom’. 
The third idea deduced from the series of posters is democracy, which was 
perhaps the most important concept for Churchill and his country. The 
images of British destiny and the warrior were used in various mediums, 
but there was only one restriction: in any medium, Churchill had to be 
portrayed as a leader of the democratic world. The Ministry of Information 
was heedful of depicting him within the framework of representative 
democracy.38  
                                                   
36  J. W. Miller, ‘Winston Churchill: Spokesman for Democracy’, Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 28:2, 1942, 133. 
37 ‘The Dragon-Slayer’, Punch, 1 January 1941. See: http://punch.photoshelter. 
com/image?&_bqG=0&_bqH=eJxNj8sKwjAQRf.mGzep4qKBLGKSyvhIZJIuX
AVbah8UFa0gfr2JiDqbOZdh7p3pRVUiOT67C8h7mesZyR9ZWq2zUdEZnc4J
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w_WRAnWo9oobpX8yN2_NghKh1Uw.u1i0DHkeh24sAo9SFbEe_pV382xPA3
QJF4sPASbkP_B4ouY_3AbkQvHbvUhfJGI6PYCuplNVA--&GI_ID=. 
38 Sinclair, Winston Churchill, 94. 
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While Hitler pushed his charisma to the forefront and emphasized his 
singularity in newsreels and speeches, Churchill had to be the 
representative of the British people, and had to show he was one of them. 
Roberts argues that Hitler was a charismatic leader and that Churchill was 
an inspirational one.39 Yet it is important to note that a different kind of 
leadership was required in democratic Britain from totalitarian Germany. 
In Churchill’s belief, what one person could do was limited, and the role of a 
national leader was to mentor people in the framework of democracy,40 and 
ultimately his power rested with the House of Commons.41 In contrast to 
Hitler, a totalitarian leader who possessed a somewhat sacred status among 
German people as seen in ‘Hitler greeting’ and ‘pilgrims for the Berghof near 
Berchtesgaden’,42 Churchill had to remain a representative of the British 
people. 
Although Churchill symbolized democracy in many visual materials in 
Britain in wartime, his idea of democracy was that of a privilege bestowed 
on people from above, and it was not widely shared by the popular public. 
David Low, a cartoonist who had depicted Churchill frequently, commented 
on his attitude towards democracy in 1920s: 
 
In those days, whenever I heard Churchill’s dramatic periods about 
democracy, I felt inclined to say: ‘Please define’. His definition, I felt, 
would be something like ‘government of the people, for the people, by 
benevolent and paternal ruling-class chaps like me.’[…] I could never 
accept him as a democrat in the Lincolnian sense.43  
 
                                                   
39 A. Roberts, Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership, London 2003, xx. 
40 Churchill, If I Lived My Life Again, 1. 
41 Roberts, Hitler and Churchill, 96. 
42 I. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford 
1987, 60. 
43 D. Low, Low’s Autobiography, London 1956, 147. 
82 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 6 (2017)  
 
Churchill was, in many eyes, not a democratic figure before the war 
despite his support for democratic policies.44 In the Second World War, the 
old language of ‘liberty’ was often used to emphasize free Britain in order to 
distinguish democratic Britain from Hitler’s dictatorship. According to 
Quinault, ‘in their struggle with the dictators, Churchill and Roosevelt 
mixed the “new” language of all inclusive democracy with the “old” language 
of popular liberty’.45 
In order to contrast totalitarian Germany under the Nazis and democratic 
Britain under Parliament, the wartime propaganda distributed a dogmatic 
and ambiguous concept of democracy via images of Churchill. As seen in the 
poster ‘Our heritage’, depicting Churchill with the British Parliament,46 
Churchill was portrayed as the symbol of parliamentary democracy. Behind 
him is blue sky and the Houses of Parliament and in his hands a book and 
glasses. The caption was taken from his speech delivered in the House of 
Commons on 4 June 1940. The original speech used an old word ‘freedom’ or 
‘liberty’ rather than democracy.47 It aimed to plant the image of personal 
freedom as an important element of democracy, which he strived to protect 
from Germany. The inclusion of the Houses of Parliament implies that 
Churchill is a banner of representative parliamentary democracy, and 
clarifies the ideological dichotomy between Britain and Germany. It reminds 
people of the role of Churchill as a democratic leader who would lead them 
                                                   
44  R. Quinault, ‘Churchill and Democracy’, in Winston Churchill in the 
Twenty-First Century, ed. D. Cannadine and R. Quinault, London 2004, 27. 
45  R. Quinault, ‘Anglo-American Attitudes to Democracy from Lincoln to 
Churchill’, in Anglo-American Attitudes from Revolution to Partnership, ed. F. 
Leventhal and R. Quinault, Aldershot 2000, 134. 
46 ‘Our heritage; Winston Churchill’, London Transport Museum, 
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to freedom. The poster also shows that Britain is destined for victory. The 
series depicts the rightness and justice of Britain in both past and present, 
and perhaps the future. Those four heroes represent Britain’s destiny to 
make things right, and to lead the world to freedom. 
Churchill symbolized his country in various media, and embodied some 
concepts of Britishness, such as British destiny, fighting spirit, and the 
democratic world. Those themes already existed in the Whig tradition of 
history, and Churchill and propagandists used them to unite peoples. 
Throughout the war, Churchill was depicted as a brave, heroic, and 
romantic leader, who would lead the world right. He personified British 
virtues and contributed to clarify Britain’s war aims and to raise civilian 
morale.  
It is certain that in European battles between Britain and Germany, this 
scenario was right. Seen, however, in a global context, or from the viewpoint 
of other ethnic groups, the characters he showed can be understood 
differently.  
 
 
The Japanese depiction of Churchill 
 
In the Western world, Churchill is remembered as a democratic leader. An 
analysis of British visual propaganda provides overwhelming evidence for 
the positive and adulatory British perspectives of Churchill. This section 
aims to challenge such concepts more objectively, by looking at Japanese 
propaganda depicting Churchill. Notions of ‘Christendom’, ‘civilian force’, 
and ‘democracy’ appear beyond question in Europe in the mid-twentieth 
century; however, seen from the perspective of other ethnic groups, or in 
terms of postcolonialism, they are understood differently. In this sense, 
Churchill was considered as a leader of colonization, who had exploited Asia 
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and Africa, and Christian civilization or democracy was viewed as an 
imposition on others. While Germans depicted Churchill as an exploiter of 
the working class in Britain, as well as a liar and a drunkard,48 the 
Japanese emphasized him as a symbol of white arrogance. In order to 
examine the Japanese perspective on Churchill, this paper will use 
Japanese propaganda during the Pacific War, from December 1941 to 
August 1945. His depiction in cartoon form can often be found in Shashin 
Shuho, the Weekly Photographical Journal, first published by Naikaku 
Jouhoubu and later by Naikaku Jouhou Kyoku. The magazine was 
published between 16 February 1938 and 11 July 1945. In March 1941 its 
circulation was claimed to be more than 200,000, while in April 1942 it was 
approximately 300,000. The number of readers per copy was 10.6, which 
meant that the magazine had roughly two to three million readers.49 In 
order to examine how the Japanese conceived the character of Churchill and 
the British Empire, this paper will mainly use caricatures from the 
aforementioned magazine, as well as some other posters and leaflets 
produced by the Japanese forces as a supplement.50 By so doing, it will 
draw a picture of the great man in the global context, seen from a different 
ethnic group. 
It is undeniable that there was no freedom of the press in Japan after the 
National General Mobilization Law in 1938, which allowed the bureaucracy 
to issue any orders in a time of emergency.51 As a political consequence, 
censorship was enforced over radio and press, and critics of the government 
                                                   
48 R. Bytwerk, ‘Churchill in Nazi Cartoon Propaganda’, in Finest Hour: Journal 
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were purged.52 Japanese primary sources in this paper only reflect the 
governmental ideas of Britain and Churchill. In Japanese visual 
propaganda, Churchill and Roosevelt were depicted as twin bearers of evil 
imperialism, who had oppressed and exploited Asian and African people. 
Japanese propaganda can be categorized in two forms: one for Asian and 
African people who had been under the control of the British Empire, and 
the other as propaganda for Japanese domestic use which intended to stir 
up hostility towards Britain and America. The former tried to make Asian 
and African soldiers secede from the British army and revolt against 
Britain.53 Through various media, the Japanese claimed a just cause for her 
Asian invasion: the liberation of Asia from Europe. 
By referring to Japanese propaganda, the paper will deal with colonialism 
and imperialism in Churchill. It must be mentioned first that in terms of 
race, the historical context has to be considered, and there is no intention in 
this text to denounce him or to support him, much less to affirm the 
superficial Japanese war objective. It will first seek to grasp and understand 
the racial feeling among the British in general and Churchill in particular, 
and then analyse Japanese visual propaganda depicting Churchill, 
distributed across the Asian continent and in Japan. 
On the eve of the Second World War, Britain possessed a great deal of 
power in Asia. She had taken over several regions in Asia, such as India, 
Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, and some ports in China. In the middle of the 
twentieth century, racism was prevalent among many Britons. A British 
police officer in Hong Kong called Chinese ‘yellow pigs’ and a ‘bunch of 
worthless, treacherous, yellow-skinned reptiles’. He declared that the 
Chinese ‘should only be treated as the animals they are’. Asian people in 
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Hong Kong were not allowed to enter theatres or European hotels and 
clubs.54  
This inequality was justified in terms of moral responsibility of those who 
sought to civilize the less advanced people,55 and many white people in 
general saw non-whites as animals.56 At the heart of British imperialism 
was their belief in British racial superiority. Churchill never doubted the 
superiority of his race and was an outdated imperialist even in his own time. 
Franklin Roosevelt was against Churchill’s imperialism, and it caused a 
certain amount of tension between those two leaders.57  
Churchill shared the general attitude towards racism in the late 
nineteenth century. In his youth he mentioned the role of white people and 
the inferiority of ‘the other’ as follows: 
 
Year after year, and stretching back to an indefinite horizon, we see 
the figures of the odd and bizarre potentates against whom the 
British arms continually are turned […]. These extraordinary 
foreign figures – each with his complete set of crimes, horrible 
customs, and ‘minor peculiarities’ – march one by one from the dark 
wings of barbarism up to the bright footlights of civilisation.58 
 
He considered colonization as ‘White men’s burden’ and did not 
understand ‘native’ cultures outside Europe. It is famous that Churchill 
called Gandhi, who visited London for an Indian conference in 1931 ‘a 
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half-naked fakir’,59 and claimed that non-white races were unsuitable for 
democracy.60  Churchill believed in the civilizing mission and defended 
British rule in India in 1920: 
 
Our reign in India or anywhere else has never stood on the basis of 
physical force alone, and it would be fatal to the British Empire it we 
were to try to base ourselves only upon it. The British way of doing 
things has always meant and implied close and effectual co-operation 
with the people of the country. In every part of the British Empire that 
has been our aim, and in no part have we arrived at such success as in 
India, whose princes spent their treasure in our cause, whose brave 
soldiers fought side by side with our own men, whose intelligent and 
gifted people are co-operating at the present moment with us in every 
sphere of government of industry.61 
 
Churchill expressed an idealistic view on the relationship between the 
mother country and colonies in public. In private, he often used casual 
words on coloured or foreign people, such as ‘blackamoors’, ‘niggers’, ‘wogs’, 
‘chicks’, ‘eyeties’, etc.62 He shared the common feeling among people against 
different ethnic groups, and, as Best contends, ‘racial difference did matter 
to him’ till the end of his life.63 For him Asian cultures were not worth 
considering, and he expected and believed that they should have imitated 
the European way of life for good, if it was possible. He held a paternalistic 
view on Japan, believing that Britain and America were the godparents of 
modern Japan, and Japan attained her industrial power thanks to British 
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and American guidance.64 This stance often irritated Asian countries, and 
his attitude towards non-European races was a fat target to be attacked by 
other ethnic groups. In the Second World War this aspect of Churchill was 
emphasized by the Japanese, combined with complaints about Western 
civilization in general.  
Before the Second World War, Churchill’s image and his position in 
British politics was partially explained in the Yomiuri Shimbun, with the 
paper containing several articles describing Churchill, each time with a 
different portrayal. In 1914 the newspaper offered an idealized picture of 
him, stating that he was tall, spruce, and donnish. It was explained that he 
had made his name as a literary man although he had a military 
background.65 In 1920 the paper called Churchill ‘the man for the new era’. 
Describing his life since he was nineteen years old, it claimed that he was 
indispensable in the British government, which, at that time, was headed by 
Lloyd George. 66  While these two articles in 1914 and 1920 positively 
depicted Churchill, an article in 1925 was bitter about his opportunism; it 
described him as eccentric, changing his party from the Conservatives to the 
Liberals and back again, and claimed that he was ‘wicked’ because he did 
whatever took his fancy,67 once joining the front lines as a soldier and then 
occasionally attending parliamentary debates at home. The article even 
claimed that some British people hoped he would die during the First World 
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War. 68  Then, in 1933, the paper claimed that Churchill took an 
accommodating view on the position of Japan at the annual assembly of the 
Anti-Socialism Union. In this sense, it positively described Churchill as an 
understanding politician, who declared that it was unwise for Britain to 
enter into a military conflict with Japan, and that, before criticizing 
Japanese actions, Britain had to try to accept the position of Japan in the 
Far East.69 As such, the image of Churchill in the newspaper changed over 
time as his position in British politics and the position of Japan in the 
international community changed. 
The idea of democracy and freedom, which Churchill embodied in British 
and Japanese visual propaganda, was disregarded in pre-war Japan. After 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan sought to develop a modern political 
system, but the new system was authoritarian, not democratic. The 1889 
constitution framed Japanese citizens as ‘subjects’, and although it 
enumerated the freedoms of ‘subjects’, such as freedom of thought, speech, 
religion, assembly, association, press, and property, it provided no 
guarantees for such freedoms. They were carried out only within the bounds 
of the law and, according to Maki, ‘what was guaranteed was not the 
enjoyment of freedoms by the people, but the right of the government to 
limit their exercise.’70 Although the Imperial Diet, in which the House of 
Representatives represented the constituency, was established in 1889, 
suffrage was limited to men who paid a certain amount of tax and, as a 
result, voters were restricted to only one per cent of the total population in 
Japan.71 It was not until 1925 that universal suffrage for men over 25 years 
old was achieved. However, although the democratic movement in the 
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Taisho period (1912–26) seemed to advance democracy in Japan, at the 
same time the government enacted laws that supressed freedoms, such as 
the Peace Preservation Law in 1925.72 Authoritarianism and militarism 
took control of Japan after the Manchurian crisis in 1931–2, eliminating 
moderates and political parties through targeted strategies of assassination 
and oppression. Maki explains that the political parties ‘were accused of 
being un-Japanese because they represented a foreign, Western institution 
and, even more, liberalism that was incompatible with the unique structure 
of Japanese politics’.73 As such, democracy was assumed unsuitable for 
Japanese politics by certain militaristic and chauvinistic civilians, and, 
especially after the Manchurian crisis, it collapsed and was eventually 
disregarded through a series of political assassinations, censorship, public 
indoctrination, and suppression of political activities. 
In Japanese propaganda during the Pacific War, Churchill was depicted 
as a symbol of Britain. Themes like ‘Christianity’, ‘fighting spirit’, and 
‘democracy’ were used to describe the nature of Churchill and his country, 
yet these concepts were synonymous with imperialism and colonialism. 
These motifs, in Japanese eyes, were based on British supremacy, which 
was built upon the sacrifice of Asia and Africa. Those ‘virtues’ were filled 
with Eurocentricity and hypocrisy, seen from those who lived in 
non-Western regions in the middle of the twentieth century. The ‘freedom’ 
Churchill believed in was achieved at the expense of others. At the outset of 
the war, Japan emphasized Churchill’s support for colonialism in order to 
poison non-white populations’ minds against Britain, yet as the momentum 
of the war turned against Japan and Japan seemed certain to lose the war, 
Churchill became a symbol of the old world, one pushed around by Japan’s 
prime enemy, the United States of America.  
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At the beginning of the Pacific War, Japan proclaimed herself the leader of 
Asia and advocated the freedom of Asia from American and British control. 
She named the Pacific War the ‘Greater East Asian War’ and tried to found a 
‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ by overturning Western rule.74 
Japan intended to unite Asian peoples through anti-Western propaganda 
and, in this context, Churchill and Roosevelt were seen as the symbols of 
Asian colonization. Rhodes, in Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World 
War II, presents various Japanese visual propaganda. One leaflet, entitled 
‘One Billion Asians Against Anglo-Americans’ shows that Japan intended to 
unite disparate Asian peoples through anti-Western propaganda.75  
The anti-British and anti-American campaign during the war was not 
very successful, but some Asian people preferred new imperialists to the old 
ones. Prior to the Second World War, Japan was held in a different, special 
regard by non-white races in Asia and America. The fact that she defeated 
Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), that the coloured beat the 
white race, gave Asian people a hope of freedom from Western colonization. 
Nehru, later prime minister of India, praised the Japanese triumph:  
 
So Japan had won, and she entered the charmed circle of the great 
Powers. The victory of Japan, an Asiatic country, had a far-reaching 
effect on all the countries of Asia. I have told you how, as a boy, I used 
to get excited over it. That excitement was shared by many a boy and 
girl and grown-up in Asia. A great European Power had been defeated; 
therefore Asia could still defeat Europe as it had done so often in the 
past. Nationalism spread more rapidly over the eastern countries and 
the cry of ‘Asia for Asiatics’ was heard.76 
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Japanese propaganda before and during the war stirred the non-white 
population in Asia and even in America, which had been oppressed and 
segregated by the white population.77 By the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
many Asian countries had experienced some kind of Western rule. Sutan 
Sjahrir, an Indonesian nationalist leader, analysed that Asians felt 
‘disaffection with the Whites’ and they had ‘the Asiatic inferiority feelings, 
which seek compensation in a glorification of the Japanese’.78 Japanese 
propaganda did not create a new hostility, but inflamed one which had 
already existed among Asians. The Japanese emphasized racial 
discrimination and exploitation by the British, and sought Asian and 
African deference to Japan. British defeats in the early stage of the war and 
their evacuation were celebrated by some Asian people.79 The British and 
American approach to Asian and African people made it possible for Japan 
to use these propaganda tactics.  
A poster by an unknown artist entitled ‘Rise of Asia’ proclaims that 
Japanese leadership would break Western control over Asia.80 The alphabet 
letters ABCD meant America, Britain, Republic of China, and the Dutch, 
who held interests in Eastern Asia and had implemented economic 
sanctions on Japan,81 and the Japanese government regarded them with 
hostility. At the bottom of the figure, Churchill can be seen lying on the 
Union flag. His face looks like a traditional Japanese ogre, and he grabs a 
stick with his right hand. It implies that Britain led by Churchill had beaten 
Asia with his stick, but that the Japanese saved people by breaking down 
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the ‘ABCD circle’. The chain which the Japanese soldier ripped down 
suggests oppression and slavery by Western powers. 
For Japan her main enemy in the Pacific War was the United States of 
America, and for Britain it was Nazi Germany in the Second World War. 
Although the Pacific War had caused fatal damage to the British Empire, it 
was deemed to be of less importance in Britain’s and Churchill’s mind.82 
Thus in Asia, the British army relied a great deal on Asian and African 
soldiers to fight against Japan, 83 and was ambivalent about the racial 
identities of those who fought to defend the British Empire. Japanese 
propaganda emphasized British colonialism in order to convert those 
soldiers and persuade them to switch to Japanese forces. 
A caricature collected at the Churchill Archive, Cambridge, 84  was 
distributed by the Japanese army for African soldiers fighting for Britain in 
Asia. It emphasized that ‘Japanese soldiers are fighting against the white 
British soldiers’, and, in this sense, they did not intend to kill non-white 
people. It declared that: 
 
The Japanese Forces are so strong that the British soldiers are afraid 
of fighting against them, so that the British solders make you fight. 
You have been brought here from Africa to be killed by the Japanese 
soldiers. The Japanese soldiers are fighting against the white British 
soldiers. The Japanese don’t want to kill you, Africans. Come soon to 
the Japanese with a white flag and your rifle upside down. 
 
The suggestion here appears to be that Africans should surrender and 
desert to the Japanese army, where they would be well treated. The 
caricature depicts Churchill as a slave owner, holding chains around the 
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African soldier, with a whip on his left arm. His famous cigar is drawn to 
make him look like a gangster, and his nice John Bull-esque clothes are 
contrasted with the soldier’s bare feet. By depicting crosses with skulls, it 
made up the image of the British Empire or western culture as a tomb of 
African people. The themes of this picture are inequality and false 
masculinity. 
 
 
<Figure 1> Shashin Shuho No. 294, 20 October 1943 
 
In Japan, images of Churchill as an exploiter of Asia, and a henchman of 
Roosevelt were also circulated. After Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, 
Churchill was frequently depicted in the Shashin Shuho. Fig. 1 is a 
caricature in Shashin Shuho, published on 20 October 1943. 85 While a 
huge Roosevelt and equally large Churchill are enjoying a luxury meal, 
small native people in their colonies deliver their dishes for them. The table 
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was built upon naked coloured people, and indicates that Anglo-American 
superiority was attained at the expense of their colonies. An artillery gun 
was drawn next to Roosevelt and implies how violent they were in order to 
seize power over colonies, and destroy natives’ lives. By depicting those two 
leaders ominously, it emphasized the cruelty of Britain and America. 
 
 
<Figure 2> Shashin Shuho No. 294, 20 October 1943 
Fig. 2 is also from the 20 October 1943 issue.86 Churchill and Roosevelt 
are monsters, half-mankind and half-beast, who eat Asian and African 
profits. The caption implies the mistrust in those leaders, who were ready to 
break any international treaties and laws in order to profit from Asia and 
Africa. It implies that they had attained power over Asia and Africa by 
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concluding ‘legitimate’ yet unequal treaties, and had exploited native people 
with their hypocritical attitude of the ‘White men’s burden’.   
As mentioned before, Churchill was vehemently against Indian 
independence, and his attitude was too imperialistic even in his own time. 
In Japan, Churchill was often used to symbolize Indian coercion. In the 
context of the liberation of Asia, he could not be a leader representing the 
free world. 
 
 
<Figure 3> Shashin Shuho No. 281, 21 July 1943. 
As Fig. 3 shows, 87 Japanese propaganda asserted that Britain had to be 
swept away from Asia to protect native people in India. The caption of the 
figure denotes two hundred years of colonization, and how badly Indian 
people were treated by Britain. The caricature does not mention the name of 
Churchill explicitly; however the fat John Bull on the seat can easily be seen 
to represent him. 
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<Figure 4> Shashin Shuho No. 317, 19 April 1944. 
Fig. 4 is a caricature of the Indian liberation from Britain. 88 Churchill is 
sitting on the couch of India, but overturned by the Indian, who has been 
imprisoned in the base of the chair. The caption says that ‘now that your 
fellow beings came to save you, let’s spread your arms and legs’. The man 
running away from Indian flags is Lord Mountbatten, who was the Supreme 
Allied Commander, South East Asia Command (1943–6).89 It implies that 
with Japanese help, India could liberate herself from British rule. Visual 
propaganda distributed in Japan focused on British colonial history, and 
aimed to legitimize the ultimate Japanese war objective of Asian freedom. 
Japan found the best emblem of Western arrogance in Churchill, due to his 
late-Victorian imperialism. 
The other image of Churchill is found in his relationship with Roosevelt. 
Since Japan’s main enemy was the United States, Churchill was frequently 
drawn alongside Roosevelt in Japanese propaganda. Except for the colonial 
context, he was depicted as a sub-entity of Roosevelt. 
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<Figure 5> Shashin Shuho No. 285, 18 August 1943. 
 
 
<Figure 6> Shashin Shuho No. 340, 27 September 1944. 
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Fig. 5 shows Churchill’s position in the Pacific War. 90 Behind Roosevelt, 
he is awaiting the attack by the Japanese army. He is almost like a baby, 
seeking protection from the USA. Fig. 6 shows that Roosevelt is tying up 
Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), the leader of the Republic of 
China, with the chain of dollars. 91  The caricature was published on 
September 1944, when airstrikes by the American army were destroying 
Japanese social structures. It denotes that for America, Britain or China 
were just stepping-stones or vehicles for American prosperity.  
The Japanese government tried to show people that the Allies were not 
monolithic. Those countries seemed to be united under the name of 
democracy and proclaimed a ‘free world’; the propaganda warned that 
America would rule the world once the war was over. It certainly sounds like 
sour grapes on the Japanese part, yet it was proved correct. When defeat 
seemed apparent, Japan depicted Churchill as a winner of the war but a 
loser in the new international system.  
Although Japan justified the invasion of Asia for the nobler purpose of the 
‘liberation of Asia’, it was apparent that her aim was to exploit Asia just as 
Western powers had done previously. To counter the claim of racial 
discrimination by the Japanese, the Atlantic Charter was signed by 
Churchill and Roosevelt, which declared idealistic guidelines such as 
self-government. Yet Churchill, because of the empire, still clung to the idea 
of rule by white men. Gandhi told Roosevelt in 1942 that ‘the Allied 
declaration that [they] are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the 
individual sounds hollow so long as India, and for that matter Africa, are 
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exploited by Great Britain, and America has the Negro problem in her own 
home’.92 This statement clearly aimed to denounce the attitude of Churchill, 
who was convinced that white men should rule the world. What Asia wanted 
was not cultural imperialism or paternalism where people would lead a 
Westernized and ‘civilized’ life.93 Churchill ran counter to the trend towards 
decolonization and held on to the principle of white power. He personified 
Asian coercion by Britain in Japanese visual propaganda, and at the same 
time he symbolized the British Empire in ruination. In Japanese 
propaganda, Churchill was the one who had fought against Japan for 
American supremacy. The Japanese depicted in images of Churchill two 
types of Britishness. He represented both old and new Britain: the old 
empire which had colonized Asia and Africa and oppressed non-white people, 
and the new kingdom which would serve America. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper has examined contrasting perceptions of Churchill’s leadership 
in Britain and Japan. In Britain, he was praised for his military leadership. 
He was considered to be an inspirational leader who always stood alongside 
the people. He embodied his country, and the concepts he was proud of: 
British destiny, fighting spirit, and democracy. In Japan, on the contrary, he 
was depicted as a leader of Western civilization in a negative way. Because 
of Japanese negative campaigning against Britain in Asia, Churchill was 
portrayed as an exploiter, symbolizing colonialism and imperialism. He was 
almost like a slave owner or gangster in Japanese visual propaganda, and 
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those concepts of British virtue were depicted to show British arrogance and 
racism. 
The paper could not cover visual materials outside Britain and Japan, and 
because of the limitation of Japanese primary sources, it could not cover the 
Japanese depiction of Churchill by the popular public. In other countries, 
German propaganda accused Churchill more of his exploitation of 
working-class people and emphasized his upper-class insularity. 
Propaganda in continental Asia might tell us more about how Asians viewed 
Churchill through the prism of his imperialism and colonialism. Also, 
because it compared ‘British’ with Japanese propaganda, it did not mention 
the diversity within Britain. Some English people might have respected 
Churchill as a hero, yet the Scots, Welsh, and Irish could have considered 
him differently. By simplifying the definition of Britain, the paper did not 
discuss different identities within the country. It is very important to look at 
Churchill from such perspectives, in order to grasp the entirety of 
perspectives on one of the ‘greatest’ men in history. 
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Abstract 
The article examines British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s policy 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the June 1967 War, exploring why 
Wilson was reluctant to become an active arbitrator in the conflict and why 
he supported the Resolution 242 even though he sustained economic and 
political damage from the war. Answering those research questions helps to 
clarify one part of the historical background of the enduring Arab-Israeli 
stalemate. Three historical interpretations could be provided in the article: 
the first reason emanated from Britain’s wish to contain the Soviet influence 
in the Middle East. As a result of the June 1967 War, Israel seemed to serve 
as a deterrent power, the role of which Britain used to act in 1950s. Secondly, 
unlike Arab countries, Israel was regarded to be deserving of Western 
support. Thirdly, even though it turned out that Israel had territorial 
ambition, Britain was no longer an influential power in the Middle East to 
assume the required leadership to mediate the conflict. In other words, 
peace was not necessary for Britain and, one may go so far as to say that 
Britain’s reluctance to arbitrate the Arab-Israeli conflict in part caused the 
long-lasting and entangled stalemate of the conflict. 
 
Keywords: The Second World War, Winston Churchill, Propaganda, Japan
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Introduction 
 
Despite the United States being the leading mediator of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process for more than 70 years, a lasting peace agreement has not 
been achieved.   This prolonged period of conflict has impacted many of 
America’s Western allies more profoundly than America itself, and leads us 
to question: why was the United States the only major power to lead a peace 
process?  Why did other countries not propose a viable peace plan and lead 
a wider peace initiative in the region? The aim of this article is to depict a 
historical picture by focusing on Western allies’ reactions, thereby clarifying 
one of the reasons why a lasting peace settlement has eluded the region for 
so long. 
As a case study, it will focus on British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s 
policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during the June 1967 War. Wilson 
was known for his attempts to mediate between the United States and North 
Vietnam. His peace initiative was, in part, motivated by a desire to avoid 
Britain’s militarily involvement in the Vietnam War,1 but he also hoped 
that mediating this conflict would bring some international prestige to 
Britain at a time when its power and influence was waning.2  Despite the 
                                                   
1 Wilson also faced the growing unpopularity of the war at home and increasing 
pressure from Labour backbenchers to take action for peace, particularly 
after the United States began its bombing campaign and introduced ground 
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(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004), 270. 
2  John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace 
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ambition, Wilson was not eager to be actively involved in the peace 
settlement of the June 1967 War even though he later lamented that the 
negative outcomes provoked by the war, namely the closure of the Suez 
Canal and an Arab oil embargo, in part, resulted in the November 1967 
Sterling devaluation.3 It is true that UN Resolution 242 was based on the 
British proposal. But the main content, namely requiring Israeli withdrawal 
from ‘territories’—one interpretation of which was that Israel should not 
necessarily return all of the lands occupied in the June 1967 War—, partway 
caused the protracted conflict. People involved in the UN negotiation indeed 
realised the meaning of this clause, foreseeing that the peace settlement 
would not be achieved easily.4 It is therefore important to explore why 
Wilson was so reluctant to become an active arbitrator in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and was satisfied with the flimsy UN Resolution while sustaining 
damage from the war. 
With regard to Britain’s policy towards the Middle East, events before and 
during the 1956 Suez Crisis as well as political interactions between the 
Gulf and South Arabian nations have attracted much attention by scholars. 
But its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1956 has been generally 
overlooked. While Mosh Gat has broadly analysed the relationship between 
Britain and Israel during the 1967 War, he did not cover some important 
newly declassified documents as the book was published in 2003. Although 
Simon C. Smith has analysed Britain’s policy during the June 1967 War, the 
analytical focus has been limited in exploring the Anglo-American 
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cost Britain the balance of payment £20m a month. 
4 Author’s Skype interview of Kunio Katakura, 27 September 2016. Katakura 
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relationship.5 Within this respect, this article will also contribute to the 
development of the research in this field. 
It is also valuable to look at the June 1967 War in order to consider the 
historical background of the stalemated conflict. The June 1967 War 
markedly changed the balance of power in favour of Israel. Washington 
found an opportunity in Israel’s overwhelming victory to curtail the Soviet 
influence in the region, which resulted in the origin of America’s overt and 
obvious support for Israel. One might perhaps indicate that Israel’s 
invincibility backed by the United States and the clause of Resolution 242 
made the country less prone to compromise to the peace negotiation, which 
frustrated the Arab neighbours over the occupation, jumping to commence 
the Yom Kippur War. The shift in balance of power between Israel and the 
Arab states also consolidated the influence of the Palestinian liberation 
movements, partly originating the terrorist activities nowadays. 
The analysis of this article is based on the archival documents stored in 
The National Archives (TNA), Kew, and, to a lesser extent, The Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library (LBJL), Austin, Texas. The other sources include the 
author’s interview to related persons, the official report of parliamentary 
debates and the related volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS). 
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1. Historical Background:  
The Wilson Government’s Concealed Pro-Israel Stance 
 
The 1956 Suez adventure convinced the leaders of Britain that actions 
abroad regarded as ‘imperialist’ would no longer be tolerated by the 
international community. The world was witnessing a period of 
decolonisation and the trend was increasing. Tore T. Petersen goes so far as 
to say that, if some Britons continued to believe that their country was a 
world power even after 1945, ‘this view could no longer be sustained after 
1956’.6 Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s prestige was boosted 
profoundly as a champion of an anti-Western pan-Arabism, and the regional 
balance of power marked the end of European predominance in the Middle 
East. The leaders of Britain realised that it was only a matter of time before 
Britain would be forced to quit the region. 
This declining power concerned the leaders of Britain since the country 
had acted as a deterrent against Soviet encroachment. Britain and the 
United States were concerned that the Soviet Union was trying to exploit 
Arab nationalism. In particular, Nasser was regarded as sensitive to the 
Soviet political encroachment. The two leading countries in the free world 
believed that the USSR was attempting to create political instability, 
thereby threatening the Western interest, particularly access to Gulf oil. 
They therefore considered that the preservation of Western interests was 
dependent on political stability in the region.7 Since Britain appeared to be 
the most vulnerable power in the Middle East, it hoped pro-Western 
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regional regimes would be a deterrent power against the Soviet-backed Arab 
radicals. Britain therefore tried to protect oil-rich and pro-Western regimes 
by providing physical security, thereby allowing them to combat the Soviet 
threat. The pro-Western Arab regimes were, nevertheless, vulnerable to the 
growing influence of Nasser’s anti-Western campaign. 
Britain was aware of the fact that Israel was enhancing its military 
abilities and this dampened the Arab nationalists’ willingness to wage war. 
France first sold jet fighters to Israel in 1953 and had increasingly 
recognised Israel’s strategic value against Nasser’s Egypt that was 
supporting Algeria’s National Liberation Front (NLF), expanding so far as 
to sell its advanced military hardware to the country. Then Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, surely perceived that a French-armed Israel could help 
maintain political stability in the Middle East and therefore also decided to 
release to Israel several Meteors, jet fighters, and artillery pieces. Yet, the 
actual delivery was delayed. It was during the 1958 Iraq revolution and the 
consequent uprising in Jordan that Britain truly recognised the importance 
of maintaining Israel’s military capabilities. Responding to King Hussein’s 
appeal for assistance in deterring a disturbance in Jordan, Britain asked 
permission from Israel for the Royal Air Force (RAF) to use the country’s 
airfields and Israel consented to the request. Here, Israel demonstrated its 
ability to serve as a useful regional power, thereby maintaining the political 
stability. Consequently, Britain sold Israel Centurion tanks, which were top 
of Israel’s wish list, jet fighters and anti-aircraft missiles. Indeed, since the 
1958 turmoil, Britain started an actual withdrawal from the region.8 As of 
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late 1950s to 1960s, the balance of power moved slightly in favour of Israel 
which worked for the leaders of Britain in terms of containment of Soviet 
influence. 
Regarding Britain’s preference towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, one 
should also take into account the ideology of the Labour Party, which was in 
power during the June 1967 War. The majority of the Labour Party regarded 
Israel as a progressive social-democracy, which deserved British support. 
June Edmonds stresses that, since the establishment of Israel, the Labour 
Party viewed the country as a natural supporter of their Party. The ideology, 
which was based on a sense of shared political purpose with Israel, 
emanated from three distinct, albeit interrelated streams of social 
democratic thought, the tradition of reformism and the historically close 
association between the Labour Party and Western Jews.9 During Wilson’s 
premiership, the State of Israel was led by Mapai, a centre-left political 
party, and since 1968, Israeli Labour Party, which also gave the Labours a 
sense of unity. Indeed, as of 1967, two hundred Labour MPs were paying 
members of the Labour Friends of Israel (LFI). The National Executive 
Committee also contained many pro-Israeli members and continued to show 
its support for Israel. 10  What is more, Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
himself was well known for his pro-Israeli stance. David Watkins, the 
Labour MP and the Director of the Council for the Advancement of 
Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) since September 1983, argued that 
‘Wilson, the most pro-Israeli Prime Minster ever, . . . took pleasure in 
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serving Israeli orange juice to visiting Arab leaders who did not take 
alcohol’.11 In a similar vein, Richard Crossman, the Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the House of Commons, wrote in his diary that 
Wilson was ‘wholly pro-Israel’. He also claimed that Roy Jenkins, Home 
Secretary, and John Silkin, Chief Whip, were sympathetic towards the 
Israelis too, and he described himself, saying ‘I’m pro-Israel’.12  
Wilson’s pro-Israeli orientation was, aside from the shared value between 
the Labour Party and the Israelis, emanated from his commitment to 
Atlanticism. David Reynolds portrays this by commenting that ‘as party 
leader  . . .  he stood firmly in the Bevinite tradition’,13 it was in the realm 
of the Anglo-American relationship where Wilson emphasised particular 
importance, at least by the end of 1967. Wilson was of the view that the 
strong Anglo-American cooperation could undermine the Soviet influence, 
the thinking of which shaped his general attitude towards foreign policy. 
But one might point out that Wilson was rather forced to maintain a close 
relationship with Washington. Avoiding the devaluation of Sterling 
constituted Wilson’s most important and impending agendas by the end of 
1967 and he was well aware of America’s goodwill in maintaining the parity 
of Sterling/Dollar.14 John Young has argued that, ironically, ‘this acted as a 
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be ‘a power capable of playing an expensive role’. By 1964, America’s 
opposition to British Imperialism had given way to a belief that it was in 
America’s own interests for ‘its junior ally’ to maintain ‘the last vestiges of a 
global military infrastructure’. In a similar vein, Ponting explains that the 
United States was strongly opposed to devaluation because the Pound was 
regarded as a first line of defence for the dollar, the position of which was 
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restraint on London’s independence’. 15  It was believed that Britain 
maintained global prestige thanks to owning a major currency and, 
according to Philip Darby, the conception of Britain as a world leading 
power was ‘too deeply rooted in Britain’s outlook and history’ to be 
questioned easily.16 Wilson therefore tended to cooperate with Americans in 
his foreign policy and the Middle East was not exceptional. 17  During 
Wilson’s premiership, America’s pro-Israeli policy had been strengthening 
by President Lyndon B. Johnson, whom the Israelis regarded as one of the 
most reliable friends since he was a Senator, as well as his Jewish and 
pro-Israeli advisers, such as McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor 
until 1966 and Special Consultant during the June 1967 War, Under 
Secretary William Bundy, Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor since 
1966, and Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg.18 
                                                                                                                          
being undermined by trade deficits. David M. McCourt, ‘What was Britain’s 
“East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964-1968’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 20 (2009), 459, 462; Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in 
Power 1964-1970 (Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 223-226. 
15 John W. Young, The Labour governments 1964-1970 volume 2: International 
policy (Manchester University Press, 2003), 41. 
16 Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-68 (R.I.I.A.) (Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 330. 
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It should be also pointed out that the British public was very much 
pro-Israeli as of 1967. This was a natural phenomenon because, in the 
phrase of François Duchêne, ‘Jews are so much part of the fabric of 
European history and contemporary life that relations with Israel must, in 
some sense, be an extension of folk memories on both sides’. In this sense, 
the State of Israel could never be entirely foreign to people in Western 
Europe any more than those in America and Russia.19 
Nevertheless, there existed the other important factor to be considered: 
the Arab reactions. In contrast to the Labour’s sympathy to Israel, its 
tradition of thought in late 1960s characterised Arabs as ‘backward and 
feudalistic’.20 Yet, Wilson’s Cabinet considered that openly supporting Israel 
would incite the Arab party to seek more Soviet assistance, recalling the 
memory of the 1956 conspiracy between Britain, France and Israel which 
was still perceived negatively in the Arab world. Nasser indeed spelled out 
his radical brand of Arab nationalism by comparing the British arms sales 
to Israel as an act of Imperialism. The Cabinet therefore hoped to maintain 
the political stability without overtly and publicly supporting Israel.21 This 
resulted in Britain’s low-profile policy in the Middle East, but underneath 
its public neutrality, the Labour government, under Wilson’s leadership, 
was comfortable with other Western powers’ support towards Israel.22 
 
                                                   
19 François Duchêne, ‘Israel in the Eyes of Europeans: A Speculative Essay’, in 
Ilan Greilsammer ed., Europe and Israel: Troubled neighbours (Walter de 
Gruyter: Berlin and New York, 1988), 11. 
20 Christopher Mayhew and Michael Adams, Publish It Not: The Middle East 
Cover Up (London: Islamic Propagation Centre International, 1975), 38. 
21 Foreign Secretary George Brown rather saw the friendship with Israel as 
harmful and he was more interested in furthering friendship with the Arab 
states. See Young, The Labour governments 1964-1970 volume 2, 7. 
22 See also Moshe Gat, ‘Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, 
June 1967: From Support to Hostility’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 18, 
No. 1, (Spring 2004), 59. 
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2. The Outbreak of The War and Revealing  
the Wilson Government’s Pro-Israeli Stance 
 
On 22 May 1967, Nasser announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba and 
Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and all vessels carrying strategic 
materials to Israel. The Western countries regarded the Gulf as an 
international waterway. If the closure continued, Britain would have £20 
millions deficit a month on the balance of payments. The closure would also 
give the Israelis casus belli. Immediately after Nasser’s announcement, the 
Cabinet members consequently began to think how to end his action, and 
reopen the waterway. Aside from pragmatic reasons, the aforementioned 
political background also put the Cabinet in a position to challenge Nasser 
quite easily. Crossman recalled that the first Cabinet reaction to the closure 
was that ‘we can’t stand aside and let Israel be strangled by Nasser in the 
Strait of Tiran’.23 There was a shared belief among the members that 
‘Nasser’s prestige and regional ambitions had to be trimmed.’24 The view of 
the Cabinet was also fully supported by Parliament, where the mood 
represented a ‘completely bipartisan approach to the problem’.25  
In practice, the Cabinet considered a probability to establish an 
international naval task force that would secure Israeli access to the Gulf 
and the Straits. Foreign Secretary George Brown, despite his general 
pro-Arab stance, actively supported an Anglo-American initiative to reopen 
the waterway. Crossman wrote that it looked ‘as if the whole of George 
Brown’s pro-Nasser policy, on which he’s been spending weeks and months, 
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has collapsed overnight. Instead George and Harold [Wilson] have suddenly 
done a complete volte-face and are now wholly pro-Israel’.26 George Brown’s 
motivation was perhaps related to his commitment to Atlanticism: he 
claimed in the conversation with Wilson and Defence Secretary Denis 
Healey that ‘we should not fail to support the US in their efforts or leave 
them their own.’27 Yet, Brown was also of the view that ‘but we should not 
wish this to be a solely Anglo-American enterprise’.28 He feared that the 
initiative would create an Eastern bloc/Arab versus Western bloc/Israel 
line-up, thereby weakening the influence of the West in the Middle East. 
The other Cabinet members were more sensitive about a coalition that 
would remind the Arab states of the collusion of the partners during the 
Suez crisis. Indeed, they turned down American suggestions to utilise the 
1950 Tripartite Declaration among the United States, Britain and France to 
deter Nasser’s demarche.29 
Regardless of the Cabinet preference about the form of multi-national 
naval force to end Nasser’s action, the Ministry of Defence was nevertheless 
                                                   
26 Crossman, 355. 
27 Note of meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the 
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29 ‘Chronology of US-UK consultation on the Middle East, May15-June 6, 1967’, 
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aware that ‘such a force would be highly vulnerable in such confined waters 
so close to Egyptian batteries’. The Ministry believed that ‘the Egyptian had 
no clear view of the action that should be taken if the force were attacked’, 
and in this context, international coalition would lead to the potential for 
Britain’s military involvement in the crisis.30 While the Cabinet members 
certainly wished to end Nasser’s action, they definitely needed to avoid the 
military involvement as Britain encountered balance of payment problems 
partially caused by overseas expenditures on defence. The backbenchers 
harshly accused the costly expenditure and the Cabinet could never afford 
to consider war as a viable option in the Middle East. The Cabinet 
consequently decided to avoid any coalitions that would ‘incur the risks 
inherent in any commitment to the use of force to reopen the Straits’.31 
When Kuwait forewarned Britain on 27 May that the country would 
embargo oil exports to the country if it took any steps against the interests 
of Arabs, Wilson and Brown even became reluctant to force the waterway 
open. 32  Instead, Wilson showed interest in the French proposal of 
discussion between the US, Britain, France and USSR while Brown tried to 
pass an appropriate Security Council Resolution.33 
By 2 June, the Cabinet nevertheless realised that a war would probably 
be unavoidable. London learned that Washington was of the view that if 
Israel won ‘after more than 10 years of pouring Soviet arms into the Middle 
East, the whole Soviet arms game will be profoundly degraded’.34 Harold 
Wilson consequently hoped for an Israeli triumph if war broke out.35 When 
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the war did break out, Wilson rather regarded a war dominated by Israel as 
an even opportunity to stabilise the Middle East, and told Canadian Prime 
Minister Lester Pearson that: 
 
What I feel is that there is a good chance now that Israelis are pretty 
generous and magnanimous. They want to be settled there with 
everybody recognising their existence and the right to live, and 
obviously they want Aqaba. But I understand they are prepared now to 
settle the refugee problems once and for all...36 
 
From Wilson’s point of view, once the Israelis could secure their borders, 
they would be ready for peace because he thought that it was Nasser who 
posed the risk, jeopardising Israel’s right to exist. In his Memoirs, he argued 
that Israel had always suffered from ‘a succession of incidents on Israel’s 
borders, some from the UAR side, some from the Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan, and some of the most provocative from Syria’. 37  He never 
mentioned Israel’s aggression towards its neighbours, such as its raid on 
Samu village in Jordan in November 1966, where it killed 96 people.38 
Consequently, the Cabinet decided not to place an embargo on arms sales to 
Israel as long as the Soviet Union continued to provide weapons to the Arab 
states.39 
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Wilson’s view was proved when Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told an 
American official on 13 June 1967 that Israel had no territorial ambition.40 
On 23 June, British officials in Tel-Aviv also concluded that ‘the Israeli 
objective is peace and their territorial claims are minimal, much less than 
we would have anticipated’.41  In this scenario, support for Israel was 
justifiable. Wilson’s announcement on 9 June demonstrated this stance: he 
never condemned Israel or called for a prompt withdrawal, but instead, he 
insisted the necessity of recognising Israel’s sovereign right to existence.42 
 
 
Britain’s Actual Stance: A Low Profile Policy 
 
On the surface, Britain was nevertheless trying to avoid publicly taking 
sides with the state of Israel. It rather sought to restore relationships with 
the Arab states because the Arab reaction brought severe economic pressure 
on Britain. In the midst of the War, Radio Cairo claimed that the United 
States and United Kingdom militarily supported Israel, providing aircrafts 
and assisting battlefield communications. 43  Although this was a ‘big 
lie’—the two countries never militarily assisted Israel—, the memories of 
the Suez plot was still fresh in the minds of people in the Arab states and 
the big lie continued to be accepted as truth even after King Hussein 
confirmed that there was no support from the two Western countries.44 
Moshe Gat has argued that Britain’s low profile policy made the Arab people 
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presume that the country was essentially pro-Israel and anti-Arab and this 
view was buttressed by Britain’s arms transfer to Israel over the late 1950s 
to 1960s.45 Besides, the Arab people were humiliated by the complete 
defeat and thus tried to represent Israel’s triumph ‘as the result of 
encouragement and at least moral support from the “imperialist powers”’.46 
The leaders of the Arab states subsequently demonstrated a harsh attitude 
towards Britain and the United States in order to protect their prestige in 
the Arab world. 47  For instance, Egyptian President Nasser publicly 
consolidated his anti-Western stance and refused to reopen the Gulf of 
Aqaba to the Western vessels, while covertly keeping the communication 
with the United States via King Hussein of Jordan. 48  The Arab oil 
producers also imposed an oil embargo on the West and processed 
substantial withdrawals from British bank accounts. Those Arab attacks on 
Britain certainly caused heavy damage to the balance of payments: the 
closure, as aforementioned, was costing Britain £20 million a month on the 
balance of payments; the persistence of the Arab oil embargo would result in 
the reduction of 28 per cent of oil supplies to Western Europe, which would 
bring a heavy burden on the British balance of payments, equivalent to £50 
million; and Arab withdrawal from British bank accounts was a matter of 
credibility in finance.49 Wilson later claimed that the incident eventually 
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led to the devaluation of the pound sterling in November 1967.50 The 
Cabinet subsequently recognised that ‘we need to do all we can to improve 
Anglo-Arab relations to avoid further damage to British interests and in 
order to get the Canal open and the oil flowing’.51 
Since late June onwards, it became more difficult for Britain to show its 
pro-Israeli stance as the Israelis revealed that they were reluctant to move 
towards peace. Firstly, even though the American as well as British officials 
in Tel-Aviv were going to reconcile a covert Israeli-Jordanian talk in early 
July, the Israelis refused to give Hussein any clear indications of their 
intentions regarding the future of the occupied territories in the West 
Bank.52 Secondly and more importantly, Israel publicly annexed the Arab 
part of Jerusalem on 30 June. This was opposed to what the Israeli Foreign 
Minister Abba Eban had assured George Brown: Eban claimed that Israel 
would ‘unify the city’ at ‘practical level’ ‘without annexing it’.53 Israel’s 
declaration of the annexation eventually resulted in Hussein’s refusal to 
enter into negotiations with Israel. Under this condition, Hussein could not 
gain support from President Nasser. The British Ambassador to Jordan, 
Phillip Adams, opined that ‘it is the return of Jerusalem that they [the 
Jordanians] are after and that the West Bank is of secondary importance’,54 
and in this respect, it was the Israelis who ruined the negotiations. In short, 
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Wilson’s view, namely that once the Israelis could secure their borders, they 
would be ready for peace, was now being questioned. 
The changing political situation in the Middle East shifted in claims in 
the House of Commons. On 31 May 1967, James Dickens, Labour MP, 
stressed the importance of supporting Israel, and this was justified as Israel 
had fought against ‘the axis of Cairo and Moscow’. Duncan Sandys, 
Conservative MP, and former Defence Secretary, also stated that the strife 
in the Middle East stemmed from ‘the struggle for power within the Arab 
world’ and ‘Russia’s desire to secure a dominant influence in the Middle 
East’. And consequently, it was important for Britain to support Israel. 
Their statements seemed to be applauded while Labour MP Margaret 
McKay’s campaign for Palestinian refugees was totally ignored. 55 
Nevertheless, on 7 July, Douglas Alec-Home, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, 
recognised that ‘there has been a general feeling in the House that the 
course of the recent momentous events in the Middle East should be 
reviewed by hon. Members’. Indeed Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
George Thomson’s remark that: 
 
 ‘we have been able to maintain our links with the majority of Arab 
Governments, and our differences with certain other Arab 
Governments, who have not maintained relations with us, have not 
been of our own making. We would like to have good relations with 
these centuries. We wish them and their people well. We can 
sympathise with and try to understand their aspirations and desires 
for a better social order within their own countries’ 
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online: 
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was largely supported by House. Francis Noel-Baker, Labour MP, J. 
Grimond, the Leader of Liberals, and Will Griffiths, Labour MP, went so far 
as to insist on the possibility of restoring friendship with Nasser.56 
Given the change in political situation as well as the atmosphere in House, 
the Cabinet therefore sought a similar strategy to that of the French 
president, Charles de Gaulle, in adopting a policy of non-alignment. This 
strategy prevented France from being identified as being on either side of 
the conflict. Indeed, France was never criticised as an Israeli supporter 
despite the fact that the Israelis won victory due to forces mostly armed by 
the French.57 
In practice, the Cabinet took a two-fold policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. On the one hand, the Cabinet condemned Israel in order to appease 
the Arab states.58 This resulted in George Brown’s speech at the United 
Nations General Assembly, in which he accused Israel of the annexation of 
East Jerusalem, demanding its withdrawal from the occupied territories, as 
well as an immediate solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.59 For the 
Secretary-General of Mapai (Israeli political party), Golda Meir, Brown’s 
speech was equivalent to that of ‘Judas’.60 
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On the other hand, the Cabinet did nothing to push the Israelis to 
withdraw from the occupied land. The Cabinet was, in fact, satisfied with 
the current balance of power in the Middle East, which was sustained by the 
American-Israeli coalition. Indeed, even though Britain tried to be congenial 
to the Arab states in public, Eban recognised that Britain ‘privately’ 
supported Israel’s impossibility of retreat.61 In a similar vein, the United 
States perceived that ‘the UK is the itchiest of all since the Canal’s 
continued closure is costing Wilson—and Britain—a great deal’, and thus 
understood the necessity of Britain’s ostensible pro-Arab stance.62 Britain 
only hoped not to be judged as being on the Israeli side. Cabinet members 
surely recognised Britain’s diminishing power, even though they had yet to 
decide on a withdrawal from the East of Suez at this stage. They therefore 
concluded that it was not Britain but the superpowers that would be able to 
force the related parties to sit down at the negotiation table.63 This thinking, 
again, resulted in Britain’s low-profile policy during the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Three reasons could be provided to demonstrate why was the Wilson 
government so reluctant to arbitrate the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first 
reason emanated from Britain’s wish to contain the Soviet influence in the 
Middle East. The balance of power in favour of Israel was beneficial to 
Britain in terms of maintaining political stability. As a result of the June 
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1967 War, Israel seemed to serve as a deterrent power, the role of which 
Britain used to act in 1950s. The power vacuum caused by Britain’s 
declining influence in the region was now filled with Israel’s power, 
enhanced with stronger military capabilities. Secondly, unlike Arab 
countries, Israel was regarded to be deserving of Western support. The 
Labour Party and the Israelis shared political values, which made the 
Cabinet members trust Israel’s ability to maintain political stability as well 
as its generosity to return the occupied territories to move towards peace. 
Thirdly, even though it turned out that Israel had territorial ambition, 
Britain was no longer an influential power in the Middle East to assume the 
required leadership to mediate the conflict. It was true that peace was the 
best way to serve British interests. However, it was also true that ‘the risks 
of accepting the status quo in the Middle East were reckoned to be smaller 
than the risks of upsetting it’.64 
In other words, peace was not necessary for Britain. Britain was satisfied 
with the status quo in the Middle East so long as the country’s political and 
economic interests were preserved. For Britain, the most significant aims 
were keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open, securing regular and cheap oil 
supplies, maintaining a large share of the oil industry in the Middle East, 
and encouraging Arab investment in Britain. In this respect, an interim 
settlement was important and this stance reflected on its contribution to the 
conclusion of the UNSC Resolution 242. Yet, one should indicate that 
Britain in fact realised that the flimsy contents would rather prolong the 
conflict. The British prioritised its own short-term interests over reaching a 
settlement that would provide a prosperity and peace in the region. In this 
respect, if one assumes that Israel’s invincibility and the clause of 
Resolution 242 made it even more difficult to achieve a lasting peace, Harold 
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Wilson’s Labour government’s policy might have caused one of the reasons 
why a lasting peace agreement has not been achieved in the Levant. 
Some scholars have tended to regard the Arab-Israeli conflict as a peculiar 
and unique regional conflict.65 It is true that the Arab-Israeli conflict has 
been characterised by the establishment and expansion of Israel, the 
emergence and decline of Arab nationalism, the development of Islamism 
and a series of terrorist activities originally emanating from the dismal 
state of the Palestinian refugees, which indeed makes the conflict 
exceptional. The author nevertheless contends that the intrusion or 
indifference of the major powers certainly exacerbated and prolonged the 
stalemate. 
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Since the 1980s, the study of woman’s history has made great progress in 
China. According to the Chinese scholar Wenming Liu’ statistics in 2003, 
between 1990 and 2001, there has been a total of 679 research papers and 
27 books on the history of women published by Chinese scholars.( p.1) In 
recent years, with the impact of new historiography, there has been more 
attention devoted to women’s history, and certain new characteristics are 
becoming clear. First, the research field has been expanded, ordinary 
women’s lives are considered more and more by many scholars, especially 
young ones. Second, new methods are being introduced, social-gender 
history has replaced traditional ways and encourages perspectives. Dr. 
Xiangmei Wang’s book The Study of the Medieval England Rural Women 
can be seen as the representative of this new trend. 
In the Introduction, Wang points out how problems existed in this field in 
China with an interesting comparison : “generally, the study of English 
women’s history was mainly confined to the upper class……,  about the 
period, the research was mostly limited to the modern ages…..,  and about 
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the topic, it normally concentrates on the feminist movement and 
employment problems…...” (p.2) From this point of view, Wang’s book can be 
seen as a response to these problems, her research period was defined to the 
middle ages and her subject to rural women, this is an useful compliment to 
Chinese current women’s history study. Professor Xu Hao affirmed the value 
of her book in the preface and said: "Wang’s book has made positive efforts 
to improve the women’s history study in China." (Preface: p. 6) 
 The main body of this book consists of five chapters. In the first one 
Wang examines the legal and political rights of rural women; The second 
focuses on their economic activities; The third mainly investigates the role 
of rural women in public life; In the fourth chapter Wang discusses the rural 
women's marriage and family; The last one describes women who are 
outside of the marriage. Setting the “women” in a wide and complicated 
social background and analyzing it from multiple perspectives is the 
primary feature of Wang’s book. So after Wang’s description the reader can 
easily get a general and vivid view of the social conditions of rural women in 
middle ages. In Wang’s general argument, medieval rural women were not 
totally passive although there were many kinds of limitations in their real 
lives, still “they played an important role in economic lives and also own 
certain legal rights. For most peasants’ families, there is more cooperation 
than oppression between men and women, and more harmony than violence 
between couples.”(p.31) Obviously Wang’s book repaints the traditional 
portrait of the medieval woman which describes them as the complete 
victim of masculine authority.   
Another important feature of this book is that Wang emphasizes the 
otherness of the research object, both the overall and internal 
characteristics of medieval rural women are considered. This is based on 
Wang’s understanding of the women’ concept, "women, which is never a 
kind of undifferentiated or immobile concept, but contains diverse groups, 
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and the social and natural attributes of its connotation change constantly " 
(p. 22) From the perspective of class and gender, “rural women” in medieval 
England had some basic commonalities. They all belonged to the labouring 
class and participated directly in various economic activities, this made 
them different from the noble women. At the same time, women as a whole 
were distinguished from men, their attribute as “the second sex” is 
especially obvious in the medieval society, as Wang said: "For women, 
gender is the primary factor affecting their social status. Because no matter 
to which rank they belong... their gender makes them lose lots of 
opportunities to participate in public affairs." (p. 127)  
 The differences within the grouping of rural women are also thoroughly 
described by Wang, and she thinks the rank and the marriage are two 
primary factors which effects the rural woman’s life. Because of her rank 
women as individuals encountered different economic conditions, social 
status and occupied different space. And to some extent, Wang shows, 
marriage also connected with women’s freedom. Normally married women 
owned minimum rights although they got more protection and security, the 
women who is “not in the marriage relationship”, such as the unmarried and 
the widow obviously enjoyed more independence. (p. 184)  
Overview, multiple perspective and the emphasis of inner diversity are 
two important features of Wang’s book, this also represents the new 
tendency of women’s history research away from the traditional way, so the 
“women “presented in her book have new characteristics. 
There are also some questions which are worth being further discussed in 
this book. Firstly, some issues put forward by Wang are not explored or 
explained enough. For example, in the Section 1 Chapter3 relating to public 
space and to the laws of rural women, the discussion of laws in public life is 
too simplified especially the common law, which is less than one page and 
its relationship with the village’ public life is not mentioned at all. A similar 
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problem also exists in Chapter4 regarding the relationships within the rural 
families; Secondly, the book lacks the diachronic investigation of the object. 
“Middle ages” is a complicated historical period which contains many stages, 
and in each stage the women’s living conditions change. So it is necessary to 
define the time and be aware of the changes caused by time. Thirdly, in the 
epilogue Wang points out: "The situations of medieval England rural women 
were also affected significantly by regional factor" (p. 231), but this book 
rarely considers the influence of the regional differences.  
Anyway, this is a valuable academic book, the author experiments with 
new method in the study of woman’s history, some of her views can be seen 
as an important compliment to the past research, and also useful to the 
continuing study.
 [Book Review] 
 
Angus Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture:  
‘Habits of Heart & Mind’ 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
 
 
 Keisuke Masaki* 
 
 
 
Angus Hawkins’s Victorian Political Culture is a brilliant book, offering a 
broad picture of British politics in the nineteenth century. It has two 
significant features. First, it reveals that ‘the enduring potency of partisan 
pasts, the moral purposes of politics, and the importance of the community, 
with implicit notions of status and hierarchy, were fundamental’ to Victorian 
politics (p. 387). These three concepts – the past, morality, and community – 
were employed not only by the Tories, the Conservatives, the Whigs, and the 
Liberals, but also radicals and the Socialists. 1  On British radicalism, 
Hawkins argues that, ‘Thomas Paine’s arguments for “the rights of man” in 
the 1790s and the Philosophic Radicalism of the 1830s, based on Jeremy 
Bentham’s Utilitarian philosophy, remained peripheral to the mainstream 
of patriotic political debate’ (p. 7). On British Socialism, he claims that, ‘It 
[British Socialism of the 1880s and 1890s] was also a call for moral reform, 
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1 In his previous book, British Party Politics (1998), Hawkins employed a 
different set of conceptions as consistent and fundamental to Victorian 
politics, which were the past and constitutionalism: see Angus Hawkins, 
British Party Politics, 1852-1886 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 6-7.   
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rather than proletariat revolution’, and goes on to state that, ‘The 
patriotism espoused by the Socialist movement also drew on earlier radical 
traditions – a partisan past shaping a moral community of support’ (pp. 
381-2). Victorian political culture, therefore, was shaped and underpinned 
by pragmatism and conservatism, rather than theoretical and ideological 
innovation, which was common in other European nations and in 
post-Revolutionary France in particular. By emphasising the values of the 
past, morality, and community, Hawkins challenges a dominant view in the 
existing literature that: ‘Victorian Britain is usually characterized as a 
Liberal age’ (p. 16).2  
  Second, Hawkins emphasises a shift of governmental frameworks in the 
process of democratisation in the nineteenth century: from a ‘mixed (form of) 
government’ to ‘parliamentary government’ and ‘party government’. In the 
long eighteenth century, between 1688 and 1832, the British polity was 
‘mixed government’ characterised by the sovereignty of Parliament, or the 
monarchy-in-Parliament. Hawkins claims that: 
 
In parliament ‘the estates of the realm’, King, Lords, and Commons, 
were brought together. By acting on each other in Westminster, they 
checked the usurpation of power by any one ‘estate’ and secured 
‘balance’ between the parts of the constitution. (p. 34) 
 
He also points out that: ‘In a convergence, rather than dispersal, of 
powers, parliament was the sovereign institution where the functions of 
executive, legislature, and judiciary merged’ (p. 35). In the process of the 
passage of the Reform Acts of 1832, ‘parliamentary government’ was 
                                                   
2  In his reply to Simon Morgan’s review, Hawkins claims that this book 
attempts to ‘offer some modification to the view of Victorian politics as 
expressive of liberal modernity and processes such as secularisation’: see 
Simon J. Morgan’s review of this book in Reviews in History (2016) 
(http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1943 [accessed: 27 April 2017]). 
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established, where the Commons possessed the power to make and unmake 
governments. After 1832, parliamentary parties became vital to the 
constitution. ‘Their purpose was to save the executive from a corrupting 
reliance on the prerogative and to insulate debate in Westminster from 
electoral dictate, preserving the sovereignty of parliament’ (p. 104). By the 
end of 1860s, two parties, Conservative and Liberal, came to dominate 
Parliament. Their alignment was cohesive, but fluid to a certain extent. 
They were mutable associations of like-minded opinion, and their affiliation 
was cemented by consultation and consent, not coercion. The Reform Acts of 
1867 and 1884 as well as other statutory acts concerning the parliamentary 
election, such as the Bribery Act of 1854, the Ballot Act of 1872, the Corrupt 
and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, and the Redistribution Act of 1885, 
prompted ‘parliamentary government’ to give way to ‘party government’. In 
the late Victorian period, when three out of five male adults had the vote in 
Britain and Ireland, party politics became more sophisticated. The power of 
party leaders was enhanced, and effective party discipline replaced the 
independent discretion of MPs. Westminster and the constituencies were 
tightly connected. National issues, rather than local concerns, made the 
difference between winning and losing in electoral contests. Parliamentary 
candidates who hoped for a successful contest relied on full-time 
professional party agents and permanent party organisations in the 
constituencies. The electorate became increasingly party-oriented: ‘the 
embryonic concept of the electoral mandate ... [was] the basis of the 
cabinet’s authority to govern, a ministry deriving its commission from the 
electorate’ (p. 302). ‘National parties, enjoying mass popular membership 
and centralized bureaucracies, were assuming the power to make and 
unmake governments’ (p. 320). In this process, the sovereignty of 
Parliament was eventually replaced by popular sovereignty. 
132 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 6 (2017) 
 
Hawkins’s argument is strong and convincing. It seems to me, however, 
that there are some points that he could have addressed in the book. First, 
while looking closely at parliamentary elections, he does not provide 
detailed analysis of party politics in municipal corporations in the Victorian 
era. Recently, historians have emphasised that municipal reform and 
parliamentary reform were closely connected in the early nineteenth 
century.3 In the aftermath of the passage of the Reform Acts of 1832 and the 
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, municipal contests were polarised 
along clear national party lines. Philip Salmon has identified ‘the crucial 
link between the municipal and parliamentary voter registration process 
and its merger of constituency and council politics’.4 It is regrettable that 
Hawkins does not investigate the extent to which and the way in which 
Victorian political culture identified by him can be seen in local municipal 
politics in the nineteenth century. The second point is about when a 
two-party system was firmly established in British political culture. In this 
book, he argues that: ‘For much of the period from 1832 to 1914 multiple 
parties were the norm in parliament and the constituencies’. He goes on to 
state that, ‘between 1832 and 1914, it was only the period from 1859 to 1874 
that conformed closely to such a simple binary two-party form’ (p. 385). In 
his previous book, British Party Politics, 1852-1886, however, he has 
claimed that: ‘Only occasionally since 1886 has British politics operated as a 
simple two-party system’.5 Probably, he has changed his opinion about the 
establishment of a two-party politics in Britain since the publication of the 
previous book in 1998. It might have been better to explain why and how he 
                                                   
3 Philip Salmon, ‘“Reform Should Begin at Home”: English Municipal and 
Parliamentary Reform, 1818-32’, Parliamentary History, 24 (2005), 93-113.  
4  Idem, Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties, 
1832-1841 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002), chapter 7, esp. 210. 
5 Hawkins, British Party Politics, 290. 
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has done so particularly to readers who are familiar with his analysis in 
British Party Politics. 
  These two criticisms, however, do not undermine the importance of 
Victorian Political Culture. As Anthony Howe points out, this book 
demonstrates that ‘political history matters’.6 According to Hawkins’s reply 
to the review done by Simon Morgan, the book aims to provide ‘a context for 
more specialised studies’.7 Frank O’Gorman, who has recently published a 
revised book on British politics in the long eighteenth century, shows a 
similar opinion.8 While emphasising the growing importance of cultural 
history, he argues that: 
 
I remain convinced that the development of political history, 
interpreted in the widest and most flexible manner, remains perhaps 
the most valuable of all approaches to the history of the long 
eighteenth century. That century, to me at least, is best treated, best 
studied and best understood within the context of a firm scaffolding of 
political history in its social, cultural and economic contexts. Many 
themes in cultural history, crime, law and popular culture, together 
with our fascination for representation and identities, embrace a 
continuing preoccupation with how power was exercised, upheld, 
defended and negotiated. And where power goes, the historian of 
politics should be prepared to follow.9  
 
These two recent books, one on the long eighteenth century and the other 
on the Victorian era, declare that political history matters to different 
historians in different fields. On the basis of significant insights offered by 
the two books, we can understand a modernising Britain much more fully. 
                                                   
6 Anthony Howe’s review of this book in History, 102:349 (2017), 152. 
7 See Morgan’s review in Reviews in History. 
8 Frank O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social 
History 1688-1832 (second edn., London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016). 
9 Ibid., xii. 
